Kitabı oxu: «A Constitution of the People and How to Achieve It»
ibidem-Press, Stuttgart
In tribute to my teachers
—past, present and future—
with particular gratitude
for my mother, aunty, and uncles
Contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
FOREWORD
INTRODUCTION
1. “A text about a text”: constitutions of Britain and Bosnia
1.1 Searching for the soul of a state
1.2 Overview of the British constitution
1.3 Overview of the Bosnian constitution
1.4 Comparative constitutional histories
2. “Look a shoot is sprouting”: measuring culture
2.1 Political culture in theory
2.2 Political culture in practice
2.3 Political culture applied to Bosnia and Britain
2.4 Problem of political apathy
3. “Going back to whence I sprang”: assessing apathy
3.1 A-systemic orientations
3.2 Anti-systemic orientations
3.3 Absence of interpersonal trust
3.4 Institutions as an explanation
4. “We’ve still not found a cure”: constitutional rules
4.1 Constitutional choice and change
4.2 Recurrent crisis and rarefied reform in Bosnia
4.3 Rising strain amidst weak reform in Britain
4.4 Reform dilemmas and deadlock
5. “We need to uncover lost paths”: modelling change
5.1 Modelling intransigence
5.2 Modelling the failure of reform
5.3 Modelling successful evolution in the short run
5.4 Modelling future co-operation and participation
6. “A text about hope”: lessons from Bosnia and Britain
6.1 Debate, deliberation and participation
6.2 Lessons for Bosnia and post-conflict societies
6.3 Lessons for Britain and pre-conflict societies
6.4 Pathways out of constitutional quagmires
BEYOND LAW, PRESCRIPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
AFTERWORD
APPENDICES
GLOSSARY
REFERENCES
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book would not have been possible without the conversation, counsel and guidance of a great many friends and colleagues who have added immeasurably to my understanding of politics, law and international relations over the course of my academic and professional callings. Our interactions have made writing this book enjoyable and highly rewarding.
I am very grateful to Professor Philippe Sands QC, Sir Geoffrey Nice QC, Baroness Helena Kennedy QC, Hon. Dr Brett Mason, Dr Valery Perry, and Margaret Owen OBE for their contributions to this book, as well as their critical thoughts and reviews. A much better book is the result.
I am indebted, in particular, to my friends and mentors: Helena Kennedy, Geoffrey Nice, Valery Perry, Kyrie James and Salim Ibrahim. They have often given up their valuable time, without asking for anything in return, to help resolve dilemmas and difficulties. In this case, they have extended their kindness to tackle seemingly intractable ones in Bosnia and Britain.
I would like to give thanks to a number of colleagues who contributed directly to the preparation of this book. Valery Perry is a leading scholar on Bosnian constitutional reform. Without her constructive, challenging and critical comments whatever nuance and distinction there is in this book would have been lost.
I was very privileged to have been taught, and encouraged in my thinking about Bosnian constitutional reform, by the late Zdravko Grebo. He never once suggested that conventional thinking might be the answer to elusive endeavours in pursuit of peace and justice. As one of the young leaders of the first mass protests in Yugoslavia, he inspired many a mind to stand upright, and without fear, in the face of powerful and insurmountable behemoths. I hope I am a worthy student.
I had insightful discussions about constitutions with Dr Kurt Bassuener, Professor Daniel Sewer, and Ewelina Ochab. Kurt Bassuener provided much food for thought drawing upon his many decades of experience and scholarship on the Bosnian constitution.
Dr Rachel Kurian and Alina Trkulja provided useful comments and direction as to the structure of my original thesis and Dr Mansoob Murshed, a specialist in game theory, helped develop the models adopted in this book through his feedback.
I received very helpful critical suggestions on either the proposal or parts of the draft manuscript from: Dr Miles Jackson, Mark George QC, Andrew MacDowall, Dalila Sadinlija, Kate Young, George Mitchell, Kerim Suruliz, and Natasha Jackson. This book, in style and substance, is much improved as a result. Among the kind readers of the manuscript was Patrick Page. As a master of the written word, he led me on a testing, but extremely rewarding, journey in questioning all my defaults as to style. I am grateful to him.
Lily Lewis, through a fortuitous turn of events, assisted me with some further research on political culture in Bosnia and Britain and contributed to those chapters. I had remarked to Lily, knowing she had no prior connection with Bosnia, that it was no coincidence that the Golden Lily happened to be the symbol of Bosnia. I hope this book, and Lily’s contribution, will help add to the corpus of knowledge on good political culture and its cultivation, growth and bloom in both Bosnia and Britain.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my colleagues at Ibidem Press who have been unfailingly kind, supportive and helpful from proposal to publication: Jakob Horstmann, Valerie Lange, Dr Soeren Keil, and Dr Jelena Džankić.
Although the suggestions and comments of these readers greatly improved the final manuscript, I alone am responsible for the interpretations appearing in this book and for any flaws, errors or omissions that remain.
Aarif Abraham
Garden Court North Chambers
Manchester, February 2021
FOREWORD
Fifteen years of involvement in international cases that followed the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or SFRY, made me acutely aware of the particularities of the constitutional situation that faced Bosnia and Herzegovina, the sovereign State which emerged from that collapse. It also left me cognisant of the apparent differences with the situation faced by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
I recognised that matters of history and politics, of culture and identity, will combine to weave distinguishable constitutional arrangements. Yet I also knew, not least from the research that went into my book East West Street, that a situation which exists at one moment in time can, within just a few years, change very radically. That was the case for the city of Lemberg, which had, in the late 1920s, a diverse and multinational population, but within two decades found itself with a totally different population.
As a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and then the SFRY, Bosnia was largely made up three majority communities—Bosnian Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox Christians. There were other minority groups too. As the SFRY dissolved, a violent conflict in Bosnia exposed all populations to such unimaginable horrors that—eventually and belatedly—the international community was catalysed into action. A ‘peace’ was negotiated, then concluded in 1995 at a military base in Dayton, Ohio. Out of this process a new constitution emerged.
Britain’s unwritten constitution, by contrast, is said to be ancient, one that establishes a parliamentary democracy that threads together the four ‘nations’ of Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The composite constitution goes back many centuries, through and beyond empire. It is said to be unwritten and characterised by a particular flexibility.
The differences between Bosnia and Britain appear stark. What might be learned from an exercise in comparison?
Bosnia’s constitution was imposed. It is codified, rigid, difficult to amend. The people had no direct say in its creation, on the basis that they harboured “ancient ethnic hatreds.” The constitution is seen by some to institutionalise divisions that many believe to be debilitating. It seeks to ensure a formal equality of the three main ethnic groups, with strict rules on elite power-sharing, which some consider to undermine the freedoms and rights of individuals. Aarif Abraham poses some important and searching questions about a constitutionally-imposed system of group segregation, one that arose in the context of international crimes. If the people of Bosnia do not harbour supposed ancient hatreds but have a political culture that is democratic, tolerant and accommodating, he asks, might another constitutional future be envisaged? What circumstances might cause the different groups and their elites to abandon this structure for a different one? Can the people of Bosnia truly control their own democratic destiny within the current constitutional straightjacket within which they now exist?
With its different model, Britain claims, by contrast, a high degree of constitutional longevity and slow evolution. Yet it has faced its own challenges, all the more so today, following its departure from the European Union and the real possibility that Northern Ireland and Scotland may, within the foreseeable future, leave the Union. Such a fundamental change to the system has not happened for 350 or so years, but new divisions and polarisations appear to be eating away at some constitutional fundamentals. There is contestation over devolution and independence of the four nations, as well as the various regions, over distributions of wealth and socio-economic entitlements, and in respect of human rights (and, it might be asked, who would have imagined, just a few years ago, that Scotland would be able to shut its border to visitors from England, in the face of a health pandemic?) Such developments cause Mr Abraham to raise other questions, equally significant. Has a practise of moderate constitutional tinkering put the entire structure at risk? Has there been a fracture in the delicate balance between executive, legislative and judicial power and authority? Can the British constitution resist the challenges of extreme nationalisms and populisms?
This important and original book seeks to unwrap these and more challenging questions. Mr Abraham embarks on a comparative exercise, one that contrasts what some view as a pre-conflict society (Britain), on the one hand, and a society viewed as having frozen and embedded a conflict (Bosnia), on the other. As readers, we are invited to reflect on a most fundamental issue of our times: the relationship between a country’s political culture and its constitution.
Mr Abraham sees the cultures of both countries as increasingly moderate and inclined to a broad and democratic political participation. He is maybe optimistic, or right. If he is right, the discrepancy between elite preferences and people’s preferences becomes acute, a space in which the constitutional rules will play themselves out, and the forces for change will be overwhelming.
Could Bosnia adopt some of the flexibilities of the British system? Mr Abraham imagines a revolving constitution, one that would subject existing constitutional arrangements to fixed and regular public debate, to the deliberation and approval of succeeding generations. Properly institutionalised, and with procedural safeguards, he argues, no one should be worse off. At best, everyone might have an opportunity for an enhanced constitution than is currently the case. He seeks a coincidence between the people’s and elite’s preferences.
In a certain sense, Britain already has a revolving constitution, one in which elites are regularly confronted with constitutional issues in the hurly burly of generational day-to-day of politics. Yet, Mr Abraham argues forcefully that some of the conventions, rules and practises that allowed fair and measured constitutional changes are no longer functional. On his view, Britain need not make its constitution as fixed and rigid as Bosnia’s in order to represent all of its communities. It can, however, imagine a more inclusive national debate and process of deliberation, and a four-nation settlement around a new constitutional statute, one that all of Britain’s people might have contributed to.
The book argues that a constitutional settlement owned by all the people will have a greater authority and stability. Mr Abraham offers no prescription on the content of a constitutional settlement but a road map as to how it may be achieved. As such, he succeeds in inviting us to think about our individual and collective roles in constitution-making. He encourages us to be more creative and careful. He asks us to reflect seriously about a people’s political culture, and to cultivate, maintain and enrich that culture so people can contribute to change the way in which they are governed. Such transformation, he argues, requires practice and action, and not just words.
Professor Philippe Sands QC
University College London & Matrix Chambers
London, January 2021
“Words abound in everything
So words are everything but everything is bound by words
For just one word we wait and pray
An ancient word from far away
But we have heard a new word
Verily we have heard a word so new
That be it but whispered the heavens ring”
- Mak Dizdar, The Stone Sleeper 1
INTRODUCTION
Britain has an almost unique constitutional position among States. It is a long-established democracy, comprising four diverse nations, with an uncodified, non-federal constitutional arrangement. The constitution itself is a miscellaneous collection of flexible conventions, norms and rules governing political behaviour. It cannot be found written down in a single place and some aspects of it are not written down anywhere at all. To the ‘outsider’, as well as the most intimate of ‘insiders’, it can be difficult or even impossible to comprehend. The current monarch of the United Kingdom, Queen Elizabeth II, is reported to have remarked that “the British constitution has always been puzzling and always will be.”2 While that may be the case, the constitution has endured for almost three and a half centuries without armed conflict threatening its core structure. The foundation on which the constitution is built goes back further still to the Kingdom of Athelstan, over a thousand years ago. That thousand-year period was punctuated by armed conflict and bloodshed. Even Britain’s recent history saw armed conflict at its periphery and within its imperial dominions. Its constitutional structure, however, has had an undeniable longevity and continuity.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, by contrast, is a relatively recent democracy with an ethnically diverse population (though perhaps less diverse than Britain’s).3 Bosnia emerged in 1995 from three and a half years of devastating inter-ethnic armed conflict. The Bosnian constitution is not in any sense conventional, drawn up, as it was, as Annex IV to the Dayton Peace Agreement.4 With the signatures of the war’s main protagonists, the Dayton Peace Agreement successfully ended the war that ravaged Bosnia following its declaration of independence from the former Yugoslavia.
Neither the Dayton Peace Agreement nor the Bosnian constitution within it, however, created the successful democratic and functioning State envisaged by its chief proponents.5 Instead, it set out complex procedures for governance that have institutionalised ethnic division and led to governmental paralysis. Bosnia, for instance, is composed of two devolved entities, three ‘constituent peoples’, and five layers of governance which, together, count among them a tripartite State presidency, two entity presidents, and fourteen prime ministers and governments.6 In a country of no more than 3.53 million inhabitants (AfS 2013), Bosnia has the highest number of presidents, prime ministers, and ministers per capita in the world. Such a proliferation has made streamlined and efficient government difficult (Belloni 2010, 99). The Bosnian constitution has no popular mandate and lacks any features that may allow future democratic legitimacy. It has been imposed on the people and like other constitutions created in—or mostly for—seemingly ‘divided societies’, it has proved immune from change.
Most written constitutions are a product of war or revolution and are imposed by political elites who do not formally consider the views of ‘their’ people, even if they occasionally invite them to ratify the new arrangements. The absence of popular participation is not always fatal to the working of a constitution, but it can be if the political culture of the people differs from these rules-that-create-all-rules which the people are then required to respect.
This book seeks to contrast the two very different models of constitutional design in Britain and Bosnia. They sit at very different ends of a spectrum. The comparison goes to the heart of what a constitution is understood to be. Is it imbued with meaning, culture and history and, as such, is the soul of a State and its people? Or is it merely a functional, abstract and prescriptive set of rules which create the practical environment in which the people go about their everyday business?
In Bosnia, abstract and prescriptive constitutional rules have real world consequences. The Bosnian constitution has maintained and reinforced ethnic division and led to governmental deadlock. There are critical aspects of the constitution that require reform and there has been no shortage of proposals for reform.7 All reform proposals since 2005 to amend the Bosnian constitution, however, have been driven by political elites and have failed. These failures are to the immense detriment of individual human rights,8 and amount to at a colossal economic cost to the electorate. Up to 55 per cent of the entire State budget,9 some 3 per cent of the country’s GDP, is spent on government administration, largely as a result of Bosnia’s highly complex system of government (PIC 2020). By comparison, the cost of the Britain’s central government administration is approximately 1.36 per cent of the State budget, some 0.5 per cent of the country’s GDP.10
Why has reform not succeeded? As this book will seek to show, efforts have been impeded by intransigent, narrow, and nationalist positions adopted by the political representatives of Bosnia’s three official ‘constituent peoples’: Bosniaks (Muslims), Bosnian Croats (Catholic Christians) and Bosnian Serbs (Orthodox Christians). These representatives sit in a number of constitutionally created institutions: the Parliamentary Assembly, the State Presidency and the two federal entities of Bosnia (Republika Srpska and the Federation). Intransigence is made possible due to vetoes, strict ethnic quotas and decentralised powers accorded exclusively to the three constituent peoples, all at the expense of such individuals or groups as are not specifically recognised by the Bosnian constitution. The constitution collectively and dismissively describes, although does not define, those not falling withing the three constituent groups as “Others” or “Citizens”. Others loosely comprise those identifying as “Bosnians and Herzegovinians” or those refusing to politically affiliate with any of the three constituent groups and the corresponding ethno-national political parties.
The Bosnian constitution was premised on the notion that the people, harbouring ‘ancient hatreds’, are divided, meaning that it is preferrable to leave decision-making in the hands of political elites.11 Meanwhile, experts warn about the latent desire of political elites for renewed armed conflict. In the international arena, powerful countries like Russia, China and Turkey are pursuing their own narrow self-interests in the Balkans and this has exacerbated local ethno-national competition. The economic and political manoeuvring of these powers demonstrates their intention to rescind the international communities’ guarantee to maintain the peace in Bosnia. In the domestic arena, ethno-nationalist elites in Bosnia are vying with each other for support in their secessionist ambitions by appealing to predatory neighbours, namely Croatia and Serbia. These international and domestic pressures are compounded by US dis-engagement from the region over the past decade. This has created a power vacuum in the region for other international actors to fill.
In Britain, the constitutional arrangements seem to have worked relatively well historically in maintaining stability and adapting to needed political as well as socio-economic change.12 The British constitution does not have a formal mechanism to give priority or permanence to one piece of legislation above another.13 This is generally true of statutes that have constitutional significance and means that, where political practice is accommodating and respectful of traditions, adapting the constitution in accordance with changes in society is evidently much easier. A number of recent crises, however, have put the constitution to the test. These crises include: the process leading to the UK withdrawal from the European Union (“Brexit”); constant appeals for secession from Scotland and Northern Ireland; the breakdown of centuries-old conventions as seen with the unlawful prorogation of Parliament by the Prime Minister in 2019; the placing of limits on Parliamentary scrutiny by the government; and a lack of adherence to important international norms and rules as seen by a sustained government campaign to dilute people’s human rights protections.14
On one view, these crises have all been resolved precisely because Britain has a flexible constitution and a sovereign, representative Parliament. The current government maintains that there are checks and balances between the branches of government, that human rights protections for the individual under common law go back centuries, and that arrangements for devolved and local decision making has ensured continued responsiveness to local needs. Ironically, the same government had planned radical changes to the British constitution because they believed changes were needed to address “trust” and a “destabilising and potentially extremely damaging rift between politicians and the people” (Conservative Party Manifesto 2019).
On another view, however, these recent crises have emanated precisely from a lack of formalised rules which could provide some clarity. The political opposition, for instance, characterise as ambiguous the arrangements for power distribution between institutions (horizontal power), power sharing between the central government and regional administrations (vertical power), and the human rights protections accorded to individuals under domestic legislation. Human rights legislation can be repealed by an express majority vote, as in the case of European Union rights post-Brexit and as the government has threatened with the European Convention on Human Rights.15 There have been calls for a far deeper entrenchment of constitutional rules in respect of some of the existing arrangements seen to be under threat. In respect of horizontal power distribution, there is said to be a strong case for institutional checks and balances on the executive through greater legislative and judicial scrutiny. In respect of vertical power distribution, this might mean securing a firmer statutory footing for the devolution settlements of three of the four nations of the United Kingdom. In respect of human rights, this would mean a permanent statute guaranteeing certain socio-economic, civic and political rights that cannot be repealed by a simple parliamentary majority. The debate has centred on whether it is finally time for Britain to codify and entrench its constitutional foundations as almost all other modern democracies have done.
What might Britain and Bosnia learn from each other, and what might other countries learn about the process of creating or amending constitutions by considering these two contrasting cases?
This book challenges the acceptance and proliferation of overly legalistic and/or entrenched constitutional models. Those models are largely characterised by abstract, prescriptive, and mechanical rules created in a single constitutional moment.16 They have gained almost universal acceptance in both developed countries and countries transitioning to democracy. But these models have sometimes created and reinforced the very divisions and polarisations that they were intended to resolve. If, however, the culture of the people is conducive to accommodation, trusting of difference, and democratically oriented, then introducing the capacity to change the constitution need not be feared.
In Bosnia, informed public participation and deliberation in a constitutional design process, on a fixed and repeated basis, with some procedural safeguards, could introduce a flexibility in political life in Bosnia that was, perhaps still is, present in long-evolved democratic polities like Britain. The capacity to change the constitution every new generation (a ‘revolving constitution’) could allow, with careful calibration, the possibility of catalysing evolutionary outcomes in the short run. Britain itself may be reminded of its own tradition.
Unlike Britain, Bosnia cannot afford to wait to evolve towards a new constitutional settlement. One unfortunate and very real pathway out of the current deadlock in Bosnia is collapse and the other is a return to violent conflict. If the people in Bosnia are much more accommodating than the ethno-nationalist political elites representing them, then the presumption upon which the current constitutional arrangements were built were incorrect. Furthermore, that presumption has helped to perpetuate a collective socio-economic and political malaise from which there is, seemingly, no escape.17
This book’s suggestions for reform are predicated on the fact, as demonstrated, that the people are accommodating, human rights oriented and tolerant. The political culture of the people in Bosnia is conducive to democratic reform. It is, contrary to popular opinion, open to popular participation and retains the capacity for inter-ethnic cooperation and engagement. One of the tests for this claim is whether or not there is evidence proving that political culture in Bosnia is as democratic as its close EU neighbours’ culture. If so, the second test is whether both Bosnia and Britain respectively have political cultures conducive to greater democratic participation. If they do not, then surely this needs immediate and critical attention. If they do, then the objective is to introduce context and an ear for justice into fixed and rigid legalistic constitutional documents by involving the people in key constitutional decisions.18 The aim, ultimately, is to reorient political life towards an inherently democratic political culture.
The current debate in Bosnia is on reforming the content of the constitution by tweaking or changing specific constitutional provisions. The paradox is that reform continues to be unlikely given the special constitutional guarantees accorded to the three constituent peoples. There are few incentives for political elites to compromise their intransigent positions. If anything, the reality is the opposite. Any attempt at reform by one group of elites is seen as an attempt to undermine one group at the expense of the other (at least that is how ethno-nationalist leaders present proposals for reform to their respective ethnic constituencies). It is a classical “beggar thy neighbour” problem. Political elites explain that this conflict, and their own intransigence, is because of the political culture. They claim to behave as they do in the name of ‘their people’ in their respective Bosniak, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb electoral silos. The irony is that the electoral silos correspond closely to ethno-territorial silos created by ethnic cleansing during the war. The same people indicted for international crimes, as a result of responsibility for the ethnic cleansing, were the principal negotiators of the Bosnian constitution.19
It has been taken for granted, by political commentators and academics alike, that conflict between elites in the constitutional structures of Bosnia is a mirror reflection of the latent desire for conflict within the population-at-large. The people of Bosnia are characterised as anti-democratic and pro-ethno-nationalist. Political apathy and deadlock within State institutions, therefore, are held to be a consequence of a lack of citizen initiative and will. A lack of will that emanates from an apparently intrinsic, non-participant political culture.
But this narrative is not supported by Bosnia’s variegated, multi-ethnic and thousand-year history. For much of their history, the Bosnian people have come under the strong influence of foreign powers depriving them of agency. Despite that, Bosnian history is, in fact, predicated on participation, accommodation and tolerance. This book will seek to show that the contrary view is not supported by the evidence including data relating to people’s political preferences since at least 1992. If the people are momentarily apathetic, intransigent, or intolerant, this is because that orientation is a consequence of the war rather than being endemic to the political culture. Later that orientation has been strengthened directly by the constitutional structure agreed—or rather imposed—by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Either way, this Dayton-driven emanation of poor political participation has no reason to remain fixed or unchanging. There is always a possibility for change where there is the capacity, as there is in Bosnia. Such change is imperative before it is too late.
24 Given the different paths Croatia and Bosnia have taken following the war and the relative political ‘success’ of Croatia the comparison is immensely useful in analysing variations, if any, in ‘culture’ and levels of apathy.
25 The World Values Survey is a global database for social scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life. The WVS has been carried out in close collaboration with the European Values Study and encompasses data of representative national surveys from ninety-seven societies around the globe, containing almost 90 percent of the world’s population. These surveys show pervasive changes in what people want out of life and in what they believe. In order to monitor these changes, the EVS/WVS has executed seven waves of surveys, from 1981 to 2019. Data set sources: World Values Survey 1981-2019.
26 A poem called “A Text About A Text” by Mak Dizdar [1917-1971] (2009, 71).
1. “A text about a text”: constitutions of Britain and Bosnia
1.1 Searching for the soul of a state
Constitutions have existed for time immemorial. Whenever groups of people have come together for political, social, or economic association, some form of rules, practices or principles have inevitably followed: a constitution of the people for some particular purpose. Rules, practices or principles would have helped people ascertain the terms of their association particularly where differential power dynamics existed among the group. The historical record shows differential power dynamics existed in much of Britain’s and Bosnia’s royal histories.1 There would have been a single monarch, his and sometimes her court, and then the mass of the people. In much of Bosnia’s and Britain’s early histories, differential power dynamics would have also existed between outside influences (such as invading rulers) and the indigenous peoples.
In Bosnia’s case, the major outside influences were Illyrian, Celt, Roman, Slav, Hungarian, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Yugoslav2 and, today, American. The outside influences were interposed by relatively long periods of independence. One such period, in particular, saw the rise of the Bosnian Kingdom (Banate or Banovina) and its associated Bosnian Church in the 12th and 13th centuries. In Britain’s case, the conquering or outside influences were Roman, Norwegian Viking, Danish Viking, Anglo-Saxon, and finally Norman. The Normans were the last of the major conquering forces who won control and, ultimately, assimilated into the English population.
As people’s associations, both internal and external, started to become more akin to communities, with repeated engagement and interaction, the relevant rules, practices or principles may have been written down. Very early in human history those written rules would have been on scraps of bone or skin or stone.3 The earliest known written rules in England are said to be that of Ethelbert of Kent believed to date from c.602-603 which was very early in the formation of kingdoms in England and long before we can talk of a Kingdom of England. In Wales, a type of Celtic law, the Cyfraith Hywel, was codified by Hywel Dda in c.942–950. In Scotland, the earliest preserved code of Scots law appears to be the Leges inter Brettos et Scottos, promulgated under David I (c.1124–1153). Equally, however, a great deal would have remained unwritten. The unwritten rules would have been in the thoughts and, more importantly, practices of men and women. Irish law, for instance, in origin, consisted of the accumulated decisions of the Brehons, or judges, who were guided entirely by an oral tradition developed from custom.
Constitutions of formal political communities were (and remain) not altogether different in nature to the rules, practices or principles formed whenever groups of people have come together for some economic, social or political purpose. Today, we might categorise these formal political communities in a hierarchical pyramid at the top of which sit ‘States’ as the predominant and pre-eminent form of political organisation. A State may be considered, loosely speaking, to be a formal political community bound by some geographical limits. A State in modern political parlance is often synonymous with the idea of a nation or a national community. It is sometimes thought, albeit not without controversy, that a nation can only truly manifest itself when it controls all the machinery of the State. This conception culminated in the post-1648, Westphalian idea of ‘nation-states’. By nation-states we mean that there is, or ought to be, some congruence between the perceived idea of the nation and the boundaries of the State. In practical terms, this means that group characteristics (such as race, ethnicity, language, or religion) which together constitute the nation come, or are brought, together as a formal political community.4 There may be one or more nations within a State and sometimes there may be none.
Within that context, we can locate the idea or concept of citizenship that may or may not coincide with other identities such as nationality or ethnicity (Džankić 2015, 7). Citizenship concerns the legal relationship people have with the State, giving rise to their rights and duties, as well as their emotional attachment to the State and their willingness to take part in the day-to-day functioning of the polity (Ibid, 5). This book concerns itself with States as the formal and formative form of political community.
Formal definitions of what exactly a modern constitution is differ greatly. Generally, we might understand a constitution of a State to serve three principal purposes. The first is to delineate the authority given to the State institutions or organs. A constitution thereby acts as a constraint on the power—as opposed to formal authority—of its principal institutions and, in particular, on the executive which functions as the government. The principal institutions are often the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. The second purpose is to set-out the basis for interaction between the State institutions and its constituents, the people. It is useful for a constitution to resolve the issue of the participation, or the representation, of the people within those institutions and whether that participation is to be formal or informal and direct or indirect.5 The third purpose is to outline the rights and obligations of the people vis-à-vis the State and in some cases their responsibilities. Responsibility can mean two things. Responsibility of the people to State institutions and people’s responsibility to each other via the machinery of the State itself such as its justice system. This three-fold typology for defining a constitution is relatively modern. The typology does, however, loosely model constitutions that were pre-modern.6
It is difficult to ignore that the terminology used to describe constitutions and their function are distinctly anthropomorphic. It is, however, not by chance that we have inherited such terminology. A constitution, for instance, we say, is ‘created’. Creation necessarily entails a maker and even, perhaps, a higher power. A power which somehow ‘births’ the foundational moment of the State, particularly a nation-state, into being. A State we say is ‘born’ and popularly, in the context of male-dominated power structures, it is perceived often as female on conception. Just as gender is socially constructed, the nation-state too is socially constructed. It incorporates ideas about ‘manhood’ and ‘womanhood’ (Yuval-Davis 1997). As such, a nation-state, in societies with patriarchal norms, is characterised as ‘feminine’ in nature. She is expected, as the ideal mother, to reproduce the nation with her children. In that process, the nation-state, sometimes, also impermissibly lays physical claim to women’s bodies which by inference are an extension of the nation-state.
A State which coalesces with the idea of the nation is seen to have boundaries around ‘her’ as well as her body politic (her sons and daughters). Both of these require protection from alien intruders which may infect, harm or penetrate the body (Duhaček 1997) and, therefore, the ‘organs’ of the State are mobilised for State-sanctioned violence. This violence in the cause of protection emanates, usually, from the ‘sons of the nation’ imbued with the rhetoric of loyalty, betrayal and sacrifice. They are, in turn, often led by a founding father who stands, all powerful, as the Godhead (Iveković 1993, 115-116, 120-122). In some instances, States have notably taken on board this almost religious iconography and conceived the birth of their State as immaculate in conception. The father figure, of course, co-opts, or becomes synonymous with, that higher power alluded to earlier. Sometimes the nexus between the dear father figure transforms the motherland into the fatherland. And then the power and control of the leader becomes tantamount with the power and control of the State itself over others.7
The ascribing of human characteristics to a clearly non-human thing goes to the heart of how a constitution is understood and perceived. The further one goes with the metaphor, the further one moves away from the idea of a constitution as an abstract or functional document simply concerned with rules and institutions. People ascribe such human characteristics to a constitution for myriad reasons, which are relevant to the issue of constitutional creation, design or change.
Is a constitution, to carry the metaphor yet further still, the soul of the body politic and, therefore, its real, pure and metaphysical core?
Is a constitution rather the skeleton providing some foundational structure to the body politic that allows the body to function but is, in and of itself, of no further dynamic utility?
Is a constitution perhaps the skin or the outward cosmetic form of the body providing a surface presentation, in a manner of speaking, of this more complicated and esoteric inner core? Or,
Is a constitution something disconnected from the body such as the environment within which the body may find function and meaning in order to truly manifest itself?
The metaphor, one might think, can be stretched to breaking point but scholars have alluded, or expressly considered, the constitution, over the centuries, to be each of these humanly things.
Aristotle was considering the nature of political association as early as the fourth century BC. For him, the formal cause of the city-state was its constitution (politeia). Aristotle defined the constitution as “a certain ordering of the inhabitants of the city-state” and the political community as “the form of the compound” (Politics, III.1.1274b32-41). He argued that whether the community is the same over time depends on whether it has the same constitution of the people which bring with them certain ideals, values and objectives (III.3.1276b1–11). The constitution, according to this formulation, is not a written document, but an immanent organizing principle, analogous to the soul of an organism. The constitution, therefore, is “the way of life” of the citizens (IV.11.1295a40-b1, VII.8.1328b1-2).
But the citizens in the Aristotelian city-state were those of the (minority) resident population who were privileged enough to possess full political rights (III.1.1275b17–20). Women, slaves, working-class men and non-residents were excluded. It was much like Britain until the movements for universal suffrage or the Britain of the colonies. It was only until the passing of the voting rights acts in the 19th and 20th centuries that most men and then women were granted suffrage. It was long after then that Britain granted to its imperial possessions in the British Empire independence and self-determination. A constitution, therefore, can include as well as exclude even when it is conceived of as the soul of a State.
An intermediary view has seen the constitution as much less esoteric and more akin to a skeleton around which the body politic is formed. Whilst the skeleton is intimately connected and indeed is critical for the functioning of the body, in day-to-day life it is not particularly relevant until things go wrong. On this view, political turmoil “can operate like an X-ray, lighting up the bones around which the body politic is formed. And we suddenly realise that we can no more live without a constitution as we can without a skeleton to support our flesh” (Stourton, BBC 2017). This view sees the constitution as far removed from the people but paradoxically inescapably close.
A somewhat different use of the metaphor is to consider the constitution as not human at all. Rather it is more analogous to the environment in which the critical human component of a State, the body politic, must operate. This strand of thinking is most prevalent in the modern age. The constitution in extremis is merely an abstract construction. An important abstraction but without very much relevance to the way people really live their lives. It is simply concerned with the form and function of government: the right to, and frequency of, elections; the provision of some basic human rights protections; and ultimately little else more. Constitutions are just the ‘rules of the game’ so to speak. Rules that only concern a handful of people at the top.
Discussions and indeed disagreements about constitutional creation, design or amendment go back to the very beginning of political action and thought.8 Broadly, discussions on constitutional design relate to two major aspects. The first aspect is whether the foundational moment of a constitution is an imposed legal settlement or a freely negotiated social contract upon which all members of society agree to govern their affairs. The second aspect is about content. Should a constitution include a link to important social or moral values, delineate the authority and powers of institutions, and provide for individual or group rights including representation in institutions? Some of these issues are resolved expressly at the outset and others are determined through time as a constitution becomes a ‘living instrument’. In taking either of those routes to a constitutional settlement, what is deemed essential to a constitution must necessarily come before what is the desirable content of a constitution. That is why the process of constitution-making becomes highly important. It is the sole concern of this book.
In terms of form and substance, therefore, constitutions can be as close to the soul of a State as one might want them to be. A constitution may reflect the social, cultural and moral virtues or norms of the people who expressly or tacitly accept the State, and the way it functions, as legitimate. And accept it they must if the State, bound by constitutional rules and norms, is to function properly. A constitution, however, may be devoid of any sociological or metaphysical basis if all it is considered to be is an abstract, prescriptive and instrumental document setting-up an environment in which any State or people may operate. Over time, an empty vessel may indeed be filled with something worthwhile should it remain intact. The question, however, of whether it remains intact and what exactly is worthwhile cannot be answered simply by gauging the political opinion of the majority at a particular snapshot in time through national elections. Longer term social, moral and cultural norms, collectively known as ‘political culture’, must be ascertained in a far more rigorous way if the process of constitution making is to be truly reflective, participatory and inclusive. This is where considering the British and Bosnian constitutions as well as the histories of their development is relevant.
1.2 Overview of the British constitution
The British constitution, famously, is not written or codified in any single document. Some elements are not written anywhere at all. Those unwritten elements are rather a product of experience, whether that was the experience of the monarch, the monarch’s government in Parliament, or the monarch’s counsel (as a pre-cursor to the judiciary). Over time, experience became custom and even later still hallowed convention until, of course, such time that the convention is dis-applied. Even the British constitution’s most important written elements—legal rules created by Parliament or by the courts under common law—may be unwritten just as easily as they were made. Parliament may repeal any previous Act of Parliament by simple majority vote. Important constitutional principles, however, may only be repealed if the intention to do so is made express by Parliament.9
It is a great strength of the British constitution that many important constitutional documents, particularly in relation to fundamental rights, have stood the test of time. They have remained on the statute books and have been faithfully applied by the courts. But that such fundamental rules or practices may not succumb to popular whims, prejudice or ‘transient passion’, as Turpin and Tomkins (2012) call it, is not guaranteed at all.
Certain rules or practices that most people might consider fundamental have been diluted by Parliament despite vociferous and principled opposition. These include the defendant’s right of peremptory challenge of jurors, or their right to silence when charged with a crime or the right to trial by jury. In each of these cases the right has either been expressly removed, diluted or abrogated by Parliament (Turpin and Tomkins 2012, 7).
In some instances, the courts, where they have had sufficient legal basis and authority, have declared such attacks on fundamental rights as incompatible with the British constitution. Famously, in the case of A v SSHD,10 the House of Lords held that indefinite detention without trial of non-British nationals, who were suspected of being terrorists, was contrary to right to liberty and security of the person because it discriminated against foreign nationals (contrary to Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) although it was not unlawful per se. Following a tradition of judicial conservatism and considering the sovereignty of Parliament over all other institutions, the majority did not rule on whether the government was right to derogate from the ECHR (under Art. 15) on the basis that there was a ‘threat to the life of the nation’ allowing such derogation. The judges were careful to implicitly acknowledge that they are unelected and must not make or be seen to make policy. Lord Hoffman, in a stinging dissent in the case, argued that the power of indefinite detention was fundamentally contrary to the British constitution because it was both unlawful and there was an impermissible derogation from the ECHR:
“In my opinion, such a power in any form is not compatible with our constitution. The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the terrorists such a victory” (A v SSHD, para. 97).
The case of A v SSHD demonstrates the difficulty of interpreting constitutions as well as rights. Given the nebulous nature of the British constitution a helpful starting point would be to identify precisely what it is or means today, as precisely as is possible, before moving to consider its origins.
In simple terms, the British constitution is a miscellaneous collection of flexible conventions, practices and rules governing political behaviour. Britain is a constitutional monarchy which means it is a State headed by a sovereign who rules according to the constitution which puts at its centre a sovereign Parliament (Bogdanor 1997, 1). Britain and New Zealand are the only two constitutional monarchies in the world where the constitution remains unwritten. It might be more accurate to say the British constitution is ‘uncodified’ as large parts of the body of law that would ordinarily form the constitution is written down. Its written elements appear in the form of primary legislation, delegated legislation, common law precedent produced by court judgments, and government guidance. Britain is also only one of two States, proper, in the world which have unwritten or uncodified constitutions. Israel, Saudi Arabia and Sweden’s constitutions might also be considered as relatively uncodified although they do have significant Basic Laws comprising constitution-like fundamentals.
The British constitutional arrangement, with Parliament at its centre, has endured for over 350 years since the ‘Glorious’ or ‘Bloodless’ Revolution of 1688-1689. The origins of parliamentary sovereignty lie in the Bill of Rights 1688 and the Coronation Oaths Act 1689. Whilst the constitution has remained in place, Britain’s underlying institutional structure has undergone gradual change as have the nations which comprise the ‘United Kingdom’. Britain today comprises four nations—England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—which are held together in an uncodified, non-federal arrangement. There is no legal document in Britain identifying the country as ‘a State’ to which rules and principles can be ascribed or attributed. Historically, its public law has developed from interaction between parties arguing in the courts over what are the responsibilities of government over something in the public realm (as opposed to disagreements between private persons) (Turpin and Tomkins 2012, 12-13). The nature, extent and reach of the State, and its officials, organs and bodies, has developed over time. Not unlike Britain’s democracy this development has been in a partial and piecemeal fashion.11 Britain though is undoubtedly recognised as a State under international law.
Britain’s political institutions are constituted as follows. The executive is comprised of a Prime Minister and Ministers from the majority party who sit in ‘Cabinet’ as Her Majesty’s Government. They run the administration of the State supported by an a-political and professionalised bureaucracy called the Civil Service. The party with the next largest majority forms Her Majesty’s Opposition. Parliament is the legislative body which has the power to make and un-make any law it wishes through primary legislation—Acts of Parliament—or related delegated legislation such as regulations, instruments and orders in council. Parliament is supreme over all other sources of law and indeed the monarch herself. Parliament has two chambers: an unelected upper chamber, the House of Lords, and the elected lower chamber, the House of Commons. Parliament creates law and the monarch is expected to adhere to it and has been expected to since the late seventeenth century. The judiciary is composed of judges who, since 2006, have been appointed by an a-political commission. Courts adjudicate on private disputes between legal persons as well as public disputes between the government and its citizens by way of judicial review and/or application of domestic or international human rights law incorporated into domestic legislation. Judges are also an important source of uncodified ‘common law’ which they create by applying or interpreting past precedent or creating new precedents where past practice is not instructive. The institutional structure under the British constitution mirrors the ‘separation of powers’ principle. That principle is often a formal feature of presidential and other modern systems of government: ensuring a strict division between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. In reality, however, the British system may be better characterised as having a fusion of powers which are, in theory, finely balanced—how finely and whether the scales have tipped in favour of one institution over another is an issue addressed in Chapter 4.
As Parliament is supreme, no Act of Parliament may bind a subsequent Parliament. No single piece of legislation, therefore, may be entrenched giving it priority over any other. It is for this reason that no legislation has a special, constitutional status, conferred on it per se. Some fundamental constitutional conventions, rules or laws, however, may only be repealed or abrogated, if Parliament makes its intention to do so explicit. A number of fundamental pieces of primary legislation may be identified, as have the courts over time, including:
Magna Carta 1215 (as amended and reissued in 1225)—set out that the sovereign is subject to the rule of law and provided some basic rights to free men including no taxes without common consent or imprisonment without cause.
Charter of the Forest 1217 (as amended and reissued in 1225)—now largely forgotten and superseded only in 1971, this instrument was a radical document on land rights. It was a statute that remained in force longer than any other in England (Standing 2019). It granted free men (commoners) access and use to increasingly vast royal landholdings and unlike the Magna Carta did not only deal with the grievances of the barons. It complemented and evolved from the Magna Carta.
Petition of Right 1628—reinforced two principles from the Magna Carta—no taxation without parliamentary consent and no imprisonment without cause. It prohibited quartering of soldiers or subjects, and abolished martial law in peacetime.
Habeas Corpus Act 1679—directed judicial inquiry into the legality of detention of a person.
Act of Settlement 1701—created judicial independence.
Parliamentary Acts of 1911, 1949—deprived the House of Lords of its absolute veto on legislation and allowed, in essence, delay rather than veto powers.
Crown Proceedings Act 1947—allowed civil actions to be brought against the Crown albeit with certain limitations.
Reform Acts of 1832, 1867, 1884—expanded the electorate of the House of Commons and made representation more democratic in that body.
Other Acts relating to voting rights in the 19th and 20th centuries—led to parliamentary democracy and universal suffrage (most men received the vote in the 19th century and women in the first half of the 20th).
European Communities Act 1973—UK became subject to European Community (EC) law.
Human Rights Act 1998—obliged public bodies to give effect domestically to the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”).
The exercise of identifying constitutional statutes is always fraught. Blaustein and Flanz (1992) offered a list almost 30 years ago which listed over 300 statutes. The most recent versions of Blackstone’s Statutes in Public Law and Human Rights rarely list more than 30 statutes out of over 100 that predate 1975 (Turpin and Tomkins 2012, 5). The difficulty of separating out party political issues and issues of fundamental constitutional importance is neatly seen in the issue of Brexit. David Cameron, who as Prime Minister called the referendum on membership of the European Union (EU) in 2016, did not appear to appreciate that Britain leaving the EU would generate a constitutional crisis. Neither did his party. His pledge to hold a referendum in 2013 was to see off the challenge from an increasingly popular UK Independence Party and influential critics of the EU within his own party (Emerson 2020, 100-103).
The withdrawal process from the EU, as the government has found, has put at risk peace in Northern Ireland, possibly hastened unilateral Scottish secession from Britain, and curtailed the fundamental rights of the British electorate. Cameron called, foolishly, and contrary to the British constitutional tradition of representative democracy, a crude and binary referendum (Emerson, 2020, xiii). A referendum whose outcome was said to constitute the “will of the people” but clearly could not if the people only represented, as they did in fact: only 37 per cent of the electorate once non-voters (27.8 per cent) were accounted for or 51.9 per cent as a simple majority of those who voted. It was only the third such national referendum, as it happens, in Britain’s entire history. The outcome of that referendum has seemingly jeopardised Britain’s constitutional underpinnings or may yet still. It is an issue further considered in Chapter 4.
The ‘Crown’ is the title given to the monarch as the Head of State and she is also the Head of the Church of England, Head of State for assenting countries within the Commonwealth of Nations, and Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The monarch’s constitutional role today is almost entirely symbolic although she nominally retains some residual powers of royal prerogative. These powers confer on her authority to take certain ‘privileged’ actions without requiring authorisation from any other institution. Prerogative powers are, in reality and by convention, exercised by the monarch acting through her Prime Minister and Ministers in Cabinet. She would almost never exercise those powers on her own initiative unless the circumstances were extreme and without precedent. That very remote possibility remains, and some had called for her to oppose the Prime Minister on some aspects of the Brexit withdrawal proposals as well as his advice on proroguing Parliament (Evans 2020). That was on the basis that although the Government had the confidence of Parliament (because no motion of no confidence had been passed under the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011) it did not preclude the Queen, by convention, in not following the advice of the Prime Minister if that conflicted with the express will of Parliament in the form of a Bill presented for royal assent i.e., in relation to refusing a particular form of an EU withdrawal bill (Bowen 2019). The monarch also exerts some indirect influence on the Prime Minister through her weekly private consultations, which occur as of right, with him/her.
The prerogative powers of the monarch are theoretically very expansive12 and have developed over time. They have undergone significant restriction in scope by Parliamentary convention or legislation including, for instance, expressly in the Bill of Rights 1689.13 The courts, under common law, have made clear that the Crown is subject to the law but is immune from civil suit or criminal prosecution. The prerogative powers today include all manner of actions including: conduct of foreign affairs including declaring war and peace; signing international treaties; annexing or ceding territory; grant or withdrawal of British passports; appointment of bishops and archbishops in the Church of England; grant of pardons or commutations in sentence; appointment of the Prime Minister—theoretically anyone the monarch wishes although he/she has always sensibly decided on someone who would be best positioned to command a majority in the House of Commons; royal assent to legislation passed through Parliament; prorogation of Parliament; and the calling and dissolving Parliament until those powers were set out in the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011.
Some prerogative powers are directly exercised by the Prime Minister, acting through Cabinet, without the approval of Parliament. In the past, this has included the powers of declaring war and peace, the issuing of passports, and the granting of honours. The Queen’s or relevant Prince’s consent, by convention, is required before Parliament can debate a bill affecting prerogatives or interests of the relevant Crown, such as hereditary revenue or personal property (Sumption 2020, 109). The Queen ordinarily grants or withholds consent on the advice of her Cabinet (Guardian 2013).
The power to declare war was exercised by the Cabinet in both world wars. Since then, the prerogative power has arguably been altered on the basis that Tony Blair sought symbolic and non-binding parliamentary approval for going to war with Iraq in March 2003; this has meant all subsequent Prime Ministers have sought approval. Notably, David Cameron failed to achieve support for air strikes on Syria in August 2013 and he honoured Parliament’s decision. A new constitutional convention has, arguably, been created that requires Parliament to approve deployment of troops abroad other than in an emergency (Mills 2018). That new convention sits uneasily with the prerogative power to declare war, which in law rests squarely with the monarch as opposed to Parliament. Whether by practice that changes over time remains to be seen. In April 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May, launched airstrikes on Syria without parliamentary approval citing the ‘element of surprise’ and ‘national interest’. As it happens, President Donald Trump had warned President Bashar al-Assad of the incoming missiles four days before via the medium of Twitter (Kentish 2018; Peck 2018). In Britain, the lack of parliamentary scrutiny or consultation for armed action abroad reignited a debate about whether Parliament should formally legislate on such matters to provide clarity (HoC 2011; Mills 2018).
1.3 Overview of the Bosnian constitution
The Bosnian constitution—set out in Annex IV of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement—is a relatively short document comprising only twelve, mainly functional, articles and two annexes. It was drafted in the English language, which is not the official language of the country, and has never been officially published in Bosnia’s three official languages. The Bosnian constitution administratively divides Bosnia into two federal ‘entities’: the Federation comprising 51 per cent of the territory and Republika Srpska (RS) comprising 49 per cent of the territory, while reiterating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia as a whole. Both entities have their own constitution which are required to be read, and be in conformity with, the Bosnian constitution. There is also the self-governing independent district of Brčko. The district’s status was contested as each entity claimed it was theirs. Its ultimate status was settled by international arbitration.
The Bosnian constitution sets out the responsibilities of the institutions of Bosnia vis-à-vis the entities. Only certain exhaustive and enumerated powers are given to the State; all others are vested in the entities (USIP 2006, 3). The collective head of State, and the executive, is the three-member rotating Presidency comprising: a Bosniak and a Bosnian Croat directly elected in the Federation and a Bosnian Serb member directly elected in the RS. Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs constitute the three official ‘constituent peoples’ of Bosnia. ‘Others’ and ‘Citizens’ who are referred to in the Preamble to the constitution are left out of all of the substantive provisions in the constitution itself and are, therefore, excluded from the central governing structures. The Council of Ministers (“CoM”), acts as a de facto Cabinet government with one Chairperson. It is collaborative in nature and roles are divided among the three constituent peoples (although not exclusively so). Decisions by the CoM must be unanimous or be approved by the tripartite presidency. The legislature, the Parliamentary Assembly, is bicameral. The upper chamber, the House of Peoples, has 15 delegates: five Bosniaks and five Bosnian Croats chosen by the Federation Parliament and five Bosnian Serbs chosen by the RS National Assembly. It has equal power to the lower chamber, the House of the Representatives, making it unusually and uniquely powerful (Išerić 2016). Decisions of the House of Representatives require approval of a majority which must include one third of members from each entity. Only two thirds of members of the House of Representatives may emanate from the Federation. Any parliamentary decision can be declared destructive of a ‘vital national interest’ by a majority of one of the constituent peoples (USIP 2006, 3). International human rights law is directly incorporated into the constitution and the ECHR has supremacy over domestic law.
The Bosnian constitution was primarily drafted with a view to ending the armed conflict of 1992-1995. Secondary to the cessation of hostilities was the idea of a fully functioning and viable State that would regulate ethnic conflict and overcome the hostility (exponentially multiplied by the war) to the very idea of a multi-ethnic Bosnian State. Franjo Tuđman, President of the newly independent Croatia, and Slobodan Milošević, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”), both denied many times having control or being the minds behind the armed conflict in Bosnia14 yet both were key negotiators and signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement.15 As signatories, Tuđman and Milošević together on behalf of their respective States, agreed to act as guarantors of the Agreement vis-à-vis Bosnia.
Tuđman and Milošević, however, had no specific obligation to ensure compliance by the RS or the Federation (or compliance between them) except in respect of two Annexes seen as ‘critical’ for peace: the Agreements on Military Aspects and the Agreement on the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. That was important. Milošević was always very clear on the right of any Serb entity to have essentially a mandate to conduct foreign policy by having “parallel relationships”; Tuđman had helped negotiate a similar mandate for Bosnian Croats. As Bob Owen, a principal US peace negotiator, candidly revealed: “[..]it was quite obvious to us that he—although he never said secession—regarded that as a sort of slippery slope down which the Bosnian Serbs could slip into the hands of Serbia” (USD Jun 1996, 29). Whenever Milošević was challenged about whether he would ever push the Bosnian Serbs to secede he would always say he would not do it, but he would never commit to “giving up the right to it” (Ibid, 30).16 Tuđman and Milošević were not signatories to Annex IV, which was the Bosnian constitution, and had no commitments to protect it. Perhaps, that indicates the importance that was given to the future of Bosnia as a sovereign and viable State (Gaeta 1996, 156).17
In tandem with the cessation of hostilities, a specific objective of the Dayton Peace Agreement was the return of displaced persons and refugees18 to reverse the ethnic cleansing and territorial separation of ethnic groups that occurred during the armed conflict (Article II.5, Bosnian constitution and Annex 7, Dayton Peace Agreement). The wording of Annex 7, however, precluded complete unreserved return to pre-war homes; an inevitable outcome of negotiating with the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing. Displaced persons and refugees have, in practice, been unable to return to their pre-war homes and many remain in parts of the country to which they were displaced. Some of those displaced may now feel a sense of security around people of the same ethnicity; people who form a majority in the areas in which they have made their new homes (Kasapović 2005, 7). This feeling may reflect the fact that a consequence of attack can be defensiveness: “a desire to reify that aspect of the self that is being targeted” (Carmichael 2015, xiv).
The result was anticipated and, therefore, the Bosnian constitution allowed a human rights framework, as some form of protection, to be drawn up around the demographic realities that war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide had created (Toal and Dahlman 2011, 7).19 The viability and reconstruction of an independent democratic State has, accordingly, been severely compromised with almost one million out of the two million displaced (out of a population of four million overall) not returning to their pre-war homes. Bosnia’s legacy of ethnic cleansing has not been reversed to return it to pre-war ethnically mixed municipalities but neither has Bosnia been completely ‘unmixed’ into unchanging ethno-territories (Toal and Dahlman 2011, 9). Enough damage, however, has been done to challenge the legal, political and social continuity of a unified Bosnian State under the constitutional structure negotiated at Dayton.
Figure 1.3A—Ethnic composition according to the 1991 census—before the armed conflict—and ethnic composition according to the, contentious, 2013 census, by relative/absolute/two thirds majority and sub-divided by the 143 municipalities
Source: Bosnian Statistics Agency
Figure 1.3B—Bosnia by entity sub-division and by canton sub-division
Source: Bosnian Statistics Agency
Despite the new demographic realities that created the distinct ethno-territorial borders (see Figure 1.3A), the principles of group autonomy and power sharing were worked into the Bosnian constitution. By ‘power sharing’ Lijphart (2004, 96) denotes the “participation of all significant communal groups in political decision-making, especially at the executive level. ‘Group autonomy’ means that communal groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in areas of education and culture” (Ibid). The two aforementioned features are characteristic of ‘consociational democracy’. Consociational features, in favour of Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, are found in all the institutions of the State including: the Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly (House of Representatives and House of Peoples), and the Constitutional Court (See Chapter 4). In summary they include: decentralised asymmetric federalism to give wide autonomy to the two territorial entities; proportionality of representation of the three ethnic groups within the executive, legislature and judiciary; grand coalitions for the Presidency and Council of Ministers representing all major ethnic groups; and minority vetoes in the executive and legislature (DPA 1995; Bieber 2006; Keil and Hulsey 2013, 2020).
All territorial units in Bosnia, which largely coincide with electoral units (in the form entities, cantons in the Federation and municipalities in the RS), are based on ethnic criteria with the exception of two cantons in the Federation and the self-governing independent district of Brčko in Northern Bosnia (Keil and Hulsey 2020, 2). According to the most recent census in 2013, Bosnian Serbs make up 80 per cent of the population in the RS divided into 64 municipalities, Bosniaks have a significant majority in five of the Federation’s 10 cantons, and Bosnian Croats are a majority in three cantons in the Federation and are the larger of the two in the mixed Bosniak-Croat cantons. In the Federation, the 10 cantons are layered on top of 79 municipalities. In total there are 143 municipalities across the country. As shown in Figure 1.3A, the contrast between the ethnic homogeneity today with the very heterogenous population mix in the pre-war municipalities could not be starker.
1.4 Comparative constitutional histories
British constitutional history
The precise origin of the British constitution is somewhat nebulous as might appear the constitution itself to an outside observer. Both the constitution and its origins are bound up with myth, legend and reverence that is subject to competing interpretations and historical narratives. These narratives take a distinct flavour depending on the set of circumstances Britain as a State and Britons generally find themselves in. The politics of the day are hard to separate from issues of fundamental constitutional importance.
Depending on where a political commentator stands on a particular issue of the day, they will often wish for leverage from British constitutional history to uphold their claim in being right. That is true of those seeking to uphold traditional or conservative conceptions of the British constitution or, equally, of those preferring a more modern or liberal re-imagination of the constitution. The Magna Carta of 1215 is one such constitutional document, which just 10 years after its issue acquired a symbolism associated with liberty of the individual (albeit then, only for free men). The Magna Carta is readily marshalled today to uphold the view that ‘foreign’ human rights standards are not required to be incorporated into UK legislation because the British gold-plate, and always have, their own laws with better standards. ‘Look at the Magna Carta’ they say as they point to its now famous clause 40: “‘to no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.” That is notwithstanding that the Magna Carta had little to say about rights that are now recognised as universal (such as the rights to free speech, free assembly, freedom of religious belief) and offered no real means of redress when rights were infringed (other than possible war between the King and the barons). At the same time, others will say that international human rights standards are necessarily British as they derive from, and are specifically inspired by, British laws such as the Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights of 1689.20 Most importantly, discussions in the UK are framed around a generally legitimizing centre—the constitution—however nebulous it may appear to an outsider.21
Most historians have traced the origin of the British constitution to the Magna Carta of 1215.22 It was in 1215 when the first concerted attempt was made by major feudal landowners to force King John I to set out meaningful legal restrictions on his power and extract some concessions for the rights of individuals. Had he not acceded to the demands he faced the prospect of armed conflict (Hibbert 2010, 68). The Magna Carta required: consultation with the barons before imposition of new taxes; that every man be given a fair trial and be judged by his peers (other men); that no one be imprisoned without due process of law; and that the behaviour of royal officials was to be controlled (Loughlin 2013; Bogdanor 1997, 3-4).
By inference, King John I, an absolute monarch, was required to rule according to the law and take into account people other than himself namely the powerful barons and, increasingly, those lower down the wrung: knights of the shires, burgesses of the town and the gentry (Maddicott 2010, viii). The Magna Carta was almost immediately repealed by the King, but it was revived and amended a number of times particularly as the demands for money from the King came with increasingly greater demands for rights and representation (Hibbert 2010, 74). Not many years after, in January 1273, Parliament first met under King Edward I (1272-1307) with representatives from every shire and almost all major towns. Government by then was increasingly contractual between the royal and the provincial (Maddicott 2010, vii-viii). King Edward I, for instance, was criticised for failures in his crusades abroad and he received a grant of tax on condition that he confirmed the Magna Carta (as amended) and added three barons to his regular council (Maddicott 2010, 447). At the Parliament of 1295—known as the Model Parliament because it was more representative than any great other previously—even representatives of ordinary citizens of the towns were present although they did not attend with any enthusiasm. They knew that they were wanted for their money (Hibbert 2010, 78). Nevertheless, their power and influence gradually became more prominent and eventually was formalised in the creation of the House of Commons.
The other major constitutional milestone is identified as the Glorious Revolution of 1688. After the overthrow of the Catholic King James II, the Protestant King William III (William of Orange) passed the Bill of Rights 1689 in England and Claim of Right 1689 in Scotland. Both Acts provided for parliamentary dominance over the monarchy by altering the line of succession and protected some parliamentary rights and liberties to prevent royal abuse of power. A Convention Parliament met to declare that James II had abdicated as he had fled to France fearing for his safety. Parliament invited William of Orange and Mary jointly to the Crown, by Act of Parliament, rather than by the right of hereditary process. Parliament, inevitably, presented the alteration of the line of succession as continuity rather than change; James II’s son was declared illegitimate and, therefore, title naturally vested in William of Orange and Mary. Bogdanor (1997, 5) more accurately characterises this as a limit of royal power over Parliament rather than the citizen at large. William and Mary did not accept the Crown on condition that the Bill of Rights be passed but accepted it notwithstanding ‘their right’ to the Crown (Ibid, 6). The precedent, however, was set. The monarch now ruled with, and through, the consent of Parliament.
The Bill of Rights resulted from an earlier historical event: civil war between the Royalists supporting Charles I and the Parliamentarians led by Oliver Cromwell from 1642 to 1648. It was a war precipitated by Charles I’s belief in the divine rights of kings, his financial greed and his refusal to reform the church. Those issues led him to bypass Parliament and the rights of parliamentarians (Hibbert 2010, 127-128). The mid-sixteenth century period of flux remains significant as it marks the starting point of the longest continuous constitutional, legal and parliamentary culture in the world (Sumption 2019, x; Bogdanor 1997, 8). After 1689, the monarch saw a gradual decline in power brought about largely from the severe curtailment in his/her powers due to the expansive restrictions set out in the Bill of Rights. There was, as might be expected, huge push-back by the monarchy. There was the development of the ‘King’s Friends’ to influence the development of party politics in Parliament. The King bought Parliamentarians to support his own cause. But by the Reform Act 1832, the King’s power to determine policy was relegated to mere influence (Bogdanor 1997, 10). Ministers who had previously served formal roles as advisors to the sovereign later merely informed him of decisions that had already been taken (Bogdanor 1997, 15).
Despite the perceived significance of the Magna Carta, the origins of the British constitution have been shown to go back further still. Historians have shown that the roots of the English Parliament—a precursor to the British—go back to early Anglo-Saxon times. Bogdanor (1997, 2-3) has claimed that, even as far back as the Anglo-Saxons, succession to the throne was not just a matter of descent but in reality, was determined by the leading territorial magnates comprising of what was called the Witan—the council of the sovereign’s advisers—that retained a power to depose a sovereign who proved inadequate. Most would agree that such councils certainly played a large part in determining the royal succession even if they could not quite depose inadequate sovereigns (Maddicott 2010, 442). Maddicott (2010, vii-viii), in his magisterial account of the origins of the English Parliament, tracks the trajectory of the first truly national assemblies to the reign of King Aethelstan in 924 and documents their progression all the way to the deposition of Kind Edward II in 1327 which saw the parliamentary commons, from knights of the shires to burgesses of the town, fully engaged in a ‘great national act of State’. Maddicott (Ibid) persuasively argues that, at heart, the assemblies all stemmed from a relatively primitive practice: “a leader, usually a king, taking counsel with his great men”. These assemblies or Witans, a feature of Germanic political organisation, were used to confirm the accession of kings, adjudicate legal cases and give effect to royal policies and practices. These gatherings, albeit ad hoc and lacking institutional qualities, nevertheless rested on relatively broad political participation, making “them to a degree representative of peoples and places long before the days of elections and constituencies” (Maddicott 2010, 2). It was really only under King Aethelstan, following King Alfred’s attempt to unify and defend England against the Danes in the late ninth century, that royal control was imposed through development of local institutions (shires, boroughs, mints, ealdormen, sheriffs) and, critically, assemblies. These assemblies dealing with affairs of the realm were periodic, large in size, had continuity in formal attendees (which came from across the social, religious and political spectrum) and meetings were recorded by charter and decisions passed as legislation (Maddicott 2010, 4-5, 441-442). The seed was planted for the constitutional monarchy and the Parliament that was to follow: the ‘lineal descendant’ of the Aethelstan assemblies (Ibid).
This historical overview is, of course, to ignore the vast development of Britain under the Roman Empire until 410 when the Romans fully packed up and left; leading to complete civilisation decline and preparing the way for Anglo-Saxon invasions after a period of local Romano-Britain rule (Wood 2010). Even with the Norman conquest of 1066—which decimated the country—over time, some 150 years after the conquest, the assemblies of Aethelstan and specific features of its operation returned. One form in which it did was the Commune Concilium. Landowners’ obedience to the monarch was contingent on royal protection and the reintroduction of national taxation meant that some of the representational qualities of earlier Witans were reintroduced (Maddicott 2010, 444). Whilst absolute royal power still prevailed, William the Conqueror (1066) and Henry I (1100) had promised in their coronation charters to observe the laws of Edward the Confessor in return for obedience of their subjects (Maddicott 2010, 452). In no other European State, as Bogdanor (1997, 3) argues, did the local or provincial interest and royal government interests become so tightly enmeshed as they did in the couple of centuries following the Conquest.
The cursory overview of British constitutional history provided here, is not to suggest or imply any sort of evolutionary linear progression or the untrammelled march of rights and democracy in England and then, later, in Britain. The Magna Carta like any other charter, or bill or act was not entrenched, and parts were often expressly repudiated. Oftentimes it was completely ignored by powerful monarchs. The fact that the Magna Carta led directly to the beheading of the Charles I—who repeatedly bypassed Parliament and in 1629 decided to rule without Parliament entirely—shows precisely how far monarchs abused what were considered to be enforceable rules whether tacit or express in a charter. Monarchs purported to suspend legislation all the way up to the early 18th century (Loughlin 2013; Sedley 2013).
Charting the history of the English Parliament from 924 to 1327, Maddicott (2012, ix) notes that parliamentary history was far from steady or purely evolutionary but was “subject to happenchance at every stage”. What this book does attempt to show is that certain milestones in British history acquired a symbolism and the principles which were derived from them became entrenched by practice, custom and later still in accepted political culture. As Bogdanor (1997, 4) notes, the Magna Carta was used by Parliamentarians as a weapon against the divine-right theory of the Stuart Kings that led directly to the confrontations culminating in the Glorious Revolution. Sir Edward Coke claimed that the Petition of Right of 1628, which limited the royal prerogative, was derived directly from the principles of the Magna Carta: “enabling reformers to declare that it was they who were the genuine conservatives since they were acting in conformity with long-established principles” (Bogdanor 1997, 4-5). Even today, political stakeholders consider it worth their while to petition for change whilst identifying themselves with the institutions of State—symbolic or otherwise—and its interests.
Bosnian constitutional history
Bosnia, like Britain, has a rich and varied historical tradition stretching back to at least the 10th century. It was then when its name—without hyphenation or sub-division—is mentioned for the first time in writing, as a geographical entity, by an Eastern Roman Emperor, Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, in his work ‘On the Governance of the Empire’ (Malcolm 1994, 10). Bosnia is known for its breath-taking beauty and vastly diverse landscapes symbolised by mountain ranges, salt lakes, flood plains and virgin forests. It is not surprising, given its geographical richness and biological diversity, that it has been settled since, at least, the Palaeolithic age, and permanently since the Neolithic. Some of Europe’s oldest cave paintings (dating to between the 12th and 16th centuries BCE) are found at Badanj Cave, near the town of Stolac in Bosnia’s region of Herzegovina (Clancy 2013, 13). In recorded history, Bosnia, which would have formed part of Illyria, was taken over by the Romans in 168 BC. The region frequently switched hands between Byzantium and Rome in the centuries that followed. Christianity reached Bosnia in the seventh century following the work of Greek missionaries. Bosnia, whose then borders overlapped with those of Montenegro, Serbia and Croatia, was to remain ostensibly Christian until the 16th century when Islam began to be adopted en masse at the height of Ottoman rule (Carmichael 2015, 11).
Bosnia’s present borders are largely consistent with its administrative boundaries under the later period of Ottoman rule from the 15th to the 19th century. It had similar borders under King Tvrtko who secured independence from Hungary in 1353. Bosnia was occupied and administered by the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the 1878 Congress of Berlin through to WWI. In 1910, under the Austro-Hungarians, Bosnia’s first written constitution was promulgated; a constitution that expressly mentioned the Serbs, Croats and Muslims as the “native peoples” (IDEA 2016). On 4 December 1918, after the defeat of the Austro-Hungarians, Bosnia became part of the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, dominated, as the name suggests, by the Croats and Serbs (less so the Slovenes). A so-called ‘Vidovdan’23 Constitution, generally agreed between the Bosnian Muslim parties and Serbian radicals in 1921, initially allowed administrative autonomy. King Alexander, however, annulled it in 1929 and replaced it unilaterally with a new constitution in 1931. The country’s name was changed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in an attempt to develop a wider Yugoslav patriotism and to prevent, as he saw it, local ethno-nationalism to flourish (Džankić 2015). Bosnia retained a Parliament but no independent governance structure. After 31 January 1946 and until the armed conflict in 1992, Bosnia was one of six constituent republics of the communist regime of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (and then the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“SFRY”)) together with Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The constitution was largely developed from the Soviet constitution of 1936 and recognised five nationalities save for the Bosnian Muslims. Amended constitutions followed in 1952, 1963 and 1974 but it was not until 1963 when Bosnian Muslims were mentioned in the constitution alongside Serbs and Croats (IDEA 2016). It was only in the 1974 SFRY constitution that equal rights were stipulated for all nationalities living in the SFRY.
Bosnia’s religious and cultural milieu was one of its distinctive characteristics even as far back as its early royalist foundations in the 12th century (notwithstanding its shared heritage with its neighbours or its status sometimes as a vassal of foreign powers). The medieval Bosnian Church, for instance, was unique and regarded itself as the true successors of Saint Peter. It was seen as heretical by its dominant Catholic and Orthodox neighbours who vied with one another to wipe it out. It was said to present an existential threat to orthodox Christianity, but that was most likely a justification for other motives including annexation of territory.
Pulsuz fraqment bitdi.