Kitabı oxu: «The Life of Jefferson Davis»
PREFACE
In offering this volume to the public, the occasion is embraced to avow, with unfeigned candor, a painful sense of the inadequate manner in which the design has been executed. Emboldened rather by his own earnest convictions, than by confidence in his capacity, the author has undertaken to contribute to American History, an extended narration of the more prominent incidents in the life of Jefferson Davis. Whatever may be the decision of the reader upon the merits of the performance, the author has the satisfaction arising from a conscientious endeavor to subserve the ends of truth. In pursuit of the purpose to write facts only, to the aid of familiar acquaintance with many of the topics discussed, and to information derived from the most accurate sources, has been brought laborious investigation of numerous interesting papers, which his avocation made accessible. It is therefore claimed that no statement is to be found in this volume, which is not generally conceded to be true, or which is not a conclusion amply justified by indisputable evidence.
Nor is it to be fairly alleged that the work exhibits undue sectional bias. As a Southern man, who, in common with his countrymen of the South, was taught to believe the principles underlying the movement for Southern independence, the only possible basis of Republicanism, the author has regarded, as a worthy incentive, the desire to vindicate, as best he might, the motives and conduct of the South and its late leader.
Disclaiming the purpose of promoting sectional bitterness, or of a wholesale indictment of the Northern people, he deems it needless to dwell upon the obvious propriety of discrimination. Holding in utter abhorrence the authors of those outrages, wanton barbarities and petty persecutions, of which her people were the victims, the South yet feels the respect of an honorable enemy for those distinguished soldiers, Buell, Hancock, McClellan and others, who served efficiently the cause in which they were employed, and still illustrated the practices of Christian warfare. To fitly characterize the remorseless faction in antagonism to the sentiments of these honorable men, it is only necessary to recall the malice which assails a “lost cause” with every form of detraction, and aspires to crown a triumph of arms with the degradation and despair of a conquered people.
In his especial solicitude for a favorable appreciation of his efforts, by his Southern countrymen, the author has striven to avoid affront to those considerations of delicacy which yet affect many incidents of the late war. He has not sought to revive, unnecessarily, questions upon which Southern sentiment was divided, and has rarely assailed the motives or capacity of individuals in recognized antagonism to the policy of President Davis. Perhaps a different course would have imparted interest to his work, and have more clearly established the vindication of its subject. But besides being wholly repugnant to the tastes of the author, it would have been in marked conflict with the consistent aim of Mr. Davis’ career, which was to heal, not to aggravate, the differences of the South.
A large part of the labor, which would otherwise have devolved upon this enterprise, if adequately performed, had already been supplied by the writings of Professor Bledsoe. To the profound erudition and philosophical genius of that eminent writer, as conspicuously displayed in his work entitled, “Is Davis a Traitor?” the South may, with confidence, intrust its claims upon the esteem of posterity.
The author heartily acknowledges the intelligent aid, and generous encouragement, which he has received from his publishers.
January, 1868.
INTRODUCTION
ATTRACTIONS OF THE LATE WAR TO POSTERITY – MR. LINCOLN’S REMARK – DISADVANTAGES OF MR. DAVIS’ SITUATION – SUCCESS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH MERIT – ORIGIN OF THE INJUSTICE DONE MR. DAVIS – REMARK OF MACAULAY – REMARK OF MR. GLADSTONE – THE EFFECT THAT CONFEDERATE SUCCESS WOULD HAVE HAD UPON THE FAME OF MR. DAVIS – POPULAR AFFECTION FOR HIM IN THE SOUTH – HIS VINDICATION ASSURED
To future generations the period in American history, of most absorbing interest and profound inquiry, will be that embracing the incipiency, progress, and termination of the revolution which had its most pronounced phase in the memorable war of 1861. Historians rarely concur in their estimates of the limits of a revolution, and usually we find quite as much divergence in their views of the scope of its operations, as in their speculations as to its origin and causes, and their statements of its incidents and results. If, however, it is difficult to assign, with minute accuracy, the exact limits and proper scope of those grand trains of consecutive events, which swerve society from the beaten track of ages, divert nations from the old path of progress into what seems to be the direction of a new destiny, and often transform the aspect of continents, it is comparatively an easy task to reach a reliable statement of their more salient and conspicuous incidents. It is in this aspect that the Titanic conflict, which had its beginning with the booming of the guns in Charleston harbor in April, 1861, and its crowning catastrophe at Appomattox Court-house in April, 1865, will be chiefly attractive to the future student. As a point of departure from the hitherto unbroken monotony of American history, the beginning of a new order of things, the extinction of important elements of previous national existence, embracing much that was consecrated in the popular affections; in short, as a complete political and social transformation, an abrupt, but thorough perversion of the government from its original purposes and previous policy, this period must take its place, with important suggestions of theory and illustration, among the most impressive lessons of history.
The profound interest which shall center upon the period that we have under consideration, must necessarily subject to a rigid investigation the lives, characters, and conduct of those to whom were allotted conspicuous parts in the great drama. It is both a natural and reasonable test that the world applies in seeking to solve, through the qualities and capacities of those who direct great measures of governmental policy, the merits of the movements themselves. The late President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, avowed his inability to escape the judgment of history, and the bare statement sufficiently describes the inevitable necessity, not only of his own situation, but of all who bore a prominent part on either side of the great controversy.
Jefferson Davis confronts posterity burdened with the disadvantage of having been the leader of an unsuccessful political movement. “Nothing succeeds like success,” was the pithy maxim of Talleyrand, to whose astute observation nothing was more obvious than the disposition of mankind to make success the touchstone of merit. It is, nevertheless, a vulgar and often an erroneous criterion. What could be more absurd than to determine by such a test the comparative valor, generalship, and military character of the two contestants in the late war? Concede its applicability, however, and we exalt the soldiership of the North above all precedent, and consign the unequaled valor of the Southern soldiery to reproach, instead of the deathless fame which shall survive them. To such a judgment every battle-field of the war gives emphatic and indignant contradiction. History abounds with evidence of the influence of accident and of extraneous circumstances, in the decision of results, which, if controlled by the question of merit, as understood by the predominant sense of mankind, would have borne a vastly different character.
But, in addition to the disparaging influence of the failure of the cause which he represented, Mr. Davis has encountered an unparalleled degree of personal hate, partizan rancor, of malignant and gratuitous misrepresentation, the result, to a great extent, of old partizan rivalries and jealousies, engendered in former periods of the history of the Union, and also of the spirit of domestic disaffection and agitation which inevitably arises against every administration of public affairs, especially at times of unusual danger and embarrassment.1 The almost fanatical hatred of the Northern masses against Mr. Davis, as the wicked leader of a causeless rebellion against the Government of his country, as a conspirator against the peace and happiness of his fellow-citizens, and as a relentless monster, who tortured and starved prisoners of war, springs from the persistent calumnies of such leaders of Northern opinion, as have an ignoble purpose of vindictive hatred to gratify by the invention of these atrocious charges. Yet this feeling of the North hardly exceeds in violence, the resentment with which it was sought to inflame the Southern people against him, at critical stages of the war, as an unworthy leader, whose incapacity, pragmatism, nepotism, and vanity were rushing them into material and political perdition. Of popular disaffection to the Confederate cause, or dislike of Mr. Davis, there was an insignificantly small element, never dangerous in the sense of attempted revolt against the authorities, but often hurtful, because it constituted the basis of support to such prominent men as fancied their personal ambition, or amour propre, offended by the President. A misfortune of the South was that there were not a few such characters, and their influence upon certain occasions was as baleful to the public interests as their animus was malignant against Mr. Davis. Hoping to advance themselves by misrepresentations of him, during the war they persistently charged upon him every disaster, and do not scruple to impute to his blame those final failures so largely traceable to themselves. A patriotic regard for the public safety imposed silence upon Mr. Davis while the war continued, and a magnanimity which they have neither deserved nor appreciated, coupled with a proper sense of personal dignity, have impelled him since to refrain from refutation of misstatements utterly scandalous and inexcusable.
The distinguished English statesman,2 who, during the progress of the late war, declared that “Mr. Jefferson Davis had created a nation,” stated more than the truth, though he hardly exaggerated the flattering estimate which the intelligent public of Europe places upon the unsurpassed ability and energy with which the limited resources of the South, as compared with those of her enemies, were, for the most part, wielded by the Confederate administration. Nor, indeed, would such an estimate have been too extravagant to be entertained by his own countrymen, had the South achieved her independence by any stroke of mere good fortune, such as repeatedly favored her adversaries at critical moments of the war, when, apparently, the most trifling incidents regulated the balance. More than once the South stood upon the very threshold of the full fruition of her aspirations for independence and nationality. Had Jackson not fallen at Chancellorsville, the Federal Army of the Potomac, the bulwark of the Union in the Atlantic States, would have disappeared into history under circumstances far different from those which marked its dissolution two years later. At Gettysburg the Confederacy was truthfully said to have been “within a stone’s-throw of peace.” If at these fateful moments the treacherous scales of fortune had not strangely turned, and in the very flush of triumph, who doubts that now and hereafter there would have come from Southern hearts, an ascription of praise to Jefferson Davis, no less earnest than to his illustrious colaborers? At all events, it is undeniable that, as the Confederate arms prospered, so the affection of the people for Mr. Davis was always more enthusiastic and demonstrative. Only in moments of extreme public depression could the malcontents obtain even a patient audience of their assaults upon the chosen President of the Confederacy.
The people of the late Confederate States, whose destinies Jefferson Davis directed during four years, the most momentous in their history, are competent witnesses as to the fidelity, ability, and devotion with which he discharged the trust confided to him.
Their judgment is revealed in the affectionate confidence with which, during their struggle for liberty, they upheld him, and in the joyful acclaim, which echoed from the Potomac to the Rio Grande upon the announcement of his release from his vicarious captivity. As he was the chosen representative of the power, the will, and the aspirations of a chivalrous people, so they will prove themselves the jealous custodians of his fame. Be the verdict of posterity as it may, they will not shrink from their share of the odium, and will be common participants with him in the award of eulogy. There is more than an unreasoning presentiment, something more tangible than vague hope, in the calm and cheerful confidence with which both look forward to that ample vindication of truth which always follows candid and impartial inquiry.
That time will triumphantly vindicate Mr. Davis is as certain, as that it will dispel the twilight mazes which yet obscure the grand effort of patriotism which he directed. The rank luxuriance of prejudice, asperity, and falsehood must eventually yield to the irresistible progress of reason and truth. Bribery, perjury, every appliance which the most subtle ingenuity of eager and unscrupulous malice could invent, have been exhausted in the vain effort to make infamous, in the sight of mankind, a noble cause, by imputation of personal odium upon its most distinguished representative. Day by day he rises beyond the reach of calumny, and his character expands into the fair proportions of the grandest ideals of excellence. An adamantine heroism of the antique pattern; purity exalted to an altitude beyond conception even of the vulgar mind; devotion which shrank from no sacrifice and quailed before no peril, were qualities giving tone to the genius, which, wielding the inadequate means of a feeble Confederacy, for years, withstood the shock of powerful invasion, baffled and humiliated a nation, unlimited in resources, and in spite of disastrous failure, lends unexampled dignity to the cause in which it was employed.
CHAPTER I
BIRTH – EDUCATION – AT WEST POINT – IN THE ARMY – RETIREMENT – POLITICAL TRAINING IN AMERICA – MR. DAVIS NOT EDUCATED FOR POLITICAL LIFE AFTER THE AMERICAN MODEL – BEGINS HIS POLITICAL CAREER BY A SPEECH AT THE MISSISSIPPI DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION – A GLANCE PROSPECTIVELY AT HIS FUTURE PARTY ASSOCIATIONS – HIS CONSISTENT ATTACHMENT TO STATES’ RIGHTS PRINCIPLES – A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUESTION OF STATES’ RIGHTS – MR. CALHOUN NOT THE AUTHOR OF THAT PRINCIPLE – HIS VINDICATION FROM THE CHARGE OF DISUNIONISM – MR. DAVIS THE SUCCESSOR OF MR. CALHOUN AS THE STATES’ RIGHTS LEADER
Jefferson Davis was born on the third day of June, 1808, in that portion of Christian County, Kentucky, which, by subsequent act of the Legislature, was made Todd County. His father, Samuel Davis, a planter, during the Revolutionary war served as an officer in the mounted force of Georgia, an organization of local troops. Subsequently to the Revolution Samuel Davis removed to Kentucky, and continued to reside in that state until a few years after the birth of his son Jefferson, when he removed with his family to the neighborhood of Woodville, Wilkinson County, in the then territory of Mississippi. At the period of his father’s removal to Mississippi, Jefferson was a child of tender years. After having enjoyed the benefits of a partial academic training at home, he was sent, at an earlier age than is usual, to Transylvania University, Kentucky, where he remained until he reached the age of sixteen. In 1824 he was appointed, by President Monroe, a cadet at the West Point Military Academy.
Among his contemporaries at the academy were Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, Albert Sidney Johnston, Leonidas Polk, John B. Magruder, and others who have since earned distinction. Ordinary merit could not have commanded in such an association of talent and character the position which Davis held as a cadet. A fellow-cadet thus speaks of him: “Jefferson Davis was distinguished in the corps for his manly bearing, his high-toned and lofty character. His figure was very soldier-like and rather robust; his step springy, resembling the tread of an Indian ‘brave’ on the war-path.” He graduated in June, 1828, receiving the customary appointment of Brevet Second Lieutenant, which is conferred upon the graduates of the academy. Assigned to the infantry, he served with such fidelity in that branch of the service, and with such especial distinction as a staff officer on the North-western frontier in 1831-32, that he was promoted to the rank of First Lieutenant and Adjutant of a new regiment of dragoons in March, 1833.
About this period the Indians, on various portions of the frontier, stimulated by dissatisfaction with the course of the Government concerning certain claims and guarantees, which had been accorded them in previous treaties, were excessively annoying, and the Government was forced to resort to energetic military measures to suppress them. Lieutenant Davis had ample opportunity for the exhibition of his high soldierly qualities, cool courage, and admirable self-possession, in the Black Hawk war, during which he was frequently employed in duties of an important and dangerous character. During the captivity of Black Hawk, that famous Indian chieftain and warrior is said to have conceived a very strong attachment for Lieutenant Davis, whose gallantry and pleasing amenities of bearing greatly impressed the captive enemy. After his transfer to the dragoons, Lieutenant Davis saw two years of very active service in the various expeditions against the Pawnees, Camanches, and other Indian tribes, and accompanied the first expedition which successfully penetrated the strongholds of the savages, and conquered a peace by reducing them to subjection.
Though attached to the profession of arms, for which he has on repeated occasions, during his subsequent life, evinced an almost passionate fondness and a most unusual aptitude, Lieutenant Davis resigned his commission in June, 1835, and returning to Mississippi devoted his attention to the cultivation of cotton and to the assiduous pursuit of letters. Not long after his resignation, he had married the daughter of Col. Zachary Taylor, under whose eye he was destined, in a few years, to win such immortal renown upon the fields of Mexico. Living upon his plantation in great seclusion, he devoted himself with zeal and enthusiasm to those studies which were to qualify him for the eminent position in politics and statesmanship which he had resolved to assume. In that retirement were sown the seed, whose abundant fruits were seen in those splendid specimens of senatorial and popular eloquence, at once models of taste and exhibitions of intellectual power; in the pure, terse, and elegant English of his matchless state papers, which will forever be the delight of scholars and the study of statesmen, and in that elevated and enlightened statesmanship, which scorning the low ambition of demagogues and striving always for the ends of patriotism and principle, illumines, for more than a score of years, the legislative history of the Union.
The period of Mr. Davis’ retirement is embraced within the interval of his withdrawal from the army, in 1835, and the beginning of his active participation in the local politics of Mississippi, in 1843, a term of eight years. The diligent application with which he was employed daring these years of seclusion constituted a most fortunate preparation for the distinguished career upon which he at once entered. There is not, in the whole range of American biography, an instance of more thorough preparation, of more ample intellectual discipline, and elaborate education for political life.
The trade of politics is an avocation familiar to Americans, and in the more ordinary maneuvers of party tactics, in that lower species of political strategy which, in our party vocabulary, is aptly termed “wire-pulling,” our politicians may boast an eminence in their class not surpassed in the most corrupt ages of the most profligate political establishments which have ever existed. Statesmanship, in that broad and elevated conception which suggests the noblest models among those who have adorned and illustrated the science of government, combining those higher attributes of administrative capacity which are realized equally in a pure, sound, and just polity, and in a free, prosperous, and contented community, is a subject utterly unexplored by American politicians at the outset of their career, and is comparatively an after-thought with those intrusted with the most responsible duties of state.
The political training of Mr. Davis was pursued upon a basis very different from the American model. It has been more akin to the English method, under which the faculties and the tastes are first cultivated, and the mind qualified by all the light which theory and previous example afford for the practical labors which are before it. The tastes and habits formed during those eight years of retirement have adhered to Mr. Davis in his subsequent life. When not engrossed by the absorbing cares of state, he has, with rare enthusiasm and satisfaction, resorted to those refining pleasures which are accessible only to intellects which have known the elevating influences of culture.
Emerging from his seclusion in 1843, when the initiatory measures of party organization were in course of preparation for the gubernatorial canvass of that year and the Presidential campaign of the next, he immediately assumed a prominent position among the leaders of the Democratic party in Mississippi. At this time, probably, no state in the Union, of equal population, excelled Mississippi in the number and distinction of her brilliant politicians. Especially was this true of Vicksburg, and of the general neighborhood in which Mr. Davis resided.3 The genius of Seargent S. Prentiss was then in its meridian splendor, and his reputation and popularity were coëxtensive with the Union. Besides Prentiss were Foote, Thompson, Claiborne, Gholson, Brown, and many others, all comparatively young men, who have since achieved professional or political distinction. The appearance of Mr. Davis was soon recognized as the addition of a star of no unworthy effulgence to this brilliant galaxy.
The Democratic State Convention, held for the purpose of organization for the gubernatorial canvass, and for the appointment of delegates to the National Convention, assembled at Jackson in the summer of 1843. From the meeting of this convention, which Mr. Davis attended as a delegate, may be dated the beginning of his political life. In the course of its deliberations he delivered his first public address, which immediately attracted toward him much attention, and a most partial consideration by his party associates. The occasion is interesting from this circumstance, and as indicating that consistent political bias which, beginning in early manhood, constituted the controlling inspiration of a long career of eminent public service. The undoubted preference of the convention, as of an overwhelming majority of the masses of the Southern Democracy, was for Mr. Van Buren, and its entire action in the selection of delegates, and formal expressions of feeling, was in accordance with this well-ascertained preference. To a proposition instructing the delegates to the National Convention, to support the nomination of Mr. Van Buren so long as there was a reasonable hope of his selection by the party, Mr. Davis proposed an amendment instructing the delegates to support Mr. Calhoun as the second choice of the Democracy of Mississippi, in the event of such a contingency as should render clearly hopeless the choice of Mr. Van Buren. In response to an inquiry from an acquaintance if his amendment was meant in good faith, and did not contemplate detriment to the interests of Mr. Van Buren, Mr. Davis rose and addressed the convention in explanation of his purpose, and in terms of such earnest and appropriate eulogy of Mr. Calhoun and his principles as to elicit the most enthusiastic commendation.
So favorable was the impression which Mr. Davis made upon his party, and so rapid his progress as a popular speaker, that in the Presidential campaign of 1844, the Democracy conferred upon him the distinction of a place upon its electoral ticket. In this canvass he acquired great reputation, and established himself immovably in the confidence and admiration of the people of Mississippi.
This seems an appropriate point from which to glance prospectively at the political principles and party associations of Mr. Davis in his after career. Until its virtual dissolution at Charleston, in 1860, he was an earnest and consistent member of the Democratic party. To those who are familiar with the party nomenclature of the country, no inconsistency with this assertion will appear involved in the statement, that he has also been an ardent disciple of the doctrine of States’ Rights. The Democratic party and the States’ Rights party were indeed identical, when a profession of political faith in this country was significant of something ennobling upon the score of principle, something higher than a mere aspiration for the spoils of office. When, in subsequent years, to the large majority of its leaders, the chief significance of a party triumph, consisted in its being the occasion of a new division of the spoils, many of the most eminent statesmen of the South became in a measure indifferent to its success. Its prurient aspiration for the rewards of place provoked the sarcasm of Mr. Calhoun, that it “was held together by the cohesive power of the public plunder,” and the still more caustic satire of John Randolph, of Roanoke, that it had “seven principles: five loaves and two fishes.”
Nevertheless, in its spirit thoroughly national, catholic in all its impulses, for many years shaping its policy in harmony with the protection of Southern institutions, and with few features of sectionalism in its organization, it worthily commanded the preference of a large majority of the Southern people. To this organization Mr. Davis adhered until the inception of the late conflict, supporting its Presidential nominations, in the main favoring such public measures as were incorporated in the policy of the party, and he was, for several years prior to the war, by no means the least prominent of those named in connection with its choice for the Presidency in 1860.
It is no part of the task which has been undertaken in these pages to sketch the mutations of political parties, or to trace the historical order and significance of events, save in their immediate and indispensable connection with our appropriate subject. So closely identified, however, has been the public life of Mr. Davis with the question of States’ Rights, so ardent has been his profession of that faith, and so able and zealous was he in its advocacy and practice, that his life virtually becomes an epitome of the most important incidents in the development of this great historical question. His earliest appearance upon the arena of politics was at a period when the various issues which were submitted to the arbitrament of arms in the late war began to assume a practical shape of most portentous aspect. The address which first challenged public attention, and that extensive interest which has rarely been withdrawn since, was an emphatic indorsement of the political philosophy of Mr. Calhoun and a glowing panegyric upon the character and principles of that immortal statesman and expounder. Unreservedly committing himself, then, he has steadfastly held to the States’ Rights creed, as the basis of his political faith and the guide of his public conduct.
If it be true that the decision of the sword only establishes facts, and does not determine questions of principle, then the principle of States’ Rights will be commemorated as something more valuable, than as the mere pretext upon which a few agitators inaugurated an unjustifiable revolt for the overthrow of the Government of the Union. Nothing is more likely than that many who recently rejoiced at its suppression by physical force, may mourn its departure as of that one vital inspiration, which alone could have averted the decay of the public liberties. Practically a “dead letter” now in the partizan slang of the demagogues who rule the hour, since its prostration by military power in the service of the antipodal principle of consolidation, it will live forever as the motive and occasion of a struggle, unparalleled in its heroism and sacrifices in behalf of constitutional liberty.
There is little ground for wonder at the total ignorance and persistent misconception in the mind of Europe, at the commencement of the war, of the motives and purposes of the Confederates in seeking a dissolution of the Union, when we consider the limited information and perverted views of the Northern people and politicians respecting the nature of the Federal Government and the intentions of its authors. Naturally enough, perhaps, the North, seeing in the Union the source of its marvelous material prosperity, and with an astute appreciation of its ability, by its rapidly-growing numerical majority, to pervert the Government to any purpose of sectional aggression agreeable to its ambition or interests, refused to tolerate, as either rational or honest, any theory that contemplated disunion as possible in any contingency. In their willful ignorance and misapprehension most Northern orators and writers denounced the doctrines of States’ Rights as new inventions– as innovations upon the faith of the fathers of the Republic – and professed to regard the most enlightened and patriotic statesmen of the South, the pupils and followers of illustrious Virginians and Carolinians of the Revolutionary era, as agitators, conspirators, and plotters of treason against the Union. Upon the score of antiquity, States’ Rights principles have a claim to respectability – not for a moment to be compared with the wretched devices of expediency or the hybrid products of political atheism, to which the brazen audacity and hypocrisy of the times apply the misnomer of “principles.”
They are, in fact, older than the Union, and antedate, not only the present Constitution, but even the famous Articles of Confederation, under which our forefathers fought through the first Revolution. The Congress which adopted the Declaration of Independence emphatically negatived a proposition looking to consolidation, offered by New Hampshire on the 15th of June, 1776, that the Thirteen Colonies be declared a “free and independent State,” and expressly affirmed their separate sovereignty by declaring them to be “free and independent States.” The declaration of the Articles of Confederation was still more explicit – that “each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.” The Convention of 1787 clearly designed the present Constitution to be the instrument of a closer association of the States than had been effected by the Articles of Confederation, but the proof is exceedingly meager of any general desire that it should establish a consolidated nationality.
At this early period the antagonism of the two schools of American politics was plainly discernible. The conflict of faith is easily indicated. The advocates of States’ Rights regarded the Union as a compact between the States– something more than a mere league formed for purposes of mutual safety, but still a strictly voluntary association of Sovereignties, in which certain general powers were specifically delegated to the Union; and all others not so delegated were reserved by the States in their separate characters. The advocates of Consolidation considered the Union a National Government – in other words, a centralized power – to which the several States occupied the relation of separate provinces.
The famous resolutions of ’98, adopted respectively by the Virginia and Kentucky Legislatures, were the formal declarations of principles upon which the States’ Rights party was distinctly organized under Mr. Jefferson, whom it successfully supported for the Presidency against the elder Adams at the expiration of the term of the latter. With the progress of time the practical significance of these opposing principles became more and more apparent, and their respective followers strove, with constantly-increasing energy, to make their party creed paramount in the policy of the Government. A majority of the Northern people embraced the idea of a perpetual Union, whose authority was supreme over all the States, and regulated by the will of a numerical majority, which majority, it should be observed, they had already secured, and were yearly increasing in an enormous ratio. The South, in the course of years, with even more unanimity, clung to the idea of State Sovereignty, and the interpretation of the Government as one of limited powers, as its shield and bulwark against the Northern majority in the collision which it was foreseen the aggressive spirit of the latter would eventually occasion.
A common and totally erroneous impression of the Northern mind is that John C. Calhoun invented the idea of State Sovereignty for selfish and unpatriotic designs, and as the pretext of a morbid hatred to the Union. That eminent statesman and sincere patriot never asserted any claim to the paternity of the faith which he professed. It is true that, in a certain sense, he was the founder of the States’ Rights party as it existed in his day, and which survived him to make a last unsuccessful struggle to save first the Union, and, failing in that, to rescue the imperiled liberties of the South. During the eventful life of Mr. Calhoun the question of the relative powers of the Federal and State Governments assumed a more practical bearing than before, and his far-reaching sagacity was illustrated in his efforts to avert the impending evils of consolidation. He was the authoritative exponent and revered leader of the votaries of those principles which he advocated, but did not originate or invent, and sought to apply as the legitimate and safe solution of the circumstances by which he was surrounded.
Equally absurd and unfounded with the pretense, asserted at the North, of the novelty of the idea of State Sovereignty and its incompatibility with the spirit of the Constitution, was the charge so persistently iterated against Mr. Calhoun and his followers, of disunionism; of a restless, morbid discontent, which sought continually revenge for imaginary wrongs in a dissolution of the Union. To the contrary we have the irrefutable arguments of Mr. Calhoun himself in favor of the superior efficacy of the States’ Rights interpretation, as an agency for the preservation of the Union as it was designed to exist by its authors. So far from having an anarchical or disorganizing tendency, he, on all occasions, maintained that his theory was “the only solid foundation of our system and the Union itself.”
To this faith the public life of Jefferson Davis has been dedicated. For more than twenty years he sought to illustrate it in the realization of a splendid but barren vision of a time-honored and time-strengthened Union, consecrated in the common affections and joint aspirations of a people, now, alas! united only in name.
During the period of their public service together, Mr. Davis received a large share of the confidence and regard of Mr. Calhoun, and when the death of the latter deprived the South of the counsels of an illustrious public servant, Mr. Davis, though comparatively a young man, stood foremost as heir to the mantle of the great apostle of States’ Rights.4
CHAPTER II
RESULTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN 1844 – MR. DAVIS ELECTED TO CONGRESS – HIS FIRST SESSION – PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE – DOUGLAS, HUNTER, SEDDON, ETC. – DAVIS’ RAPID ADVANCEMENT IN REPUTATION – RESOLUTIONS OFFERED BY HIM – SPEECHES ON THE OREGON EXCITEMENT, AND ON THE RESOLUTION OF THANKS TO GENERAL TAYLOR AND HIS ARMY – NATIONAL SENTIMENTS EMBODIED IN THESE AND OTHER SPEECHES – A CONTRAST IN THE MATTER OF PATRIOTISM – MASSACHUSETTS AND MISSISSIPPI IN THE MEXICAN WAR – DEBATE WITH ANDREW JOHNSON – JOHN QUINCY ADAMS’ ESTIMATE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS
The Presidential canvass of 1844 was one of the most memorable and exciting in the annals of American politics. By its results the popular verdict was rendered upon vital questions involved in the administrative and legislative policy of the Government. The Democratic party was fully committed to the annexation of Texas, with the prospect of war with Mexico as an almost inevitable condition of the acquisition of that immense territory, desirable to the Union at large, but especially popular with the South, for obvious and sufficient reasons. But apart from the signal victory achieved by the Democracy, in favor of this and other leading measures of that party, the election of 1844 had an incidental significance, which the country generally recognized, in its final and irrevocable disappointment of the Presidential aspirations of Henry Clay. This canvass, too, has a peculiar historical interest in the demonstration which it gave of the real popular strength of the respective parties which had so long divided the country. Comparatively few temporary issues, of a character to excite strong popular feeling respecting either party or its candidates, were made, and there was a square and obstinate battle of Democracy against Whiggery, of what Governor Wise called the old-fashioned “Thomas-Jefferson-Simon-Snyder-red-waistcoat-Democracy,” against Henry Clay and his “American System.”
The canvass was remarkable not only for its duration and the ardor with which it was conducted, but for its unsurpassed exhibitions of “stump oratory.” The best men of both parties were summoned to the fierce conflict; and many were the youthful paladins, hitherto unknown to fame, who won their golden spurs upon this their first battle-field. Mr. Davis had borne a leading part in support of Polk and Dallas and Texas annexation in Mississippi. His services were not of a character to be forgotten by his party, nor did an intelligent and appreciative public fail to discover in the young man whose eloquence and manly bearing had so enlisted their admiration, such abilities and acquirements as qualified him to represent the honor of his State in any capacity which they might intrust to his keeping.
Of Mississippi it might have been said, as of Virginia, that “the sun of her Democracy knew no setting.” If possible, however, the State was more closely than ever confirmed in her Democratic moorings by the decisive results of the election in 1844. When Mr. Davis received the appropriate acknowledgment of popular appreciation in his election to the House of Representatives, in November, 1845, Mississippi sent an unbroken Democratic delegation to Washington. His associates were Messrs. Roberts and Jacob Thompson (afterward Secretary of the Interior under Mr. Buchanan) in the House, and Messrs. Foote and Speight in the Senate.
On Monday, December 8, 1845, Mr. Davis was qualified as a member of the House of Representatives, and from that day dates his eventful and brilliant legislative career. The Twenty-ninth Congress was charged with some of the gravest duties of legislation. The questions of the tariff, the Oregon excitement, during which war with England was so imminent, and the settlement of important details pertaining to the Texas question, were the absorbing concerns which engaged its attention until the provisions and appropriations necessary to the successful prosecution of the Mexican war imposed still more serious labors. The records of this Congress reveal many interesting facts concerning individuals who have since figured prominently in the history of the country. The fact to which we have alluded of the unusual interest which had been exhibited in the recent Presidential contest, doubtless had a considerable influence in the choice of members of Congress in the various States, and largely contributed to its elevated standard of ability.
The debates in the House of Representatives of the Twenty-ninth Congress, are unsurpassed in ability and eloquence by those of any preceding or subsequent session of that body, and upon its rolls are to be found many names, now national in reputation, which were then but recently introduced to public attention. Stephen A. Douglas, the most thoroughly representative American politician of his time, uniting to a more than average proportion of the respectability of his class, his full share of its vicious characteristics, politic, adroit, and ambitious, was comparatively a new member, and, at this time, in the morning of his reputation. R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, a statesman of sound judgment and accurate information, who based his arguments upon the facts, and reduced the complicated problems of governmental economy to the conditions of a mathematical demonstration, had not yet been transferred to the Senate. James A. Seddon, the safe theorist, whose study, like Edmund Burke’s, was “rerum cognoscere causas,” the acute dialectician, who, in his mental characteristics, no less than in his principles, was so closely allied to Mr. Calhoun, was, like Jefferson Davis, for the first time a member of Congress. Andrew Johnson was then a member of the House and at the outset of his remarkable career; and in addition to these were Brinkerhoff, Washington Hunt, Dromgoole, George S. Houston, and a score of others, whose names recall interesting reminiscences of the day in which they figured.
To a man of ordinary purpose, or doubtful of himself, the prospect of competition with such men, at the very outset of his public career, would not have been encouraging. But there are men, designed by nature, to rejoice at, rather than to shrink from those arduous and hazardous positions to which their responsibilities summon them. An attribute of genius is the consciousness of strength, and that sublime confidence in the success of its own efforts, which doubly assures victory in the battle of life. It was with an assurance of triumph, far different from the harlequin-like effrontery which is often witnessed in the political arena, that Jefferson Davis advanced to contest the awards of intellectual distinction. With the activity and vigor of the disciplined gladiator, with the gaudia certaminis beaming in every feature, with the calm confidence of the trained statesman, and yet with all the radiant elan of a youthful knight contending for his spurs at Templestowe, he pursued his brief but impressive career in the lower house of Congress.
As a member of the House of Representatives Mr. Davis rapidly and steadily won upon the good opinion of his associates, and the favorable estimate of him, entertained by his constituents and friends, was confirmed by his greatly advanced reputation at the period of his withdrawal from Congress in the ensuing summer. He became prominent, less by the frequency with which he claimed the attention of the House, than by the accuracy of his information, the substantial value of his suggestions and the easy dignity of his demeanor. His speeches, though not comparable with his senatorial efforts, were characterized by great perspicuity, argumentative force, and propriety of taste, and frequently rose to the dignity of true eloquence. They, in every instance, gave promise of that rhetorical finish, power of statement, unity of thought and logical coherence, which, in subsequent years, were so appropriately illustrated on other theaters of intellectual effort. Mr. Davis participated prominently in the debates upon the Oregon excitement, Native Americanism, and the various other contemporary topics of interest, which were then before Congress, but was especially prominent in the discussion of military affairs, the interests and requirements of the army, and the measures devised for the prosecution of the Mexican war. Upon the latter subjects his experience was of great practical value.
On the 19th of December, 1845, he offered the following resolutions: “Resolved, That the Committee on Military Affairs be instructed to inquire into the expediency of converting a portion of the forts of the United States into schools for military instruction, on the basis of substituting their present garrisons of enlisted men, by detachments furnished from each State of our Union, in the ratio of their several representation in the Congress of the United States.”
“Resolved, That the Committee on the Post-office and Post-roads be required to inquire into the expediency of establishing a direct daily mail route from Montgomery, Alabama, to Jackson, Mississippi.”
The occasion of these motions was the first upon which he occupied the floor of the House.
On the 29th of December, Mr. Davis spoke in a very earnest and impressive manner upon Native Americanism, which he strongly opposed, and on subsequent occasions addressed the House in favor of the bill to receive arms, barracks, fortifications, and other public property, the cession of which to the Federal Government, by Texas, had been provided to take place upon its admission to the Union; in favor of the proposition to raise additional regiments of riflemen; in opposition to appropriations for improvement of rivers and harbors; upon the Oregon question, and in favor of a resolution of thanks to General Taylor and his army.
The extracts from his speech on the Oregon question, and the speech in favor of thanks to General Taylor and his army, which is here given in full, are taken from the reports of the Congressional Globe. The intelligent reader will appreciate their real value, as to accuracy, without any suggestion from us.
On February 6, 1846, the House, having resolved itself into Committee of the Whole, and having under consideration the joint resolution of notice to the British Government concerning the abrogation of the Convention between the United States and Great Britain respecting the territory of Oregon, Mr. Davis spoke at some length, and in an attractive and instructive style, upon the subject before the House. A great portion of the speech consists of interesting historical details, evincing a most accurate acquaintance with the subject, and giving a clear and valuable analysis of facts. We have space for only brief extracts, which are sufficient to reveal Mr. Davis’ position upon this important question:
… “Sir, why has the South been assailed in this discussion? Has it been with the hope of sowing dissensions between us and our Western friends? Thus far, I think, it has failed. Why the frequent reference to the conduct of the South on the Texas question? Sir, those who have made reflections on the South as having sustained Texas annexation from sectional views have been of those who opposed that great measure and are most eager for this. The suspicion is but natural in them. But, sir, let me tell them that this doctrine of the political balance between different portions of the Union is no Southern doctrine. We, sir, advocated the annexation of Texas from high national considerations. It was not a mere Southern question; it lay coterminous to the Western States, and extended as far north as the forty-second degree of latitude. Nor, sir, do we wish to divide the territory of Oregon; we would preserve it all for the extension of our Union. We would not arrest the onward progress of our pioneers; we would not, as has been done in this debate, ask why our citizens have left the repose of civil government and gone to Oregon? We find in it but that energy which has heretofore been characteristic of our people, and which has developed much that has illustrated our history. It is the onward progress of our people toward the Pacific which alone can arrest their westward march, and on the banks of which, to use the language of our lamented Linn, the pioneer will sit down to weep that there are no more forests to subdue… It is, as the representative of a high-spirited and patriotic people, that I am called on to resist this war clamor. My constituents need no such excitements to prepare their hearts for all that patriotism demands. Whenever the honor of the country demands redress; whenever its territory is invaded – if, then, it shall be sought to intimidate by the fiery cross of St. George – if, then, we are threatened with the unfolding of English banners if we resent or resist – from the gulf shore to the banks of that great river, throughout out the length and breadth – Mississippi will come. And whether the question be one of Northern or Southern, of Eastern or Western aggression, we will not stop to count the cost, but act as becomes the descendants of those who, in the war of the Revolution, engaged in unequal strife to aid our brethren of the North in redressing their injuries… We turn from present hostility to former friendship – from recent defection to the time when Massachusetts and Virginia, the stronger brothers of our family, stood foremost and united to defend our common rights. From sire to son has descended the love of our Union in our hearts, as in our history are mingled the names of Concord and Camden, of Yorktown and Saratoga, of Moultrie and Plattsburgh, of Chippewa and Erie, of Bowyer and Guildford, and New Orleans and Bunker Hill. Grouped together, they form a monument to the common glory of our common country; and where is the Southern man who would wish that monument were less by one of the Northern names that constitute the mass? Who, standing on the ground made sacred by the blood of Warren, could allow sectional feeling to curb his enthusiasm as he looked upon that obelisk which rises a monument to freedom’s and his country’s triumph, and stands a type of the time, the men and event that it commemorates; built of material that mocks the waves of time, without niche or molding for parasite or creeping thing to rest on, and pointing like a finger to the sky, to raise man’s thoughts to philanthropic and noble deeds.”
It is well known that, upon this subject, there was considerable division among the Democracy. The effort to commit the party, as a unit, to a position which would have inevitably produced war with England signally failed. The country had not then reached its present pitch of arrogant inflation, which emboldens it to seek opportunity for exhibition in the vainglorious role of braggadocio. Mr. Davis, upon this and other occasions, significantly rebuked the demagogical clamor which would have precipitated the country into a calamitous war. His reply, on the 17th of April, 1846, to Stephen A. Douglas, who was among the leading instigators of the war-feeling in the House, is exceedingly forcible and spirited.
The following speech in favor of the resolution of thanks to General Taylor, the officers and men of his army, for their recent successes on the Rio Grande, was delivered May 28, 1846:
“As a friend to the army, he rejoiced at the evidence, now afforded, of a disposition in this House to deal justly, to feel generously toward those to whom the honor of our flag has been intrusted. Too often and too long had we listened to harsh and invidious reflections upon our gallant little army and the accomplished officers who command it. A partial opportunity had been offered to exhibit their soldierly qualities in their true light, and he trusted these aspersions were hushed – hushed now forever. As an American, whose heart promptly responds to all which illustrates our national character, and adds new glory to our national name, he rejoiced with exceeding joy at the recent triumph of our arms. Yet it is no more than he expected from the gallant soldiers who hold our post upon the Rio Grande – no more than, when occasion offers, they will achieve again. It was the triumph of American courage, professional skill, and that patriotic pride which blooms in the breast of our educated soldier, and which droops not under the withering scoff of political revilers.
“These men will feel, deeply feel, the expression of your gratitude. It will nerve their hearts in the hour of future conflicts, to know that their country honors and acknowledges their devotion. It will shed a solace on the dying moments of those who fall, to be assured their country mourns their loss. This is the meed for which the soldier bleeds and dies. This he will remember long after the paltry pittance of one month’s extra pay has been forgotten.
“Beyond this expression of the nation’s thanks, he liked the principle of the proposition offered by the gentleman from South Carolina. We have a pension system providing for the disabled soldier, but he seeks well and wisely to extend it to all who may be wounded, however slightly. It is a reward offered to those who seek for danger, who first and foremost plunge into the fight. It has been this incentive, extended so as to cover all feats of gallantry, that has so often crowned the British arms with victory, and caused their prowess to be recognized in every quarter of the globe. It was the sure and high reward of gallantry, the confident reliance upon their nation’s gratitude, which led Napoleon’s armies over Europe, conquering and to conquer; and it was these influences which, in an earlier time, rendered the Roman arms invincible, and brought their eagle back victorious from every land on which it gazed. Sir, let not that parsimony (for he did not deem it economy) prevent us from adopting a system which in war will add so much to the efficiency of troops. Instead of seeking to fill the ranks of your army by increased pay, let the soldier feel that a liberal pension will relieve him from the fear of want in the event of disability, provide for his family in the event of death, and that he wins his way to gratitude and the reward of his countrymen by periling all for honor in the field.
“The achievement which we now propose to honor richly deserves it. Seldom, sir, in the annals of military history has there been one in which desperate daring and military skill were more happily combined. The enemy selected his own ground, and united to the advantage of a strong position a numerical majority of three to one. Driven from his first position by an attack in which it is hard to say whether professional skill or manly courage is to be more admired, he retired and posted his artillery on a narrow defile, to sweep the ground over which our troops were compelled to pass. There, posted in strength three times greater than our own, they waited the approach of our gallant little army.
“General Taylor knew the danger and destitution of the band he left to hold his camp opposite Matamoras, and he paused for no regular approaches, but opened his field artillery, and dashed with sword and bayonet on the foe. A single charge left him master of their battery, and the number of slain attests the skill and discipline of his army. Mr. D. referred to a gentleman who, a short time since, expressed extreme distrust in our army, and poured out the vials of his denunciation upon the graduates of the Military Academy, He hoped now the gentleman will withdraw these denunciations; that now he will learn the value of military science; that he will see, in the location, the construction, the defenses of the bastioned field-works opposite Matamoras, the utility, the necessity of a military education. Let him compare the few men who held that with the army who assailed it; let him mark the comparative safety with which they stood within that temporary work; let him consider why the guns along its ramparts were preserved, whilst they silenced the batteries of the enemy; why that intrenchment stands unharmed by Mexican shot, whilst its guns have crumbled the stone walls in Matamoras to the ground, and then say whether he believes a blacksmith or a tailor could have secured the same results. He trusted the gentleman would be convinced that arms, like every occupation, requires to be studied before it can be understood; and from these things to which he had called his attention, he will learn the power and advantage of military science. He would make but one other allusion to the remarks of the gentleman he had noticed, who said nine-tenths of the graduates of the Military Academy abandoned the service of the United States. If he would take the trouble to examine the records upon this point, he doubted not he would be surprised at the extent of his mistake. There he would learn that a majority of all the graduates are still in service; and if he would push his inquiry a little further, he would find that a large majority of the commissioned officers who bled in the action of the 8th and 9th were graduates of that academy.
“He would not enter into a discussion on the military at this time. His pride, his gratification arose from the success of our arms. Much was due to the courage which Americans have displayed on many battle-fields in former times; but this courage, characteristic of our people, and pervading all sections and all classes, could never have availed so much had it not been combined with military science. And the occasion seemed suited to enforce this lesson on the minds of those who have been accustomed, in season and out of season, to rail at the scientific attainments of our officers.
“The influence of military skill – the advantage of discipline in the troops – the power derived from the science of war, increases with the increased size of the contending armies. With two thousand we had beaten six thousand; with twenty thousand we would far more easily beat sixty thousand, because the general must be an educated soldier who wields large bodies of men, and the troops, to act efficiently, must be disciplined and commanded by able officers. He but said what he had long thought and often said, when he expressed his confidence in the ability of our officers to meet those of any service – favorably to compare, in all that constitutes the soldier, with any army in the world; and as the field widened for the exhibition, so would their merits shine more brightly still.
“With many of the officers now serving on the Rio Grande he had enjoyed a personal acquaintance, and hesitated not to say that all which skill, and courage, and patriotism could perform, might be expected from them. He had forborne to speak of the general commanding on the Rio Grande on any former occasion; but he would now say to those who had expressed distrust, that the world held not a soldier better qualified for the service he was engaged in than General Taylor. Trained from his youth to arms, having spent the greater portion of his life on our frontier, his experience peculiarly fits him for the command he holds. Such as his conduct was in Fort Harrison, on the Upper Mississippi, in Florida, and on the Rio Grande, will it be wherever he meets the enemy of his country.
“Those soldiers, to whom so many have applied depreciatory epithets, upon whom it has been so often said no reliance could be placed, they too will be found, in every emergency renewing such feats as have recently graced our arms, bearing the American flag to honorable triumphs, or falling beneath its folds, as devotees to our common cause, to die a soldier’s death.
“He rejoiced that the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Black) had shown himself so ready to pay this tribute to our army. He hoped not a voice would be raised in opposition to it – that nothing but the stern regret which is prompted by remembrance of those who bravely fought and nobly died will break the joy, the pride, the patriotic gratulation with which we hail this triumph of our brethren on the Rio Grande.”
A striking feature of these two speeches, as, indeed, of all Mr. Davis’ Congressional speeches, is the strong and outspoken national feeling which pervades them. It is a part of the history of these times, that while Jefferson Davis eloquently avowed a noble and generous sympathy with his heroic compatriots in Mexico, a prominent Northern politician bespoke for the American army, “a welcome with bloody hands to hospitable graves.” When, a few months afterwards, the names of Jefferson Davis and his Mississippi Rifles were baptized in blood amid those frowning redoubts at Monterey, and when, upon the ensanguined plain of Buena Vista, he fell stricken in the very moment of victory, just as his genius and the valor of his comrades had broken that last, furious onset of the Mexican lancers, New England and her leaders stood indifferent spectators of the scene.5 Yet the same New England bounded eagerly to the conquest and spoliation of their countrymen, and the same leaders clamored valiantly for the humiliation, for the blood even, of Jefferson Davis, as a traitor and a rebel. Quosque tandem.
An interesting sequel of this speech was the debate, which it occasioned two days afterwards, between Mr. Davis and Andrew Johnson, now President of the United States. Mr. Johnson, who boasts so proudly of his plebeian origin, and is yet said to be morbidly sensitive of the slightest allusion to it by others, excepted to Mr. Davis’ reference to the “tailor and blacksmith,” warmly eulogized those callings and mechanical avocations in general, and took occasion to expatiate extensively upon the virtue and intelligence of the masses. Mr. Davis, whose language is clearly not susceptible of any interpretation disparaging to “blacksmiths and tailors,” disclaimed the imputation, saying that he had designed merely to illustrate his argument, that the profession of arms, to be understood, must be studied, and that a mechanic could no more fill the place of an educated soldier, than could the latter supply the qualifications of the former. Mr. Johnson, however, was resolved to seize the opportunity for a panegyric upon the populace, and no explanations could avail. The Globe reports this debate as, “in all its stages, not being of an entirely pleasant nature.”
As an appropriate conclusion to this sketch of Mr. Davis’ career in the House of Representatives, we quote the following extract from an interesting work,6 published some years since: “John Quincy Adams had a habit of always observing new members. He would sit near them on the occasion of their Congressional debut, closely eyeing and attentively listening if the speech pleased him, but quickly departing if it did not. When Davis first arose in the House, the Ex-President took a seat close by. Davis proceeded, and Adams did not move. The one continued speaking and the other listening; and those who knew Mr. Adams’ habits were fully aware that the new member had deeply impressed him. At the close of the speech the ‘Old Man Eloquent’ crossed over to some friends and said, ‘That young man, gentlemen, is no ordinary man. He will make his mark yet, mind me.’”
CHAPTER III
THE NAME OF JEFFERSON DAVIS INSEPARABLE FROM THE HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN WAR – HIS ESSENTIALLY MILITARY CHARACTER AND TASTES – JOINS GENERAL TAYLOR’S ARMY ON THE RIO GRANDE, AS COLONEL OF THE FAMOUS “MISSISSIPPI RIFLES” – MONTEREY – BUENA VISTA – GENERAL TAYLOR’S ACCOUNT OF DAVIS’ CONDUCT – DAVIS’ REPORT OF THE ACTION – NOVELTY AND ORIGINALITY OF HIS STRATEGY AT BUENA VISTA – INTERESTING STATEMENT OF HON. CALEB CUSHING – RETURN OF DAVIS TO THE UNITED STATES – TRIUMPHANT RECEPTION AT HOME – PRESIDENT POLK TENDERS HIM A BRIGADIER’S COMMISSION, WHICH HE DECLINES ON PRINCIPLE
The name of Davis is inseparable from those lettered glories of the American Union, which were the brilliant trophies of the Mexican war. In those bright annals it was engraven with unfading lustre upon the conquering banners of the Republic, and his genius and valor were rewarded with a fame which rests securely upon the laurels of Monterey and Buena Vista.
Jefferson Davis is a born soldier. Even if we could forget the glories of the assault upon Teneria and El Diablo, and banish the thrilling recollection of that movement at Buena Vista, the genius, novelty, and intrepidity of which electrified the world of military science, and extorted the enthusiastic admiration of the victor of Waterloo, we must yet recognize the impress of those rare gifts and graces which are the titles to authority. The erect yet easy carriage, the true martial dignity of bearing, which is altogether removed from the supercilious hauteur of the mere martinet, the almost fascinating expression of suaviter in modo, which yet does not for an instant conceal the fortiter in re, constitute in him that imperial semblance, to which the mind involuntarily concedes the right to supreme command. It is impossible, in the presence of Mr. Davis, to deny this recognition of his intuitive soldiership. Not only is obvious to the eye the commanding mien of the soldier, but the order, the discipline of the educated soldier, whose nature, stern and unflinching, was yet plastic to receive the impressions of an art with which it felt an intuitive alliance. This military precision is characteristic of Mr. Davis in every aspect in which he appears. There is the constant fixedness of gaze upon the object to be reached, and the cautious calculation of the chances of success with the means and forces ready at hand; a constant regard for bases of supply and a proper concern for lines of retreat, and, above all, the prompt and vigorous execution, if success be practicable and the attack determined upon. Even in his oratory and statesmanship are these characteristics evinced. In the former there is far more of rhetorical order, harmony, and symmetry, than of rhetorical ornament and display; and in the latter there is purpose, consistency, and method, with little regard for the shifts of expediency and the suggestions of hap-hazard temerity.
The attachment of Mr. Davis for the profession of arms is little less than a passion – an inspiration. True, he voluntarily abandoned the army, at an age when military life is most attractive to men, but the field of politics was far more inviting to a commendable aspiration for fame, than the army at a season of profound peace. But a more potent consideration, of a domestic nature, urged his withdrawal from military life. He was about to be married, and preferred not to remain in the army after having assumed the responsibilities of that relation. His speeches in the House of Representatives, indicating his earnest interest in military affairs, his solicitude in behalf of the army, his enthusiastic championship of the Military Academy, and his thorough information respecting all subjects pertaining to the military interests of the country, show his ambitious and absorbing study of his favorite science.
In common with an overwhelming majority of the Southern people, he had favored the annexation of Texas, and cordially sustained Mr. Polk’s Administration, in all the measures which were necessary to the triumphant success of its policy. While in the midst of his useful labors, as a member of Congress, in promoting the war policy of the Government, he received, with delight, the announcement of his selection to the command of the First Regiment of Mississippi Volunteers. He immediately resigned his seat in Congress and started to take command of his regiment, after obtaining for it, with great difficulty, the rifles which were afterwards used with such deadly effect upon the enemy. Overtaking his men, who were already en route for the scene of action, at New Orleans, by midsummer he had reinforced General Taylor on the Rio Grande.
The incidents of the Mexican war are too fresh in the recollection of the country to justify here a detailed narrative of the operations of the gallant army of General Taylor in its progress toward the interior from the scenes of its splendid exploits at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. For several weeks after the arrival of Colonel Davis and his Mississippians, active hostilities were suspended. When the preparations for the campaign were completed, the army advanced, and reached Walnut Springs, about three miles from Monterey, on the 19th of September, 1846. Two days afterwards began those series of actions which finally resulted in the capitulation of a fortified city of great strength, and defended with obstinate valor. Of the part borne in these brilliant operations which so exalted the glory of the American name, and immortalized the heroism of Southern volunteers, by Colonel Davis and his “Mississippi Rifles,” an able and graphic pen shall relate the story:
“In the storming of Monterey, Colonel Davis and his riflemen played a most gallant part. The storming of one of its strongest forts (Teneria) on the 21st of September was a desperate and hard-fought fight. The Mexicans had dealt such death by their cross-fires that they ran up a new flag in exultation, and in defiance of the assault which, at this time, was being made in front and rear. The Fourth Infantry, in the advance, had been terribly cut up, but the Mississippians and Tennesseeans steadily pressed forward, under a galling fire of copper grape. They approached to within a hundred yards of the fort, when they were lost in a volume of smoke. McClung,7 inciting a company which formerly had been under his command, dashed on, followed by Captain Willis. Anticipating General Quitman, Colonel Davis, about the same time, gave the order to charge. With wild desperation, his men followed him. The escalade was made with the fury of a tempest, the men flinging themselves upon the guns of the enemy. Sword in hand, McClung has sprung over the ditch. After him dashes Davis, cheering on the Mississippians, and then Campbell, with his Tennesseeans and others, brothers in the fight, and rivals for its honors. Then was wild work. The assault was irresistible. The Mexicans, terror-stricken, fled like an Alpine village from the avalanche, and, taking position in a strongly-fortified building, some seventy-five yards in the rear, opened a heavy fire of musketry. But, like their mighty river, nothing could stay the Mississippians. They are after the Mexicans. Davis and McClung are simultaneously masters of the fortifications, having got in by different entrances. In the fervor of victory the brigade does not halt, but, led on by Colonel Davis, are preparing to charge on the second post, (El Diablo,) about three hundred yards in the rear, when they are restrained by Quitman. This desperate conflict lasted over two hours. The charge of the Mississippi Rifle Regiment, without bayonets, upon Fort Teneria, gained for the State a triumph which stands unparalleled.
“Placed in possession of El Diablo, on the dawn of the 23d Colonel Davis was exposed to a sharp fire from a half-moon redoubt, about one hundred and fifty yards distant, which was connected with heavy stone buildings and walls adjoining a block of the city. Returning the fire, he proceeded, with eight men, to reconnoitre the ground in advance. Having reported, he was ordered, with three companies of his regiment and one of Tennesseeans, to advance on the works.
“When they reached the half-moon work a tremendous fire was opened from the stone buildings in the rear. Taking a less-exposed position, Davis was reinforced, and, the balance of the Mississippians coming up, the engagement became general in the street, while, from the house-tops, a heavy fire was kept up by the Mexicans. ‘The gallant Davis, leading the advance with detached parties, was rapidly entering the city, penetrating into buildings, and gradually driving the enemy from the position,’ when General Henderson and the Texan Rangers dismounted, entered the city, and, through musketry and grape, made their way to the advance. The conflict increased, and still Davis continued to lead his command through the streets to within a square of the Grand Plaza, when, the afternoon being far advanced, General Taylor withdrew the Americans to the captured forts.”8
Thus, in their first engagement, the Mississippians and their commander achieved a reputation which shall endure so long as men commemorate deeds of heroism and devotion. Veteran troops, trained to despise death by the dangers of a score of battles, have been immortalized in song and story for exploits inferior to those of the “Mississippi Rifles” at Monterey. Colonel Davis became one of the idols of the army, and took a prominent place among the heroes of the war. The nation rang with the fame of “Davis and his Mississippi Rifles;” the journals of the day were largely occupied with graphic descriptions of their exploits; and the reports of superior officers contributed their proud testimony to the history of the country, to the chivalrous daring and consummate skill of Colonel Davis. A becoming acknowledgment of his conduct was made by General Taylor in assigning him a place on the commission of officers appointed to arrange with the Mexicans the terms of capitulation. The result of the negotiations, though approved by General Taylor, was not approved by the Administration, which ordered a termination of the armistice agreed upon by the commissioners from the respective armies and a speedy resumption of hostilities. The terms of capitulation were assailed by many, who thought them too lenient to the Mexicans; among others, by General Quitman, the warm, personal, and political friend of Colonel Davis. A very important portion of the history of the war consists of the latter’s defense of the terms of surrender and his memoranda of the incidents occurring in the conferences with the Mexican officers.
To sustain the proud prestige of Monterey – if possible to surpass it, became henceforth the aspiration of the Mississippians. But the name of Mississippi was to be made radiant with a new glory, beside which the lustre of Monterey paled, as did the dawn of Lodi by the full-orbed splendor of Austerlitz. All the world knows of the conduct of Jefferson Davis at Buena Vista. How he virtually won a battle, which, considering the disparity of the contending forces, must forever be a marvel to the student of military science; how like Dessaix, at Marengo, he thought there was “still time to win another battle,” even when a portion of our line was broken and in inglorious retreat, and acting upon the impulse rescued victory from the jaws of defeat; saving an army from destruction, and flooding with a blaze of triumph a field shrouded with the gloom of disaster, are memories forever enshrined in the Temple of Fame. Americans can never weary of listening to the thrilling incidents of that ever-memorable day. By the South, the lesson of Buena Vista and kindred scenes of the valor of her children, can never be forgotton. In these days of her humiliation and despair, their proud memories throng upon her, as do a thousand noble emotions upon the modern Greek, who stands upon the sacred ground of Marathon and Plætea.
The following vivid and powerful description of the more prominent incidents of the battle is from the pen of Hon. J. F. H. Claiborne, of Mississippi:
“The battle had been raging sometime with fluctuating fortunes, and was setting against us, when General Taylor, with Colonel Davis and others, arrived on the field. Several regiments (which were subsequently rallied and fought bravely) were in full retreat. O’Brien, after having his men and horses completely cut up, had been compelled to draw off his guns, and Bragg, with almost superhuman energy, was sustaining the brunt of the fight. Many officers of distinction had fallen. Colonel Davis rode forward to examine the position of the enemy, and concluding that the best way to arrest our fugitives would be to make a bold demonstration, he resolved at once to attack the enemy, there posted in force, immediately in front, supported by cavalry, and two divisions in reserve in his rear. It was a resolution bold almost to rashness, but the emergency was pressing. With a handful of Indiana volunteers, who still stood by their brave old colonel (Bowles) and his own regiment, he advanced at double-quick time, firing as he advanced. His own brave fellows fell fast under the rolling musketry of the enemy, but their rapid and fatal volleys carried dismay and death into the adverse ranks. A deep ravine separated the combatants. Leaping into it, the Mississippians soon appeared on the other side, and with a shout that was heard over the battle-field, they poured in a well-directed fire, and rushed upon the enemy. Their deadly aim and wild enthusiasm were irresistible. The Mexicans fled in confusion to their reserves, and Davis seized the commanding position they had occupied. He next fell upon a party of cavalry and compelled it to fly, with the loss of their leader and other officers. Immediately afterwards a brigade of lancers, one thousand strong, were seen approaching at a gallop, in beautiful array, with sounding bugles and fluttering pennons. It was an appalling spectacle, but not a man flinched from his position. The time between our devoted band and eternity seemed brief indeed. But conscious that the eye of the army was upon them, that the honor of Mississippi was at stake, and knowing that, if they gave way, or were ridden down, our unprotected batteries in the rear, upon which the fortunes of the day depended, would be captured, each man resolved to die in his place sooner than retreat. Not the Spartan martyrs at Thermopylæ – not the sacred battalion of Epaminondas – not the Tenth Legion of Julius Cæsar – not the Old Guard of Napoleon – ever evinced more fortitude than these young volunteers in a crisis when death seemed inevitable. They stood like statues, as frigid and motionless as the marble itself. Impressed with this extraordinary firmness, when they had anticipated panic and flight, the lancers advanced more deliberately, as though they saw, for the first time, the dark shadow of the fate that was impending over them. Colonel Davis had thrown his men into the form of a reëntering angle, (familiarly known as his famous V movement,) both flanks resting on ravines, the lancers coming down on the intervening ridge. This exposed them to a converging fire, and the moment they came within rifle range each man singled out his object, and the whole head of the column fell. A more deadly fire never was delivered, and the brilliant array recoiled and retreated, paralyzed and dismayed.
“Shortly afterwards the Mexicans, having concentrated a large force on the right for their final attack, Colonel Davis was ordered in that direction. His regiment had been in action all day, exhausted by thirst and fatigue, much reduced by the carnage of the morning engagement, and many in the ranks suffering from wounds, yet the noble fellows moved at double-quick time. Bowles’ little band of Indiana volunteers still acted with them. After marching several hundred yards they perceived the Mexican infantry advancing, in three lines, upon Bragg’s battery, which, though entirely unsupported, held its position with a resolution worthy of his fame. The pressure upon him stimulated the Mississippians. They increased their speed, and when the enemy were within one hundred yards of the battery and confident of its capture, they took him in flank and reverse, and poured in a raking and destructive fire. This broke his right line, and the rest soon gave way and fell back precipitately. Here Colonel Davis was severely wounded.”
The wound here alluded to was from a musket ball in the heel, and was exceedingly painful, though Colonel Davis refused to leave the field until the action was over. For some time grave apprehensions were entertained lest it should prove dangerous by the setting in of erysipelas.
General Taylor, who was deeply impressed with the large share of credit due to Colonel Davis, in his official report of the battle, says: “The Mississippi Riflemen, under Colonel Davis, were highly conspicuous for their gallantry and steadiness, and sustained throughout the engagement, the reputation of veteran troops. Brought into action against an immensely superior force, they maintained themselves for a long time, unsupported and with heavy loss, and held an important part of the field until reinforced. Colonel Davis, though severely wounded, remained in the saddle until the close of the action. His distinguished coolness and gallantry, at the head of his regiment on this day, entitle him to the particular notice of the Government.”
The report of Colonel Davis, of the operations of his regiment, is highly important as a description of the most important features of the action, and as an explanation of his celebrated strategic movement. We omit such portions as embrace mere details not relevant to our purpose.
“Saltillo, Mexico, 2d March, 1847.
“Sir: In compliance with your note of yesterday, I have the honor to present the following report of the service of the Mississippi Riflemen on the 23d ultimo:
“Early in the morning of that day the regiment was drawn out from the head-quarters encampment, which stood in advance of and overlooked the town of Saltillo. Conformably to instructions, two companies were detached for the protection of that encampment, and to defend the adjacent entrance of the town. The remaining eight companies were put in march to return to the position of the preceding day, now known as the battle-field of Buena Vista. We had approached to within about two miles of that position, when the report of artillery firing, which reached us, gave assurance that a battle had commenced. Excited by the sound, the regiment pressed rapidly forward, manifesting, upon this, as upon other occasions, their more than willingness to meet the enemy. At the first convenient place the column was halted for the purpose of filling their canteens with water; and the march being resumed, was directed toward the position which had been indicated to me, on the previous evening, as the post of our regiment. As we approached the scene of action, horsemen, recognized as of our troops, were seen running, dispersed and confusedly from the field; and our first view of the line of battle presented the mortifying spectacle of a regiment of infantry flying disorganized from before the enemy. These sights, so well calculated to destroy confidence and dispirit troops just coming into action, it is my pride and pleasure to believe, only nerved the resolution of the regiment I have the honor to command.
“Our order of march was in column of companies, advancing by their centers. The point which had just been abandoned by the regiment alluded to, was now taken as our direction. I rode forward to examine the ground upon which we were going to operate, and in passing through the fugitives, appealed to them to return with us and renew the fight, pointing to our regiment as a mass of men behind which they might securely form.
“With a few honorable exceptions, the appeal was as unheeded, as were the offers which, I am informed, were made by our men to give their canteens of water to those who complained of thirst, on condition that they would go back. General Wool was upon the ground making great efforts to rally the men who had given way. I approached him and asked if he would send another regiment to sustain me in an attack upon the enemy before us. He was alone, and, after promising the support, went in person to send it. Upon further examination, I found that the slope we were ascending was intersected by a deep ravine, which, uniting obliquely with a still larger one on our right, formed between them a point of land difficult of access by us, but which, spreading in a plain toward the base of the mountain, had easy communication with the main body of the enemy. This position, important from its natural strength, derived a far greater value from the relation it bore to our order of battle and line of communication with the rear. The enemy, in number many times greater than ourselves, supported by strong reserves, flanked by cavalry and elated by recent success, was advancing upon it. The moment seemed to me critical and the occasion to require whatever sacrifice it might cost to check the enemy.
“My regiment, having continued to advance, was near at hand. I met and formed it rapidly into order of battle; the line then advanced in double-quick time, until within the estimated range of our rifles, when it was halted, and ordered to ‘fire advancing.’
“The progress of the enemy was arrested. We crossed the difficult chasm before us, under a galling fire, and in good order renewed the attack upon the other side. The contest was severe – the destruction great upon both sides. We steadily advanced, and, as the distance diminished, the ratio of loss increased rapidly against the enemy; he yielded, and was driven back on his reserves. A plain now lay behind us – the enemy’s cavalry had passed around our right flank, which rested on the main ravine, and gone to our rear. The support I had expected to join us was nowhere to be seen. I therefore ordered the regiment to retire, and went in person to find the cavalry, which, after passing round our right, had been concealed by the inequality of the ground. I found them at the first point where the bank was practicable for horsemen, in the act of descending into the ravine – no doubt for the purpose of charging upon our rear. The nearest of our men ran quickly to my call, attacked this body, and dispersed it with some loss. I think their commander was among the killed.
“The regiment was formed again in line of battle behind the first ravine we had crossed; soon after which we were joined upon our left by Lieutenant Kilbourn, with a piece of light artillery, and Colonel Lane’s (the Third) regiment of Indiana volunteers… We had proceeded but a short distance when I saw a large body of cavalry debouche from his cover upon the left of the position from which we had retired, and advance rapidly upon us. The Mississippi regiment was filed to the right, and fronted in line across the plain; the Indiana regiment was formed on the bank of the ravine, in advance of our right flank, by which a reëntering angle was presented to the enemy. Whilst this preparation was being made, Sergeant-Major Miller, of our regiment, was sent to Captain Sherman for one or more pieces of artillery from his battery.
“The enemy, who was now seen to be a body of richly-caparisoned lancers, came forward rapidly, and in beautiful order – the files and ranks so closed as to look like a mass of men and horses. Perfect silence and the greatest steadiness prevailed in both lines of our troops, as they stood at shouldered arms waiting an attack. Confident of success, and anxious to obtain the full advantage of a cross-fire at a short distance, I repeatedly called to the men not to shoot.
“As the enemy approached, his speed regularly diminished, until, when, within eighty or a hundred yards, he had drawn up to a walk, and seemed about to halt. A few files fired without orders, and both lines then instantly poured in a volley so destructive that the mass yielded to the blow and the survivors fled… At this time, the enemy made his last attack upon the right, and I received the General’s order to march to that portion of the field. The broken character of the intervening ground concealed the scene of action from our view; but the heavy firing of musketry formed a sufficient guide for our course. After marching two or three hundred yards, we saw the enemy’s infantry advancing in three lines upon Captain Bragg’s battery; which, though entirely unsupported, resolutely held its position, and met the attack with a fire worthy the former achievements of that battery, and of the reputation of its present meritorious commander. We pressed on, climbed the rocky slope of the plain on which this combat occurred, reached its brow so as to take the enemy in flank and reverse when he was about one hundred yards from the battery. Our first fire – raking each of his lines, and opened close upon his flank – was eminently destructive. His right gave way, and he fled in confusion.
“In this, the last contest of the day, my regiment equaled – it was impossible to exceed – my expectations. Though worn down by many hours of fatigue and thirst, the ranks thinned by our heavy loss in the morning, they yet advanced upon the enemy with the alacrity and eagerness of men fresh to the combat. In every approbatory sense of these remarks I wish to be included a party of Colonel Bowles’ Indiana regiment, which served with us during the greater part of the day, under the immediate command of an officer from that regiment, whose gallantry attracted my particular attention, but whose name, I regret, is unknown to me. When hostile demonstrations had ceased, I retired to a tent upon the field for surgical aid, having been wounded by a musket ball when we first went into action… Every part of the action having been fought under the eye of the commanding General, the importance and manner of any service it was our fortune to render, will be best estimated by him. But in view of my own responsibility, it may be permitted me to say, in relation to our first attack upon the enemy, that I considered the necessity absolute and immediate. No one could have failed to perceive the hazard. The enemy, in greatly disproportionate numbers, was rapidly advancing. We saw no friendly troops coming to our support, and probably none except myself expected reinforcement. Under such circumstances, the men cheerfully, ardently entered into the conflict; and though we lost, in that single engagement, more than thirty killed and forty wounded, the regiment never faltered nor moved, except as it was ordered. Had the expected reinforcement arrived, we could have prevented the enemy’s cavalry from passing to our rear, results more decisive might have been obtained, and a part of our loss have been avoided…
“I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.
“JEFFERSON DAVIS,“Colonel Mississippi Rifles.“Major W. W. S. Bliss, Assistant Adjutant-General.”
The reputation earned by Colonel Davis at Buena Vista could not fail to provoke the assaults of envy. An effort, equally unwarranted and unsuccessful, has since been made to deprive him of a portion of his merited fame of having conceived and executed a movement decisive of the battle. It has been pretended, in disparagement of the strategy of Colonel Davis, that his celebrated V movement (for so it is, and will always be known) had not the merit of originality, and besides was forced upon him by the circumstances in which he was placed, and especially by the conformation of the ground, which would not admit of a different disposition of his troops. Such a judgment is merely hypercritical. There is no account in military history, from the campaigns of Cæsar to those of Napoleon, of such a tactical conception, unless we include a slightly-analogous case at Waterloo. The movement in the latter engagement, however, differs essentially from that executed by Davis at Buena Vista. A party of Hanoverian cavalry, assailed by French huzzars, at the intersection of two roads, by forming a salient, repulsed their assailants almost as effectually as did the reëntrant angle of the Mississippians at Buena Vista. As to the second criticism, it is certainly a novel accusation against an officer, that he should, by a quick appreciation of his situation, avail himself of the only possible means by which he could not only extricate his own command from imminent peril of destruction, but also avert a blow delivered at the safety of the entire army.
In a lecture on “The Expatriated Irish in Europe and America,” delivered in Boston, February 11, 1858, the Hon. Caleb Cushing thus alludes to this subject: “In another of the dramatic incidents of that field, a man of Celtic race (Jefferson Davis) at the head of the Rifles of Mississippi, had ventured to do that of which there is, perhaps, but one other example in the military history of modern times. In the desperate conflicts of the Crimea, at the battle of Inkermann, in one of those desperate charges, there was a British officer who ventured to receive the charge of the enemy without the precaution of having his men formed in a hollow square. They were drawn up in two lines, meeting at a point like an open fan, and received the charge of the Russians at the muzzle of their guns, and repelled it. Sir Colin Campbell, for this feat of arms, among others, was selected as the man to retrieve the fallen fortunes of England in India. He did, however, but imitate what Jefferson Davis had previously done in Mexico, who, in that trying hour, when, with one last desperate effort to break the line of the American army, the cavalry of Mexico was concentrated in one charge against the American line; then, I say, Jefferson Davis commanded his men to form in two lines, extended as I have shown, and receive that charge of the Mexican horse, with a plunging fire from the right and left from the Mississippi Rifles, which repelled, and repelled for the last time, the charge of the hosts of Mexico.”
These puerile criticisms, however, were unavailing against the concurrent testimony of Taylor, Quitman, and Lane, and the grateful plaudits of the army, to shake the popular judgment, which rarely fails, in the end, to discriminate between the false glare of cheaply-earned glory and the just renown of true heroism.
The term of enlistment of his regiment having expired, Colonel Davis, in July, 1847, just twelve months after the resignation of his seat in the House of Representatives, returned to the United States. His progress toward his home was attended by a series of congratulatory receptions, the people every-where assembling en masse to do honor to the “Hero of Buena Vista.” Mississippi extended a triumphant greeting to her soldier-statesman, who, resigning the civic trust which she had confided to his keeping, had carried her flag in triumph amid the thunders of battle and the wastes of carnage, carving the name of Mississippi in an inscription of enduring renown.
During his journey homeward, there occurred a most impressive illustration of that strict devotion to principle which, above all other considerations, is the real solution of every act of his life, public and private. While in New Orleans, Colonel Davis was offered, by President Polk, a commission as Brigadier-General of Volunteers, an honor which he unhesitatingly declined, on the ground that no such commission could be conferred by Federal authority, either by appointment of the President or by act of Congress. As an advocate of States’ Rights, he could not countenance, even for the gratification of his own ambition, a plain infraction of the rights of the States, to which respectively, the Constitution reserves the appointment of officers of the militia.9 The soldier’s pride in deserved promotion for distinguished services, could not induce the statesman to forego his convictions of Constitutional right. The declination of this high distinction was entirely consistent with his opinions previously entertained and expressed. Before he resigned his seat in the House of Representatives, the bill authorizing such appointments by the President was introduced, and rapidly pressed to its passage. Mr. Davis detected the Constitutional infraction which it involved, and opposed it. He designed to address the House, but was suddenly called away from Washington, and before leaving had an understanding with the Chairman of the Committee from which the bill had come, that it would not be called up before the ensuing Monday. On his return, however, he found that the friends of the measure had forced its passage on the previous Saturday.
This is but one in a thousand evidences of an incorruptible loyalty to his convictions, which would dare face all opposition and has braved all reproach. It is an attribute of true greatness in the character of Jefferson Davis, which not even his enemies have called in question, to which candor must ever accord the tribute of infinite admiration.
CHAPTER IV
MR. DAVIS IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, FIRST BY EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENT, AND SUBSEQUENTLY BY UNANIMOUS CHOICE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF HIS STATE – POPULAR ADMIRATION NOT LESS FOR HIS CIVIC TALENTS THAN HIS MILITARY SERVICES – FEATURES OF HIS PUBLIC CAREER – HIS CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS A SENATOR – AS AN ORATOR AND PARLIAMENTARY LEADER – HIS INTREPIDITY – AN INCIDENT WITH HENRY CLAY – DAVIS THE LEADER OF THE STATES’ RIGHTS PARTY IN CONGRESS – THE AGITATION OF 1850 – DAVIS OPPOSES THE COMPROMISE – FOLLY OF THE SOUTH IN ASSENTING TO THAT SETTLEMENT – DAVIS NOT A DISUNIONIST IN 1850, NOR A REBEL IN 1861 – HIS CONCEPTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT – LOGICAL ABSURDITY OF CLAY’S POSITION EXPOSED BY DAVIS – THE IDEAL UNION OF THE LATTER – WHY HE OPPOSED THE COMPROMISE – THE NEW MEXICO BILL – DAVIS’ GROWING FAME AT THIS PERIOD – HIS FREQUENT ENCOUNTERS WITH CLAY, AND WARM FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THEM – SIGNAL TRIUMPH OF THE UNION SENTIMENT, AND ACQUIESCENCE OF THE SOUTH
Within less than two months from his return to Mississippi, Colonel Davis was appointed by the Governor of the State to fill the vacancy in the United States Senate occasioned by the death of General Speight. At a subsequent session of the Legislature, the selection of the Governor was confirmed by his unanimous election for the residue of the unexpired term. Seldom has there been a tender of public honor more deserved by the recipient, and more cheerfully accorded by the constituent body. It was the grateful tribute of popular appreciation to the hero who had risked his life for the glory of his country, and the worthy recognition of abilities which had been proven adequate to the responsibilities of the highest civic trust. Doubtless Colonel Davis owed much of the signal unanimity and enthusiasm which accompanied this expression of popular favor to his brilliant services in Mexico. The military passion is strong in the human breast, and the sentiment of homage to prowess, illustrated on the battle-field and in the face of danger, is one of the few chivalrous instincts which survive the influence of the sordid vices and vulgarisms of human nature. In all ages men have declaimed and reasoned against the expediency of confiding civil authority to the keeping of soldiers, and have cautioned the masses against the risk of entrusting the public liberties to the stern and dictatorial will educated in the rugged discipline and habits of the camp. Yet the masses, in all time, will continue their awards of distinction to martial exploits with a fervor not characteristic of their recognition of any other public service.
But the tribute had a higher motive, if possible, than the generous impulse of gratitude to the “Hero of Buena Vista,” in the universal conviction of his eminent fitness for the position. His service in the House of Representatives, brief as it was, had designated him, months before his Mexican laurels had been earned, as a man, not only of mark, but of promise; of decided and progressive intellectual power; of pronounced mental and moral individuality.
Of all the public men of America, Jefferson Davis is the least indebted for his long and noble career of distinction to adventitious influences or merely temporary popular impulses. The sources of his strength have been the elements of his character and the resources of his genius. Never hoping to stumble upon success, by a stolid indifference amid the fluctuations of fortune, nor engaged in the role of the trimmer, who adjusts his conduct conformably with every turn of the popular current, his hopes of success have rested upon the merits of principle alone. He has succeeded in all things where success was possible, and failed, at last, in contradiction of every lesson of previous experience, with the light of all history pleading his vindication, and to the disappointment of the nearly unanimous judgment of disinterested mankind.
A peculiar feature in the public career of Mr. Davis was its steady and consecutive development. He has accepted service, always and only, in obedience to the concurrent confidence of his fellow-citizens in his peculiar qualifications for the emergency. From the beginning he gave the promise of those high capacities which the fervid eulogy of Grattan accorded to Chatham – to “strike a blow in the world that should resound through its history.” His first election to Congress was the spontaneous acknowledgment of the profound impression produced by his earliest intellectual efforts. The consummate triumph of his genius and valor at Buena Vista did not exceed the anticipations of his friends, who knew the ardor and assiduity of his devotion to his cherished science, and now in the noble arena of the American Senate his star was still to be in the ascendant.
At the first session of the Thirtieth Congress, Jefferson Davis took his seat as a Senator of the United States from the State of Mississippi. The entire period of his connection with the Senate, from 1847 to 1851, and from 1857 to 1861, scarcely comprises eight years; but those were years pregnant with the fate of a nation, and in their brief progress he stood in that august body the equal of giant intellects, and grappled, with the power and skill of a master, the great ideas and events of those momentous days. Mr. Davis could safely trust, whatever of ambition he may cherish for the distinguished consideration of posterity, to a faithful record of his service in the Senate. His senatorial fame is a beautiful harmony of the most pronounced and attractive features of the best parliamentary models. He was as intrepid and defiant as Chatham, but as scholarly as Brougham; as elegant and perspicuous in diction as Canning, and often as profound and philosophical in his comprehension of general principles as Burke; when roused by a sense of injury, or by the force of his earnest conviction, as much the incarnation of fervor and zeal as Grattan, but, like Fox, subtle, ready, and always armed cap a pie for the quick encounters of debate.
Among all the eminent associates of Mr. Davis in that body, there were very few who possessed his peculiar qualifications for its most distinguished honors. His character, no less than his demeanor, may be aptly termed senatorial, and his bearing was always attuned to his noble conception of the Senate as an august assemblage of the embassadors of sovereign States. He carried to the Senate the loftiest sense of the dignity and responsibility of his trust, and convictions upon political questions, which were the result of the most thorough and elaborate investigation. Never for one instant varying from the principles of his creed, he never doubted as to the course of duty; profound, accurate in information, there was no question pertaining to the science of government or its administration that he did not illuminate with a light, clear, powerful, and original.
It has been remarked of Mr. Davis’ style as a speaker, that it is “orderly rather than ornate,” and the remark is correct so far as it relates to the mere statement of the conditions of the discussion. For mere rhetorical glitter, Mr. Davis’ speeches afford but poor models, but for clear logic and convincing argument, apt illustration, bold and original imagery, and genuine pathos, they are unsurpassed by any ever delivered in the American Senate. Though the Senate was, undoubtedly, his appropriate arena as an orator, and though it may well be doubted whether he was rivaled in senatorial eloquence by any contemporary, Mr. Davis is hardly less gifted in the attributes of popular eloquence. Upon great occasions he will move a large crowd with an irresistible power. As a popular orator, he does not seek to sway and toss the will with violent and passionate emotion, but his eloquence is more a triumph of argument aided by an enlistment of passion and persuasion to reason and conviction. He has less of the characteristics of Mirabeau, than of that higher type of eloquence, of which Cicero, Burke, and George Canning were representatives, and which is pervaded by passion, subordinated to the severer tribunal of intellect. It was the privilege of the writer, on repeated occasions, during the late war, to witness the triumph of Mr. Davis’ eloquence over a popular assemblage. Usually the theme and the occasion were worthy of the orator, and difficult indeed would it be to realize a nobler vision of the majesty of intellect. To a current of thought, perennial and inexhaustible, compact, logical and irresistible, was added a fire that threw its warmth into the coldest bosom, and infused a glow of light into the very core of the subject. His voice, flexible and articulate, reaching any compass that was requisite, attitude and gestures, all conspired to give power and expression to his language, and the hearer was impressed as though in the presence of the very transfiguration of eloquence. The printed efforts of Mr. Davis will not only live as memorials of parliamentary and popular eloquence, but as invaluable stores of information to the political and historical student. They epitomize some of the most important periods of American history, and embrace the amplest discussion of an extended range of subjects pertaining to almost every science.
The development in Mr. Davis of the high and rare qualities, requisite to parliamentary leadership, was rapid and decisive. His nature instinctively aspires to influence and power, and under no circumstances could it rest contented in an attitude of inferiority. Independence, originality, and intrepidity, added to earnest and intelligent conviction; unwavering devotion to principle and purpose; a will stern and inexorable, and a disposition frank, courteous, and generous, are features of character which rarely fail to make a representative man. After the death of Mr. Calhoun, he was incomparably the ablest exponent of States’ Rights principles, and even during the life of that great publicist, Mr. Davis, almost equally with him, shared the labors and responsibilities of leadership. His personal courage is of that knightly order, which in an age of chivalry would have sought the trophies of the tourney, and his moral heroism fixed him immovably upon the solid rock of principle, indifferent to the inconvenience of being in a minority and in no dread of the storms of popular passion. His faith in his principles was no less earnest than his confidence in his ability to triumphantly defend them. In the midst of the agitation and excitement of 1850, Henry Clay, the Great Compromiser, whose brilliant but erring genius so long and fatally led estray, from the correct understanding of the vital issue at stake between the North and the South, a numerous party of noble and true-hearted Southern gentlemen, furnished the occasion of an impressive illustration of this quality. Turning, in debate, to the Mississippi Senator, he notified the latter of his purpose, at some future day, to debate with him elaborately, an important question of principle. “Now is the moment,” was the reply of the intrepid Davis, ever eager to champion his beloved and imperiled South, equally against her avowed enemies, and the not less fatal policy of those who were but too willing to compromise upon an issue vital to her rights and dignity. And what a shock of arms might then have been witnessed, could Clay have dispelled thirty years of his ripe three-score and ten! Each would have found a foeman worthy of his steel. In answer to this bold defiance, Clay, like Hotspur, would have rushed to the charge, with visor up and lance couchant; and Davis, another Saladin, no less frank than his adversary, but far more dexterous, would have met him with a flash of that Damascus scymetar, whose first blow severed the neck of the foeman.
That would have been a bold ambition that could demand a formal tender of leadership from the brilliant array of gallant gentlemen, ripe scholars, distinguished orators and statesmen, who, for twenty years before the war, were the valiant champions in Congress of the principles and aspirations of the South. Yet few will deny the preëminence of Mr. Davis, in the eye of the country and the world, among States’ Rights leaders. Equally with Mr. Calhoun, as the leader of a great intellectual movement, he stamped his impress upon the enduring tablets of time.
Like Mr. Calhoun, too, Mr. Davis gave little evidence of capacity or taste for mere party tactics. Neither would have performed the duties of drill-sergeant, in local organizations, for the purposes of a political canvass, so well as hundreds of men of far lighter calibre and less stability. Happily, both sought and found a more congenial field of action.
The unexpired term, for which Mr. Davis had been elected in 1847, ended in 1851, and, though he was immediately reëlected, in consequence of his subsequent resignation his first service in the Senate ended with the term for which he had first been elected. A recurrence to the records of Congress will exhibit the eventful nature of this period, especially in its conclusion. In the earlier portion of his senatorial service, Mr. Davis participated conspicuously in debate and in the general business of legislation. Here, as in the House of Representatives, his views upon military affairs were always received with marked respect, and no measure looking to the improvement of the army failed to receive his cordial coöperation.
The extensive conquests of the army in Mexico, and the necessity of maintaining the authority of the Federal Government in the conquered country until the objects of the war could be consummated, created considerable embarrassment. Upon this subject Mr. Davis spoke frequently and intelligently. His sagacity indicated a policy equally protective of the advantages which the valor of the army had achieved, and humane to the conquered. In a debate with Mr. John Bell, in February, 1848, he defined himself as favoring such a military occupation as would “prevent the General Government of Mexico, against which this war had been directed, from reëstablishing its power and again concentrating the scattered fragments of its army to renew active hostilities against us.” He disclaimed the motive, in this policy, of territorial acquisition, and earnestly deprecated interference with the political institutions of the Mexicans. The estimate entertained by the Senate, of his judgment and information upon military subjects, was indicated by his almost unanimous election, (thirty-two for Mr. Davis, and five for all others,) during the session of the Thirty-first Congress, as Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs. His speeches on the subject of offering congratulations to the French people upon their recent successful political revolution, resulting in the establishment of a republican form of government, the proposed organization of the territorial government of Oregon, upon various subjects of practical and scientific interest, and his incidental discussions of the subject of slavery, were able, eloquent, and characteristic.
The session of Congress in 1849 and 1850 brought with it a most angry and menacing renewal of sectional agitation. Previous events and innumerable indications of popular sentiment had clearly revealed to candid minds, every-where, that the increasing sectional preponderance of the North, and its growing hostility to slavery, portended results utterly ruinous to the rights and institutions of the South. To the South it was literally a question of vitality, to secure some competent check upon the aggressive strength of the North. To maintain any thing like a sectional balance, the South must necessarily secure to her institutions, at least, a fair share of the common domain to be hereafter created into States. The immense territorial acquisitions resulting from the Mexican war were now the subjects of controversy. After a contest, protracted through several months, and eliciting the most violent exhibitions of sectional feeling, a plan of adjustment, under the auspices chiefly of Henry Clay, whose fatal gift was to preserve, for a time, the peace of the country by the concession of the most precious and vital rights of his section to an insolent and insatiate fanaticism, was finally reached. This settlement, known, by way of distinction, as the “Compromise of 1850,” averting for the time the dangers of disunion and civil war, met the approval of the advocates of expediency, but was opposed, with heroic pertinacity, by Mr. Davis and his associates of the States’ Rights party. They saw the hollowness of its pretended justice, its utter worthlessness as a guarantee to the South, and sought to defeat it – first in Congress, and afterwards by the popular voice. But the sentiment of attachment to the Union triumphed over every consideration of interest, principle, even security, and the snare succeeded. Again the South receded, again received the stone instead of the asked-for loaf, and again did she compromise her most sacred rights and dearest interests, receiving, in return, the reluctant and insincere guarantee of the recovery of her stolen slaves.
The folly of the South in assenting to this adjustment is now obvious to the dullest understanding, and subsequent events were swift to vindicate the wisdom, patriotism, and foresight of Mr. Davis and those who sustained him in opposition to the much-vaunted Union-saving compromise. Yet, they were no more disunionists in 1850 than rebels and traitors in 1861. The charge of disunionism was freely iterated against them, and not without effect, even in their own section, where the sentimental attachment to the Union was stronger, just as its sacrifices in behalf of the Union were greater, than those of the North. Jefferson Davis never was a disunionist, not even in his subsequent approval of secession, in the sense of a wanton and treasonable disposition to sever the bonds of that association of co-equal sovereignties which the founders of the Federal Government bequeathed to their posterity.
His action, at all times, has been thoroughly consistent with his declared opinions, and with the earnest attachment to the Union, avowed in his congressional speeches and in his public addresses every-where. In 1850 and in 1861 his course was the logical sequence of his opinions, maintained and asserted from his introduction to public life. To save the Union, upon the only basis upon which it could rest as a guarantee of liberty, – the basis of absolute equality among the States; to blend Federal power and States’ Rights, was the grand, paramount object to which all his aspirations and all his investigations of political science were directed. Repudiating the power of a State to nullify an act of Congress, and yet not surrender its normal relations as a member of the Union, he always asserted the right of secession, in the last resort, as an original, inherent, and vital attribute of State Sovereignty. The Federal Government, to his mind, was a mere agent of the States, created by them for a few general and intestate purposes, but having in it no principle subversive of the paramount sovereignty of the States. Rapidly extending its power by enactments of Congress and judicial constructions, he foresaw, and sought to counteract, its tendency to obliterate all State individuality, and ultimately absorb into its own keeping the liberties of the people. With dread and indignation, he contemplated its progress towards that monstrum horrendum, a consolidated democracy – the Union of to-day, in which we see that the will of the majority is the sole measure of its powers.
Such was his consistency, and such his sagacity, as vindicated in the light of subsequent events, and patent to the eyes of the world to-day. Who can now doubt which was the better and more logical theory? Clay said: “I owe allegiance to two sovereignties, and only two: one is to the sovereignty of this Union, and the other is to the sovereignty of the State of Kentucky.” Thus he held to the paradox of an imperium in imperio, that obvious absurdity in our system of government, a divided sovereignty. In his ardent Unionism, the great exponent of expediency disavowed allegiance to the South, though still holding to his allegiance to Kentucky. But suppose Kentucky asserts her sovereignty, and chooses to unite with the South, what, then, becomes of State Sovereignty and State allegiance? Just here was the hiatus in Clay’s logic, and, closely pressed by Davis, he emphatically declared his first allegiance to the Union as the supreme authority; and the State Sovereignty of Clay’s conception was seen to be as intangible and unreal as the “baseless fabric of a vision.”
Far more fair in its semblance, noble in its proportions, and beautiful in its harmonies, was the ideal of Davis. In his speech on the compromise measures, July 31, 1850, he said:
“Give to each section of the Union justice; give to every citizen of the United States his rights as guaranteed by the Constitution; leave this Confederacy to rest upon that basis from which it arose – the fraternal feelings of the people – and I, for one, have no fear of its perpetuity; none that it will not survive beyond the limits of human speculation, expanding and hardening with the lapse of time, to extend its blessings to ages unnumbered, and a people innumerable; to include within its empire all the useful products of the earth, and exemplify the capacity of a confederacy, with general, well-defined powers, to extend illimitably without impairing its harmony or its strength.”
The grounds of Mr. Davis’ opposition to the so-called “Compromise” programme of Mr. Clay were far otherwise than a factious and impracticable hostility to an amicable adjustment of sectional differences. He conscientiously doubted the disposition of the North to abstain from all future interference with Southern institutions, and he detected and exposed the utter want of efficacy of the compromise measures as an assurance of protection against future aggression. He abhorred the substitution of expediency for principle; could see no compromise where one side simply surrendered what the other had no right to demand, and correctly estimated this settlement, like those which had preceded it, as but an invitation to still more intolerable exactions by an implacable sectional majority. While discussing, in private conversation with Mr. Clay, the merits of Mr. Webster’s memorable speech of the 7th of March, 1850, a few days after its delivery, he briefly, but sufficiently defined his position. “Come,” said Mr. Clay, “my young friend; join us in these measures of pacification. Let us rally Congress and the people to their support, and they will assure to the country thirty years of peace. By that time” (turning to John M. Berrien, who was a party to the conversation) “you and I will be under the sod, and my young friend may then have trouble again.” “No,” said Davis, “I can not consent to transfer to posterity a question which is as much ours as theirs, when it is evident that the sectional inequality, as it will be greater then than now, will render hopeless the attainment of justice.”
His clear, penetrating glance discovered, under the guise of a friendly and pacific purpose, the insidious presence so mischievous to Southern interests, just as George Mason, more than fifty years before, had seen the “poison under the wing of the Federal Constitution.” While the bill for the organization of the Territory of New Mexico was pending, the vigilance and sagacity of Mr. Davis elicited the most flattering commendation from his Southern associates. In this bill there was a general grant, in loose and ambiguous phraseology, of legislative power, with a reservation that no law should be passed “in respect to African slavery.” Strangely enough, this provision, though obviously involving an inhibition against the enactment of laws for the protection of Southern property, escaped general detection. Mr. Davis promptly exposed its purpose, and offered an amendment, striking out the restraint against legislation “in respect to African slavery,” and prohibiting the enactment of any law interfering “with those rights of property growing out of the institution of African slavery as it exists in any of the States of this Union.” To meet the concurrence of other Senators, the amendment was variously modified, until, as explained by Mr. Davis, it embodied “the general proposition that the Territorial Legislature should not be prevented from passing the laws necessary for the protection of the rights of property of every kind which might be legally and constitutionally held in that territory.” It is needless to say that so just a proposition, affording equal protection to Southern with Northern institutions, was defeated.
While there was little in Mr. Clay’s plan of pacification to recommend it to Southern support, beyond the merely temporary staving off of a dissolution of the Union and civil war, it embodied propositions utterly incompatible with the security of the South. Mr. Davis especially and persistently combated its provision for the abolition of the slave-trade in the District of Columbia, and the concession that slavery did not legally exist in the newly-acquired territory. His position upon the general issues involved can not be more clearly and forcibly stated than in his own language:
“But, sir, we are called upon to receive this as a measure of compromise! – as a measure in which we of the minority are to receive something. A measure of compromise! I look upon it as a modest mode of taking that, the claim to which has been more boldly asserted by others; and that I may be understood upon this question, and that my position may go forth to the country in the same columns that convey the sentiments of the Senator from Kentucky, I here assert that never will I take less than the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean, with specific right to hold slaves in the territory below that line; and that before such territories are admitted into the Union as States, slaves may be taken there from any of the United States, at the option of the owners. I can never consent to give additional power to a majority to commit further aggression upon the minority in this Union; and I will never consent to any proposition which will have such a tendency without a full guarantee or counteracting measure is connected with it.”
The parliamentary annals of the Union embrace no period more prolific of grand intellectual efforts than the debates incident to this gigantic struggle. The prominence of Mr. Davis, with his extreme ardor in behalf of the rights and interests of his section, brought him constantly into conflict with the most eminent leaders of both the great political parties, who had cordially agreed to ignore all minor issues and unite in the paramount purpose of saving the Union. Cass, Douglas, Bright, Dickinson, and King, earnestly coöperated with Clay, Webster, and other Whig champions, in the advocacy of the measures of compromise. That Davis, younger in years and experience than most of these distinguished men, amply sustained his honorable and responsible role as the foremost champion of the South, contemporary public opinion and the Congressional records give abundant testimony. The great compromise chieftain, between whom and Davis occurred such obstinate and protracted encounters in debate, delighted to testify his respect for the talents and intrepidity of his “young friend,” which was his habitual salutation to Davis. Despite the pronounced antagonism between them, on all measures of public policy, and their comparatively brief acquaintance, Mr. Clay repeatedly evinced, in a most touching manner, his warm regard for one who had been the companion-in-arms and cherished friend of a noble son,10 who lost his life on the same field, upon which Davis won such deathless distinction. “My poor boy,” were his words to the latter, upon his return from Mexico, “usually occupied about one-half of his letters home in praising you.” A still more touching incident, illustrative of his friendly regard, at the moment not understood by those present, occurred, in the heat of discussion during the exciting period, which we have had under consideration. Replying to Davis, said Mr. Clay: “My friend from Mississippi – and I trust that he will permit me to call him my friend, for between us there is a tie, the nature of which we both well understand.” At this moment the utterance of the aged statesman became tremulous with emotion, and, bowing his head, his eyes were seen to fill with tears. This friendship was warmly reciprocated by Mr. Davis, and its recollections are among those the most highly-cherished of his public life.
With the defeat of those who had opposed the compromise, terminated, for the present, Southern resistance in Congress, though it did not for an instant check Northern aggression. Yet many prominent public characters at the South, and, as the sequel demonstrated, indorsed by popular sentiment, avowed themselves fully satisfied with a mere show of triumph and pretense of justice – a few paltry concessions, not worth the parchment upon which they were written. In the meantime, upon another arena, Mr. Davis entered upon a gallant struggle, in opposition to a policy from which he foresaw and predicted a fruitful yield of disaster in the future.
CHAPTER V
OPPOSITION TO THE COMPROMISE IN SOUTH CAROLINA AND MISSISSIPPI – DAVIS A CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR – HIS DEFEAT REALLY A PERSONAL TRIUMPH – IN RETIREMENT, SUPPORTS GENERAL PIERCE’S ELECTION – DECLINES AN APPOINTMENT IN PIERCE’S CABINET, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY ACCEPTS SECRETARYSHIP OF WAR – REMARKABLE UNITY OF PIERCE’S ADMINISTRATION, AND HIGH CHARACTER OF THE EXECUTIVE – DAVIS AS SECRETARY OF WAR – KANSAS-NEBRASKA BILL AND THE EXCITEMENT WHICH FOLLOWED – DAVIS AGAIN ELECTED TO THE SENATE – SPEECHES AT PASS CHRISTIAN AND OTHER POINTS WHILE ON HIS WAY TO WASHINGTON
But, though the battle had been fought and won in Congress, and it was evident, at an early date, that the weight of great names in favor of the Compromise, aided by the ever-timid counsels of capital and commerce, would command for that measure the overwhelming support of the country, the States’ Rights men were resolved upon a test of popular sentiment. Accordingly, in South Carolina and Mississippi, States at all times the most advanced in Southern feeling, the opponents of the Compromise organized, as did its friends also. The issue, though substantially the same, was presented in a somewhat different form in these two States.
In South Carolina, where public sentiment was always singularly unanimous, upon all questions affecting the honor and interests of the South, and in entire accord as to the mode and measure of redress for the grievances of the States, the propriety of resistance was a foregone conclusion. The only question was, whether South Carolina should act separately, or await the coöperation of other Southern States. The party of coöperation triumphed in the election of members to a State convention, by the decisive popular majority of seven thousand votes.
In Mississippi the issue was one of resistance or acquiescence. The States’ Rights, or resistance party, embraced four-fifths of the Democracy of the State and a small accession of States’ Rights Whigs; while the Union, or Compromise party, was composed of the Clay Whigs and a fraction of the Democracy.
The Legislature provided an election for members of a State convention to consider the subject of Federal aggressions, to be held in September, 1851, and, in the ensuing November the regular election of Governor occurred. Much interest centred upon the gubernatorial contest, and the State was for months previous to the election the scene of great excitement. General John A. Quitman, one of the most distinguished officers of the army, during the Mexican war, a man of the loftiest character, a reliable statesman, and sterling patriot, was nominated by the States’ Rights Convention. Mr. Henry S. Foote, then a Senator from Mississippi, and an active supporter of the Compromise measures, was the candidate of the Union party. While an exceedingly animated canvass between these candidates was still in progress, the election for members of the convention resulted in an aggregate majority of seven thousand five hundred votes for the Union candidates. General Quitman, disappointed by such an unexpected and decisive exhibition of public sentiment, and viewing it as the forerunner of the result of the gubernatorial election in November, withdrew from the contest.
Mr. Davis, who had already been elected for a second term to the Senate, was now looked to as almost the sole dependence of the States’ Rights men, and they summoned him to take the field as the adversary of Mr. Foote. There was little inducement, had he consulted selfish considerations, to relinquish a high position, already secured, and become the leader of a forlorn hope. Though greatly enfeebled in health, and at that time an acute sufferer, he accepted the nomination. His sense of duty and devotion to his principles triumphed even over his physical infirmities, and, resigning his seat in the Senate, he entered upon the canvass.
The result was, as had been foreseen, the defeat of Mr. Davis. Mr. Foote, a man of more than average ability, and of varied and extensive attainments, whose excessive garrulity and total want of discretion disqualified him for usefulness as a member of a legislative body, or for any practical end of statesmanship, was, nevertheless, an adroit party tactician. With great dexterity he had conducted the canvass with General Quitman, by skillfully evading the real issue, introducing side questions, and thus breaking the force of the plain and statesman-like arguments of his more open and less dexterous adversary. When Mr. Davis entered the field, under all the disadvantages to which we have alluded, the election of Foote was almost universally conceded. Had the canvass lasted a few weeks, however, the result, in all probability, would have been different. The popularity of Mr. Davis was indicated by the paltry majority (nine hundred and ninety-nine votes) given against him, as compared with the Union majority at the election in September, for members of the convention. Under all the circumstances, his friends rightly viewed it as a personal triumph, and he emerged from the contest with increased reputation and public regard.
The results of these appeals to popular judgment were scarcely less decisive, in favor of the Compromise, than had been its congressional victory. It was evident that the Southern people were yet far from being ready for organized and practical resistance, and were not likely to be, until some flagrant outrage should arouse their resentment.
Mr. Davis was now in retirement, and, though abiding the decision of Mississippi, he was yet avowedly determined to devote his energies to the efficient organization of the States’ Rights party for future struggles. Yet nothing was farther from his purpose than a factious agitation. His aim was to secure for the States’ Rights principle a moral and numerical support in the ranks of the Democracy, which should enable its friends to wield an appropriate influence upon the policy of that party. He contemplated no organization outside of the Democracy, for the promotion of disunionism per se; and, in the Presidential canvass of 1852, separated himself from many of his closest personal and political friends, who had nominated the Presidential ticket of Troup and Quitman, upon the distinctive platform of States’ Rights and separation.
The nomination of Franklin Pierce, upon the Baltimore platform, met his cordial approbation, and received his active support. With General Pierce, Mr. Davis held the most friendly relations, and in his constitutional opinions he had entire confidence. His support of the platform was quite as consistent as his advocacy of the nominee. Both indorsed, with emphasis, the Compromise, which he had opposed, but which Mississippi had ratified, and both avowed their acceptance of it, as a finality, beyond which there was to be no farther agitation of the slavery question. In Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee he participated actively in the canvass, and rendered most efficient service to his party, especially in the two latter States.
General Pierce indicated his estimate of Davis, by a prompt tender of a position in his Cabinet. Considering himself committed to the fortunes of his principles in Mississippi, he preferred to “remain and fight the issue out there,” and reluctantly declined. Subsequently the President-elect addressed him a letter expressing a desire that, upon personal grounds at least, Mr. Davis should be present at his inauguration. After he had reached Washington the tender of a Cabinet appointment was repeated. The obvious advantages to the States’ Rights party of representation in the Government, an argument earnestly urged upon him by prominent Southern statesmen, at length overcame his personal preference, and he accepted the position of Secretary of War.
With the policy of President Pierce’s administration, Secretary Davis was, of course, fully identified. Whatever of influence and sympathy he could command, were employed in promoting its success, and between the President and himself there was an uninterrupted harmony of personal and official intercourse. Indeed the glory of this administration and the explanation of its title to that high award which it earned from impartial criticism, for its courageous pursuit of an upright, constitutional policy, was the characteristic unity which prevailed between its head and his advisers. During the four years of its existence the Cabinet of President Pierce continued unchanged, at its close the head of each department surrendering the seals of office which he had received at its inauguration. The history of no other administration is adorned with such an instance of cordial and unbroken coöperation, and the fact is equally creditable to the sagacity of General Pierce in the selection of his advisers, and his consummate tact in the reconciliation of those antagonisms, which are hardly to be avoided in the operations of the complicated machinery of Government.
A common statement of its enemies, that the administration must eventually break down by disorganization, in consequence of the utterly discordant elements which composed it, was never realized. At one time Mr. Marcy, the Secretary of State, was the wily Macchiavelli, against whose intrigues the rest of the Cabinet was in arms, while Mr. Davis was charged with playing alternately the roles of Richelieu and Marplot.
Of all American executives, Franklin Pierce is preëminently entitled to the designation of the constitutional President. The great covenant of American liberty, so ruthlessly despoiled in these degenerate days, when opportunity and pretext are the sufficient justification of flagrant violations of justice, was the guide whose precepts he followed without deviation. His Northern birth and training did not swerve from his obligations to extend an equal protection to the interests of other sections, the patriotic executive, whom posterity will delight to honor, for his wisdom, purity, and impartiality, just in proportion as those qualities provoke the clamor of the dominant ignorance and passion of to-day.
In a Cabinet, noted for its ability, of which William L. Marcy was the Premier, and Caleb Cushing the Attorney-General, Secretary Davis occupied a position worthy of his abilities and his previous reputation, and peculiarly gratifying to his military tastes. It is no disparagement of his associates to say that his strongly-marked character commanded a constant and emphatic recognition in the policy of the Government.
Under his control the department of war was greatly advanced in dignity and importance, receiving a character far more distinctive and independent of other branches of the Government than it had previously claimed. He infused into all its operations an energy till then unknown, introducing improvements so extensive and comprehensive as to occasion apprehension of an almost too powerful and independent system of military organization. It is a fact universally conceded that his administration of the War Office was incomparably superior to that of any official who has filled that position – contributing more to the promotion of efficiency in the army, to the advancement of those great national establishments so vital to the security of the nation, and to the systematic, practical management of the details of the office. In reviewing Mr. Davis’ conduct of this important department of the Government, the splendid improvements which he inaugurated, his earnest and unceasing labors in behalf of the efficiency of the army, it is impossible to overestimate his eminent services to the Union, which even at that time his traducers and those of the South would pretend he was plotting to destroy. In the Cabinet, as in the Senate, there was no measure of national advantage to which he did not give his cordial support, no great national institution which he would not have fostered with generous and timely sympathy; nothing to which he was not zealously committed, promising to redound to the glory, prosperity, and perpetuity of that Union, in whose service he had been trained, whose uniform he had proudly worn, and beneath whose banner he had braved a soldier’s death.
Secretary Davis made many recommendations contemplating radical alterations in the military system of the Union. One of his first measures was a recommendation for the thorough revision of the army regulations. He opposed the placing of officers, at an early period of service, permanently upon the staff, and advocated a system, which, he contended, would improve the discipline and efficiency of officers, “whereby the right of command should follow rank by one certain rule.” The increase of the medical corps; the introduction of camels; the introduction of the light infantry or rifle system of tactics, rifled muskets, and the Minie-ball were all measures advocated by Secretary Davis, and discussed in his official papers with a force and intelligence that make them highly valuable to the military student. He urged a thorough exploration of the Western frontier, and important changes in the arrangement of defenses against the Indians, demonstrating the inefficiency of the system of small forts for the purposes of war with the savages. To obviate, in a measure, the expense, and almost useless trouble, of locating military posts in advance of settlement, he suggested the plan of maintaining large garrisons at certain points, situated favorably for obtaining supplies and accessible by steamboat or railway. From these posts strong detachments could be supplied and equipped for service in the Indian country. His efforts were most strenuous to obtain an increase of pay to officers of the army, and pensions to the widows and orphans of officers and men, upon a basis similar to that of the navy.
During the Crimean war, Secretary Davis sent a commission, of which Major-General McClellan, then a captain of cavalry, was a member, to study and report upon the science of war and the condition of European armies, as illustrated in the operations incident to that struggle. At his suggestion four new regiments – two of cavalry – were added to the army, and numerous appropriations made for the construction of new forts, improvements in small arms, and the accumulation of munitions of war.
The Presidential term of Pierce expired on the 4th of March, 1857, and with it terminated the connection of Mr. Davis with the executive branch of the Government. He retired with the hearty respect of his associates, and in the enjoyment of the most confiding friendship with the late head of the Government, a feeling which is cherished by both, with unabated warmth, at this day. All parties concurred in pronouncing Mr. Davis’ conduct of his department successful, able, and brilliant, and in the midst of the tide of misrepresentation, with which, during and since the war, it has been sought to overwhelm his reputation, the least candid of his accusers have been compelled to this reluctant confession.
Incidental to the late administration, but by no means traceable to its influence, had been legislation by Congress of a most important character, which was to give a powerful impulse to agencies long tending to the destruction of the Union. The election of Pierce had been carried with a unanimity unprecedented, upon the distinct pledge of the acceptance of the Compromise as a finality. The country, for months subsequently, reposed in profound quiet, produced by its confidence in an approaching season of unequaled prosperity, and exempt from all danger of political agitation. This hallucination was destined to be speedily and rudely dispelled by events, which afford striking evidence of how completely the peace and happiness of the American people have always been at the mercy of aspiring and unscrupulous demagogues. Mr. Stephen A. Douglas must ever be held, equally by both sections, responsible for the disastrous agitation, which followed his introduction of certain measures, under the pretense of a sentimental justice, or a concession of principle to the South, but in reality prompted by his personal ambition, and which greatly aided to precipitate the catastrophe of disunion.
Upon the application of the Territory of Nebraska for admission into the Union, Senator Douglas, from the Committee on Territories, submitted a bill creating the two Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, and affirming the supersession of the Missouri restriction of 1820, which prohibited slavery north of 36° 30', by the Compromise of 1850. It declared the Missouri restriction inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with territorial affairs, which had been adopted in the settlement of 1850, and therefore inoperative.
This bill was apparently a mere concession of principle to the South, not likely to be of much practical value, but still gratifying, as it gave to her citizens the right to carry their property into districts from which it had been hitherto inhibited. Passing both houses of Congress, in 1854, it was approved by the Pierce administration,11 sanctioned by the Democracy generally, and greeted by the South as a triumph. It was not imagined that a victory, so purely sentimental and intangible, could be accepted by the North, as a pretext for violent eruptions of sectional jealousy, and least of all did the South believe its author capable of the subsequent duplicity with which, by specious arguments and verbal ingenuity, he claimed for the measure, a construction far more insidious, but not less fatal to her interests, than the designs of proclaimed Abolitionists. The immediate result was a tempest of excitement in the Northern States, in the midst of which the so-called Republican party, for the first time, appeared as a formidable contestant in political struggles, and defeated the Democracy in almost every State election. The latter, with extreme difficulty, elected Mr. Buchanan to the Presidency two years afterwards.
In the meantime, while his term of office as Secretary of War was still unexpired, Mr. Davis had been elected, by the Legislature of Mississippi, to the Senate, for the term beginning March 4, 1857. On his return home, he was received by the Democracy of the State with distinguished honors. Dinners, receptions, and public entertainments of various kinds were tendered him; and, during the summer and autumn, previous to his departure for Washington, he addressed numerous large popular gatherings with his accustomed force and boldness upon pending issues. These addresses commanded universal attention, and were highly commended for their able, dispassionate, and statesman-like character.
His speech at Pass Christian, while on his journey to Washington, was a masterly and eloquent review of the condition of the country, with its causes and remedies. He attributed the national difficulties chiefly to the puritanical intolerance and growing disregard of constitutional obligations of the North. These influences seriously menaced the safety of the Union, for which he had no hope, unless in the event of a reaction in Northern sentiment, or of such resolute action by a united South as should compel her enemies to respect their constitutional duties. To the latter policy he looked as the best guarantee of the security of the South and the preservation of the Union. Interference by one State with the institutions of another could not, under any circumstances, be tolerated, even though resistance should eventually result in a dissolution of the Union. The latter event was possible – indeed, might become necessary – but should never be undertaken save in the last extremity. He would not disguise the profound emotion with which he contemplated the possibility of disunion. The fondest reminiscences of his life were associated with the Union, into whose military service, while yet a boy, he had entered. In his matured manhood he had followed its flag to victory; had seen its graceful folds wave in the peaceful pageant, and, again, its colors conspicuous amid the triumphs of the battle-field; he had seen that flag in the East, brightened by the sun at its rising, and, in the West, gilded by his declining rays – and the tearing of one star from its azure field would be to him as would the loss of a child to a bereaved parent.
This speech – one of the most eloquent he has ever made – was received by his audience with unbounded enthusiasm, and was approvingly noticed by the press of both sections.
At Mississippi City he delivered an address in explanation of his personal course, and in vindication of the administration of which he had lately been a member. He had obeyed the will of Mississippi, respecting the legislation of 1850, though against his convictions, and, in the present disorders in Kansas, he saw the fruits of the unwise substitution of expediency for principle. Of President Pierce he could speak only in terms of eulogy, defended his vetoes of bills “for internal improvements and eleemosynary purposes,” depicting, in passages of rare and fervent eloquence, his heroic adherence to the Constitution, elevated patriotism, and distinguished virtues. Contrasting the conduct of the Fillmore and Pierce administrations concerning the Cuban question, he avowed his belief that Cuba would then be in possession of the United States had Congress sustained General Pierce in his prompt and decided suggestions as to the Black Warrior difficulty.
Mr. Davis expressed his approbation of the course pursued by the late administration with reference to Nicaragua. “Unlawful expeditions” should be suppressed, though he should rejoice at the establishment of American institutions in Central America, and maintained the right of the United States to a paramount influence in the affairs of the continent, with which European interference should be, at all times, promptly checked.
When the Thirty-fifth Congress assembled in December, 1857, the Kansas question had already developed a difficult and critical phase. The rock upon which Mr. Buchanan’s administration was to split had been encountered, and the wedge prepared, with which the Democratic party was destined to be torn asunder.
CHAPTER VI
RETURN OF MR. DAVIS TO THE SENATE – OPENING EVENTS OF MR. BUCHANAN’S ADMINISTRATION – TRUE INTERPRETATION OF THE LEGISLATION OF 1854 – SENATOR DOUGLAS THE INSTRUMENT OF DISORGANIZATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY – HIS ANTECEDENTS AND CHARACTER – AN ACCOMPLISHED DEMAGOGUE – DAVIS AND DOUGLAS CONTRASTED – BOTH REPRESENTATIVES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SECTIONS – DOUGLAS AMBITION – HIS COUP D’ETAT, AND ITS RESULTS – THE KANSAS QUESTION – DOUGLAS’ TRIUMPHS OVER THE SOUTH AND THE UNITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY LOST – “SQUATTER SOVEREIGNTY” – PROPERLY CHARACTERIZED – DAVIS’ COURSE IN THE KANSAS STRUGGLE – DEBATE WITH SENATOR FESSENDEN – PEN-AND-INK SKETCH OF MR. DAVIS AT THIS PERIOD – TRUE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL EVENTS TO THE SOUTH – SHE RIGHTLY INTERPRETS THEM – MR. DAVIS’ COURSE SUBSEQUENT TO THE KANSAS IMBROGLIO – HIS DEBATES WITH DOUGLAS – TWO DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKING – DAVIS THE LEADER OF THE REGULAR DEMOCRACY IN THE THIRTY-SIXTH CONGRESS – HIS RESOLUTIONS – HIS CONSISTENCY – COURSE AS TO GENERAL LEGISLATION – VISITS THE NORTH – SPEAKS IN PORTLAND, BOSTON, NEW YORK, AND OTHER PLACES – REPLY TO AN INVITATION TO ATTEND THE WEBSTER BIRTH-DAY FESTIVAL – MR. SEWARD’S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE “IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT” – MR. DAVIS BEFORE MISSISSIPPI DEMOCRATIC STATE CONVENTION – PROGRESS OF DISUNION – DISSOLUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY – SPEECHES OF MR. DAVIS AT PORTLAND AND IN SENATE
Mr. Davis returned to the Senate at a period marked by agitation, no less menacing to the Union than that which had so seriously threatened it in 1850. His health at this time was exceedingly infirm, and for several months he was so much prostrated by his protracted sufferings, that a proper regard for the suggestions of prudence would have justified his entire abstinence from the labors and excitements of this stormy period. Again and again, however, did his heroic devotion carry him from his sick bed to the capitol, to engage in the death-struggle of the South, with her leagued enemies, for safety in the Union, which she was still loath to abandon, even under the pressure of intolerable wrong. Frequently, with attenuated frame and bandaged eyes, he was to be seen in the Senate, at moments critical in the fierce sectional conflict; and at the final struggle upon the Kansas question, not even the earnest admonitions of his physician, that to leave his chamber would probably be followed by the most dangerous results, were availing to induce his absence from the scene.
The opening events of the first session of the Thirty-fifth Congress, (the first incidental to the administration of Mr. Buchanan,) were far from being auspicious of the continued unity of the Democratic party, which, for several years past, the intelligence of the country had correctly appreciated as an essential condition to the preservation of the Union.
Mainly through the undivided support given him by the South, Mr. Buchanan was elected upon the Cincinnati platform of 1856, which was a re-affirmation of the cardinal tenets of the Democratic faith, involving also emphatic approval of the Kansas-Nebraska legislation two years previous. Not until months after his inauguration were there any indications of hostility to his administration within the ranks of his own party. Nor had there been any avowed difference of construction as to the end and effect of the legislation of 1854. The rare unanimity with which the South had been rallied to the support of the Democracy was based upon the unreserved admission, by all parties, that the Kansas-Nebraska act was designedly friendly in its spirit, at all events, to Southern interests. No Southern statesman, for a moment, dreamed that it was capable of an interpretation unfriendly to his section. That the plain purpose of the bill was to remove the subject of slavery outside the bounds of congressional discussion, and to place it in the disposition of the States separately, and in the Territories, when organizing for admission as States, was regarded by the South as the leading vital principle which challenged her enthusiastic support. Such, indeed, was the doctrine asserted by the entire Democratic party of the South, enunciated by the administration, and tacitly approved by the Northern Democracy. Very soon, however, after the meeting of Congress, the action of Senator Douglas revealed him as the instrument of disorganization in his party. To a proper understanding of his motives and conduct at this conjuncture, a brief statement of his antecedents is essential.
Stephen A. Douglas was now in the meridian of life and the full maturity of his unquestionably vigorous intellectual powers. For twenty-five years he had been prominent in the arena of politics, and as a member of Congress his course had been so eminently politic and judicious as to make him a favorite with the Democracy, both North and South. To an unexampled degree his public life illustrated the combination of those characteristics of the demagogue, a fertile ingenuity, facile accommodation to circumstances, and wonderful gifts of the ad captandum species of oratory, so captivating to the populace, which in America peculiarly constitute the attributes of the “rising man.” Douglas was not wanting in noble and attractive qualities of manhood. His courage was undoubted, his generosity was princely in its munificence to his personal friends, and he frequently manifested a lofty magnanimity. In his early youth, deprived of the advantages of fortune and position, the discipline of his career was not propitious to the development of the higher qualities of statesmanship – with which, indeed, he was scantily endowed by nature. It is as the accomplished politician, subtle, ready, fearless, and indefatigable, that he must be remembered. In this latter character he was unrivaled.
Not less than Davis was Douglas a representative man, yet no two men were more essentially dissimilar, and no two lives ever actuated by aspirations and instincts more unlike. Douglas was the representative of expediency – Davis the exponent of principles. In his party associations Douglas would tolerate the largest latitude of individual opinion, while Davis was always for a policy clearly defined and unmistakable; and upon a matter of vital principle, like Percy, would reluctantly surrender even the “ninth part of a hair.” To maintain the united action of the Democratic party on election day, to defeat its opponents, to secure the rewards of success, Douglas would allow a thousand different constructions of the party creed by as many factions. Davis, on the other hand, would, and eventually did, approve the dissolution of the party, when it refused an open, manly enunciation of its faith. For mere party success Douglas cared every thing, and Davis nothing, save as it ensured the triumph of Constitutional principles. Both loved the Union and sought its perpetuity, but by different methods; Douglas by never-ending compromises of a quarrel, which he should have known that the North would never permit to be amicably settled; by staving off and ignoring issues which were to be solved only by being squarely met. Davis, too, was not unwilling to compromise, but he wearied of perpetual concession by the South, in the meanwhile the North continuing its hostility, both open and insidious, and urged a settlement of all differences upon a basis of simple and exact justice to both sections.
Douglas was preëminently the representative politician of his section, and throughout his career was a favorite with that boastful, bloated, and mongrel element, which is violently called the “American people,” and which is the ruling element in elections in the Northern cities. In character and conduct he embodied many of its materialistic and socialistic ideas, its false conception of liberty, its pernicious dogmas of equality, and not a little of its rowdyism.
Davis was the champion of the South, her civilization, lights, honor, and dignity. He was the fitting and adequate exponent of a civilization which rested upon an intellectual and æsthetical development, upon lofty and generous sentiments of manhood, a dignified conservatism, and the proud associations of ancestral distinction in the history of the Union. Always the Senator in the sense of the ideal of dignity and courtesy which is suggested by that title, he was also the gentleman upon all occasions; never condescending to flatter or soothe the mob, or to court popular favor, he lost none of that polished and distinguished manner, in the presence of a “fierce Democracie,” which made him the ornament of the highest school of oratory and statesmanship of his country.
The ambition of Douglas was unbounded. The recognized leader, for several years, of the Northern Democracy, his many fine personal qualities and courageous resistance of the ultra Abolitionists secured for him a considerable number of supporters in the Southern wing of that party. The Presidency was the goal of his ambition, and for twenty years his course had been sedulously adjusted to the attainment of that most coveted of prizes to the American politician. On repeated occasions he had been flattered by a highly complimentary vote in the nominating conventions of the Democracy. Hitherto he had been compelled to yield his pretensions in favor of older members of his party or upon considerations of temporary availability. It was evident, however, that in order to be President, he must secure the nomination in 1860. The continued ascendancy of the Democracy was no longer, as heretofore, a foregone conclusion, and, besides, there were others equally aspiring and available. His Presidential aspirations appeared, indeed, to be without hope or resource, save through the agency of some adroit coup d’etat, by which the truculent and dominant free-soil sentiment of the North, which he had so much affronted by his bid for Southern support in the introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, could be conciliated. In Illinois, his own State, the Abolition strength was alarmingly on the increase, and to secure his return to the Senate at the election to be held in 1858, an object of prime importance in the promotion of his more ambitious pretensions, he did not scruple to assume a position, falsifying his previous record, wantonly insulting and defiant to his Southern associates, and in bold antagonism to a Democratic administration. The sequel of this rash and ill-judged course was the overthrow of his own political fortunes, the disintegration of his party, and the attempted dissolution of the Union.
The earliest recommendations of Mr. Buchanan, respecting the Kansas controversy, which, several months since, had developed in that Territory into a species of predatory warfare, marked by deeds of violence and atrocity, between the Abolition and Pro-slavery parties, were signalized by a coalition of the followers of Douglas with the Abolitionists and other opponents of the administration. The speedy pacification of the disorders in Kansas, by the prompt admission of that Territory, was the condition essential to the success of Mr. Buchanan’s entire policy. He accordingly recommended the admission of Kansas into the Union, with the “Lecompton” constitution, which had been adopted in September, 1857, by the decisive vote of six thousand two hundred and twenty-six in favor of that constitution, with slavery, and five hundred and nine for it, without slavery. A rival instrument, adopted by an election notoriously held exclusively under the control of Abolitionists, prohibiting slavery, was likewise presented.
For months the controversy was waged in Congress between the friends of the administration and its enemies, and finally resulted in a practical triumph of the Free-soil principle. The Anti-Lecompton coalition of Douglas and the Abolitionists, aided by the defection of a few Southern members, successfully embarrassed the policy of the administration by defeating its recommendations, and eventually carried a measure acceptable to Northern sentiments and interests.
Mr. Douglas thus triumphed over a Democratic administration, at the same time giving a shock to the unity of the Democratic party, from which it has never recovered, and effectually neutralized its power as a breakwater of the Union against the waves of sectional dispute. The alienation between himself and his former associates was destined never to be adjusted, as indeed it never should have been, in consideration of his inexcusable recreancy to the immemorial faith of his party. Mr. Douglas simply abandoned the South, at the very first moment when his aid was seriously demanded. Nay, more; he carried with him a quiver of Parthian arrows, which he discharged into her bosom at a most critical moment in her unequal contest.
It is not to be denied that Mr. Douglas’ new interpretation of the Kansas-Nebraska act was urged by himself and his advocates as having a merit not to be overlooked by the North, in its suggestion of a method of restricting slavery, presenting superior advantages. “Squatter sovereignty,” as advocated by Mr. Douglas, proposing the decision of the slavery question by the people of the Territories, while yet unprepared to ask admission as States, was far more effectual in its plans against slavery, and only less prompt and open, than the designs of the Abolitionists. It would enable the “Emigrant Aid Societies,” and imported janizaries of Abolition to exclude the institutions of the South from the Territories, the joint possessions of the two sections, acquired by an enormously disproportionate sacrifice on the part of the South, with a certainty not to be realized, for years to come, perhaps, from the Abolition policy of congressional prohibition.12 According to Mr. Douglas’ theory, the existence of slavery in all the Territories was to depend upon the verdict of a few hundred settlers or “squatters” upon the public lands. It practically conceded to Northern interests and ideas every State to be hereafter admitted, and under the operation of such a policy it was not difficult to anticipate the fate of slavery, at last even in the States.
From the inception of this controversy until its close Mr. Davis was fully committed to the policy of Mr. Buchanan, and his position was in perfect harmony with that of all the leading statesmen of the South. Less prominent, perhaps, in debate, from his constant ill-health during the first session, than at any other period of his public life, he was still zealous and influential.
An interesting incident of the session was a discussion between Mr. Davis and Mr. Fessenden, of Maine, a Senator second only to Mr. Seward among Abolition leaders, in point of intellect, and behind none in his truculent animosity to Southern institutions. Reviewing the message of Mr. Buchanan with great severity, Fessenden took occasion to discuss elaborately the slavery question, with all its incidental issues. Mr. Davis replied, not at great length, but with much force and spirit. The discussion terminated with the following colloquy, which is interesting chiefly in its personal allusions:
“Mr. Fessenden. … Sir, I have avowed no disunion sentiments on this floor – neither here nor elsewhere. Can the honorable gentleman from Mississippi say as much?
“Mr. Davis. Yes.
“Mr. Fessenden. I am glad to hear it, then.
“Mr. Davis. Yes. I have long sought for a respectable man who would allege the contrary.
“Mr. Fessenden. I make no allegation. I asked if he could say as much. I am glad to hear him say so, because I must say to him that the newspapers have represented him as making a speech in Mississippi, in which he said he came into General Pierce’s cabinet a disunion man. If he never made it, very well.
“Mr. Davis. I will thank you to produce that newspaper.
“Mr. Fessenden. I can not produce it, but I can produce an extract from it in another paper.
“Mr. Davis. An extract! then that falsifies the text.
“Mr. Fessenden. I am very glad to hear the Senator say so. I made no accusation – I put the question to him. If he denies it, very well. I only say that, with all the force and energy with which he denies it, so do I. The accusation never has been made against me before. On what ground does the Senator now put it?..
“Mr. Davis. Does the Senator ask me for an answer?
“Mr. Fessenden. Certainly, if the Senator feels disposed to give one.
“Mr. Davis. If you ask me for an answer, it is easy. I said your position was fruitful of such a result. I did not say you avowed the object – nothing of the sort, but the reverse…
“Mr. Fessenden. That is a matter of opinion, on which I have a right to entertain my view as well as the Senator his…
“Mr. Davis. Mr. President, I rise principally for the purpose of saying that I do not know whence springs this habit of talking about intimidation. I am not the first person toward whom a reply has been made, that we are not to carry our ends by intimidation. I try to intimidate nobody; I threaten nobody; and I do not believe – let me say it once for all – that any body is afraid of me – and I do not want any body to be afraid of me.
“Mr. Fessenden. I am. [Laughter.]
“Mr. Davis. I am sorry to hear it; and if the Senator is really so, I shall never speak to him in decided terms again.
“Mr. Fessenden. I speak of it only in an intellectual point of view. [Laughter.]
“Mr. Davis. Then, sir, the Senator was in a Pickwickian sense when he began; there were no threats, no intimidations, and he is just where he would have been if he had said nothing.” [Laughter.]…
While the Kansas question was pending in Congress, a sketch of Mr. Davis, in connection with two other prominent Southern Senators, which appeared in the correspondence of a leading journal, was extensively copied in the newspapers of the day. We extract that portion which relates specially to Mr. Davis. The portrait is from the pen of one who had no sympathy with his political views:
DAVIS, HUNTER, AND TOOMBS, THE SOUTHERN TRIUMVIRATE
[Correspondence of the Missouri Democrat.]
“Washington City, January 21.
“Yesterday, when Hale was speaking, the right side of the chamber was empty, (as it generally is during the delivery of an antislavery speech,) with the exception of a group of three who sat near the centre of the vacant space. This remarkable group, which wore the air if not the ensigns of power, authority, and public care, was composed of Senators Davis, Hunter, and Toombs. They were engaged in an earnest colloquy, which, however, was foreign to the argument Hale was elaborating; for though the connection of their words was broken before it reached the gallery, their voices were distinctly audible, and gave signs of their abstraction. They were thinking aloud. If they had met together, under the supervision of some artist gifted with the faculty of illustrating history and character by attitude and expression, who designed to paint them, in fresco, on the walls of the new Senate chamber, the combination could not have been more appropriately arranged than chance arranged it on this occasion. Toombs sits among the opposition on the left, Hunter and Davis on the right; and the fact that the two first came to Davis’ seat – the one gravitating to it from a remote, the other from a near point – may be held to indicate which of the three is the preponderating body in the system, if preponderance there be; and whose figure should occupy the foreground of the picture if any precedence is to be accorded. Davis sat erect and composed; Hunter, listening, rested his head on his hand; and Toombs, inclining forward, was speaking vehemently. Their respective attitudes were no bad illustration of their individuality. Davis impressed the spectator, who observed the easy but authoritative bearing with which he put aside or assented to Toomb’s suggestions, with the notion of some slight superiority, some hardly-acknowledged leadership; and Hunter’s attentiveness and impassibility were characteristic of his nature, for his profundity of intellect wears the guise of stolidity, and his continuous industry that of inertia; while Toomb’s quick utterance and restless head bespoke his nervous temperament and activity of mind. But, though each is different from either of the others, the three have several attributes in common. They are equally eminent as statesmen and debaters; they are devoted to the same cause; they are equals in rank, and rivals in ambition; and they are about the same age, and none of them – let young America take notice – wears either beard or mustache. I come again to the traits which distinguish them from each other. In face and form, Davis represents the Norman type with singular fidelity, if my conception of that type be correct. He is tall and sinewy, with fair hair, gray eyes, which are clear rather than bright, high forehead, straight nose, thin, compressed lips, and pointed chin. His cheek bones are hollow, and the vicinity of his mouth is deeply furrowed with intersecting lines. Leanness of face, length and sharpness of feature, and length of limb, and intensity of expression, rendered acute by angular, facial outline, are the general characteristics of his appearance.”
The controversy, excited by the question of the admission of Kansas, can not be viewed as having terminated with the mere practical decision of her status, as a State tolerating or prohibiting slavery. Southern men had freely admitted the improbability of the permanent abiding of the institution in that Territory, or elsewhere, north of the line of 36° 30', and their defeat had a far more alarming significance than the exclusion of slavery from soil where the laws of nature opposed its location. Important conclusions were deducible from the lesson of Kansas, which the South must have been smitten with voluntary blindness not to have accepted. Of the purpose of the Republican party, never to consent to the admission of additional slave States, there was added to constantly accumulating proof from other sources, the bold declarations of Abolition members of Congress. Recent experience clearly demonstrated that the South could no longer rely upon the Northern Democracy in support of the plainest guarantees of the Constitution, for the protection of her property, when they were in conflict with the dominant fanaticism of that section. Accordingly, the Southern Democracy, wisely and bravely resolved, and the unfortunate issue should not prejudge their action, to require of their Northern associates, as the condition of continued coöperation, a pledge of better faith in the future.
It was in the progress of events, which may be justly called the sequel of the Kansas controversy, that Mr. Davis was most conspicuous during his second service in the Senate. His course was such as might have been anticipated from his zealous and vigilant regard for constitutional principles, and the rights and interests of his section. His feeble health had prevented his frequent participation in the struggles incidental to the Kansas question, but in those subsequent struggles, which marked the dissolution of the Democratic party, he was the constant, bold, and able adversary of Douglas. The ingenious sophistries of the latter were subjected to no more searching and scathing refutations than those with which Davis met his every attempt at their illustration.
At this period the position of Mr. Davis was no less prominent than in 1850, though his speeches were less frequent and voluminous. Upon both occasions his elevation was an ample reward to honorable ambition, but would have been perilous in the extreme had he been deficient in those great and rare qualities which were necessary to its maintenance. Among his numerous contests with the distinguished exponents of the sentiment in opposition to the South, none are more memorable than his collisions with Douglas.
Of these the most striking occurred on the 23d of February, 1859, and on the 16th and 17th of May, 1860. To have matched Douglas with an ordinary contestant, must always have resulted in disaster; it would have been to renew the contest of Athelstane against Ivanhoe. Douglas was accustomed to testify, cheerfully, to the power of Davis, as evinced in their senatorial struggles; and it is very certain that at no other hands did he fare so badly, unless an exception be made in favor of the remarkable speech of Senator Benjamin, of Louisiana. The latter was an adept in the strategy of debate, a parliamentary Suchet.
The 23d of February, 1859, was the occasion of a protracted battle between Davis and Douglas, lasting from midday until nearly night. This speech of Mr. Davis is, in many respects, inferior to his higher oratorical efforts, realizing less of the forms of oratory which he usually illustrated so happily, and is wanting somewhat in that symmetry, harmony, and comeliness in all its features, with which his senatorial efforts are generally wrought to the perfection of expression. The circumstances under which it was delivered, however, fully meet this criticism, and show a most remarkable readiness for the instantaneous and hurried grapple of debate, and this latter quality was the strong point of Douglas’ oratory. The latter had replied at great length, and with evident preparation, to a speech made by Mr. Davis’ colleague (Mr. Brown), who was not present during Douglas’ rejoinder. Without hesitation Mr. Davis assumed the place of his absent colleague, and the result was a running debate, lasting several hours, and exhibiting on both sides all the vivacious readiness of a gladiatorial combat.
In their ordinary and characteristic speeches there was an antithesis, no less marked than in their characters as men. Douglas was peculiarly American in his style of speaking. He dealt largely in the argumentum ad hominem; was very adroit in pointing out immaterial inconsistencies in his antagonists; he rarely discussed general principles; always avoided questions of abstract political science, and struggled to force the entire question into juxtaposition with the practical considerations of the immediate present.
In nearly all of Davis’ speeches is recognized the pervasion of intellect, which is preserved even in his most impassioned passages. He goes to the very “foundations of jurisprudence,” illustrates by historical example, and throws upon his subject the full radiance of that noble light which is shed by diligent inquiry into the abstract truths of political and moral science. Strength, animation, energy without vehemence, classical elegance, and a luminous simplicity, are features in Mr. Davis’ oratory which rendered him one of the most finished, logical, and effective of contemporary parliamentary speakers.
During the Thirty-sixth Congress, which assembled in December, 1859, Mr. Davis was the recognized leader of the Democratic majority of the Senate. His efforts, during this session, were probably the ablest of his life, and never did his great powers of analysis and generalization appear to greater advantage. On the second of February, 1860, Mr. Davis presented a series of seven resolves, which embodied the views of the administration, of an overwhelming majority of the Democratic members of the Senate, and of the Southern Democracy, and were opposed by Mr. Douglas (though absent from the Senate by sickness), Mr. Pugh, and by the Abolition Senators. They are important as the substantial expression of the doctrines upon which the Southern Democracy were already prepared to insist at the approaching National Convention.
The first resolution affirms the sovereignty of the States and their delegation of authority to the Federal Government, to secure each State against domestic no less than foreign dangers. This resolution was designed with special reference to the recent outrages of John Brown and his associate conspirators, several of whom had expiated their crimes upon the gallows, at the hands of the authorities of Virginia.
Resolution second affirms the recognition of slavery as property by the Constitution, and that all efforts to injure it by citizens of non-slaveholding States are violations of faith.
Third insists upon the absolute equality of the States.
The fourth resolution of the series, which embodied the material point of difference between Mr. Douglas and the majority of Democratic Senators, was modified, as stated by Mr. Davis, “after conference with friends,” and finally made to read thus:
“Resolved, That neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature, whether by direct legislation, or legislation of an indirect and unfriendly character, possesses power to annul or impair the constitutional right of any citizen of the United States to take his slave property into the common Territories, and there hold and enjoy the same while the territorial condition remains.”
Fifth declares it the duty of Congress to supply any needed protection to constitutional rights in a Territory, provided the executive and judicial authority has not the adequate means.
The sixth resolution was an emphatic repudiation of what Mr. Douglas, by an ingenious perversion of terms, and a bold array of sophisms, was pleased to designate “popular sovereignty” – reading thus:
“Resolved, That the inhabitants of a Territory of the United States, when they rightfully form a constitution to be admitted as a State into the Union, may then, for the first time, like the people of a State when forming a new constitution, decide for themselves whether slavery, as a domestic institution, shall be maintained or prohibited within their jurisdiction; and ‘they shall be admitted into the Union, with or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission.’”
The seventh and last of the series affirmed the validity and sanctity of the Fugitive Slave Law, and denounced all acts, whether of individuals or of State Legislatures, to defeat its action.
The struggle upon these resolutions lasted more than three months, the Senate not reaching a vote upon the first of the series until May 24, 1860. They constituted substantially the platform presented by the South at the Charleston Democratic Convention, in April, and upon which, after the withdrawal of the Southern delegations, the Presidential ticket of Breckinridge and Lane was nominated, and supported in the ensuing canvass, receiving the electoral votes of eleven States of the South.
I desire no divided flag for the Democratic party, seek not to depreciate the power of the Senator, or take from him any thing of that confidence he feels in the large army which follows his standard. I prefer that his banner should lie in its silken folds to feed the moth; but if it unrestrainedly rustles, impatient to be unfurled, we who have not invited the conflict, shrink not from the trial; we will plant our flag on every hill and plain; it shall overlook the Atlantic and welcome the sun as he rises from its dancing waters; it shall wave its adieu as he sinks to repose in the quiet Pacific.
Our principles are national; they belong to every State of the Union; and though elections may be lost by their assertion, they constitute the only foundation on which we can maintain power, on which we can again rise to the dignity the Democracy once possessed. Does not the Senator from Illinois see in the sectional character of the vote he received, that his opinions are not acceptable to every portion of the country? Is not the fact that the resolutions adopted by seventeen States, on which the greatest reliance must be placed for Democratic support, are in opposition to the dogma to which he still clings, a warning that if he persists and succeeds in forcing his theory upon the Democratic party, its days are numbered? We ask only for the Constitution. We ask of the Democracy only from time to time to declare, as current exigencies may indicate, what the Constitution was intended to secure and provide. Our flag bears no new device. Upon its folds our principles are written in living light; all proclaiming the constitutional Union, justice, equality, and fraternity of our ocean-bound domain, for a limitless future.
CHAPTER VII
ELECTION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN – HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE EVENT – THE OBJECTS AIMED AT BY HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY IDENTICAL IN THE DISCUSSION OF EVENTS OF THE LATE WAR – NORTHERN EVASION OF THE REAL QUESTION – THE SOUTH DID NOT ATTEMPT REVOLUTION – SECESSION A JUSTIFIABLE RIGHT EXERCISED BY SOVEREIGN STATES – BRIEF REVIEW OF THE QUESTION – WHAT THE FEDERALIST SAYS – CHIEF-JUSTICE MARSHALL – MR. MADISON – COERCION NOT JUSTIFIED AT THE NORTH PREVIOUS TO THE LATE WAR – REMARKS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS – OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN – OF HORACE GREELEY – SUCCESSFUL PERVERSION OF TRUTH BY THE NORTH – PROVOCATIONS TO SECESSION BY THE SOUTH – AGGRESSIONS BY THE NORTH – ITS PUNIC FAITH – LOSS OF THE BALANCE OF POWER – PATIENCE OF THE SOUTH – REMARKS OF HON. C. C. CLAY – WHAT THE ELECTION OF MR. LINCOLN MEANT – HIS ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY – REVELATIONS OF THE OBJECTS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY – WENDELL PHILLIPS – NO SECURITY FOR THE SOUTH IN THE UNION – MEETING OF CONGRESS – MR. DAVIS’ ASSURANCE TO PRESIDENT BUCHANAN – CONCILIATORY COURSE OF MR. DAVIS – HIS CONSISTENT DEVOTION TO THE UNION, AND EFFORTS TO SAVE IT – FORESEES WAR AS THE RESULT OF SECESSION, AND URGES THE EXHAUSTION OF EVERY EXPEDIENT TO AVERT IT – THE CRITTENDEN AMENDMENT – HOPES OF ITS ADOPTION – DAVIS WILLING TO ACCEPT IT IN SPITE OF ITS INJUSTICE TO THE SOUTH – REPUBLICAN SENATORS DECLINE ALL CONCILIATORY MEASURES – THE CLARKE AMENDMENT – WHERE RESTS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DISUNION? – STATEMENTS OF MESSRS. DOUGLAS AND COX – SECESSION OF THE COTTON STATES – A LETTER FROM JEFFERSON DAVIS TO R. B. RHETT, JR. – MR. DAVIS’ FAREWELL TO THE SENATE – HIS REASONS FOR WITHDRAWING – RETURNS TO MISSISSIPPI – MAJOR-GENERAL OF STATE FORCES – ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT – MR. DAVIS PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES
As had been foreseen, and, indeed, as was the inevitable sequence of the disruption of the Democratic party, Abraham Lincoln, the candidate of the Republican party, was, in November, 1860, elected President of the United States. This was the supreme and sufficient incitement to the adoption of the dreaded resort of disunion. As the occasion which finally brought the South to the attitude of resistance, the event acquires vast historical importance.
When it is conceded that Mr. Lincoln was elected in accordance with the forms of the Constitution, having received a majority of electoral votes; that the mere ceremony of election was attended by no unusual circumstances, we concede every possible ground upon which can be based an argument denying its ample justification of the course pursued by the South. Such an argument, however, leads to a wholly untenable conclusion, and may be easily exposed in its hypocritical evasion of the real question. We are here required to note the distinction between cause and occasion. As the final consummation of tendencies, long indicating the result of disunion, this event has an appropriate place in the recapitulation of those influences, and can be rightly estimated only in connection with their operation.
Trite observations upon the influence of passion and prejudice, over contemporary judgment, are not necessary to a due conception of the obstacles which, for the present, exclude candor from the discussion of the late movement for Southern independence. In the face of the disastrous overthrow of that movement, the wrecked hopes and fortunes of those who participated in it, discussion is chiefly serviceable, as it throws additional light upon the development of those eternal principles in whose ceaseless struggles men are only temporary agents.
History and biography are here most intimately blended; beginning from the same stand-point, they encounter common difficulties, and aim to explore the same general grounds of observation. So far as a verdict – from whatever tribunal, whether rendered at the bar of justice or in the award of popular opinion, when the embers of recent strife are still fiercely glowing – can affect the dispassionate judgment of History, the Southern people can not be separated, either in fact or in sentiment, from Jefferson Davis. He was the illustrious compatriot of six millions of freemen, who struck for nationality and independence, and lost – as did Greece and Poland before them; or he and they were alike insurgents, equally guilty of the crime of treason.
With an adroitness which does credit to the characteristic charlatanism of the North, an infinite variety of special questions and side issues have been interwoven with the narrative of the late war, for the obvious purpose of confounding the judgment of mankind regarding the great question which really constitutes the gravamen of the controversy. Conspicuous among these efforts, from both audacity and plausibility, are appeals to the sympathies of the world, in consideration of the abolition of slavery, which it is well known was merely an incident, and not the avowed design of the war.
Persistent in its introduction of the moral question of slavery, the North seeks to shield itself from the reproach justly visited upon its perpetration of an atrocious political crime, by an insolent intrusion of a false claim to the championship of humanity. Whatever may be the decision of Time upon the merits of slavery, it is in vain for the North to seek escape from its responsibility for an institution, protected and sustained by a government which was the joint creation of Southern and Northern hands.
The attempted dissolution of the Union by the South was a movement involving moral and political considerations, not unlike those incidental to revolutions in general, yet presenting certain peculiar characteristics, traceable to the inherent and distinctive features of the American political system. These latter considerations constitute a vital part of its justification. The South did not appeal only to the inalienable right of revolution, which is the natural guarantee of resistance to wrong and oppression. Nor did the States, severally, as they assumed to sever their connection with the Union, announce a purpose of constitutional revolution, or adopt a course inviting or justifying violence. Mr. Davis and those who coöperated with him, neither by the acts of secession, nor the subsequent confederation of the States under a new government, could have committed treason against Mr. Lincoln, since they were not his subjects. Nor yet were they traitors to the Government of the United States, since the States of which they were citizens had rescinded the grant of powers voluntarily made by them to that Government, and begun to exercise them in conjunction with other powers which they had withheld by express reservation.
It is impossible to conceive a movement, contemplating such important political changes, more entirely unattended by displays of violence, passion, and disorder. A simple assertion, with due solemnity, by each State, of its sovereignty – a heritage which it had never surrendered, but which had been respected by innumerable forms of recognition in the history of the Union – and the exercise of those attributes of sovereignty, which are too palpable to require that they shall be indicated, was the peaceable method resorted to of terminating a political alliance which had become injurious to the highest interests of one of the parties. Could there have been a more becoming and dignified exercise of the vaunted right of self-government? It is that right to which America is so conspicuously committed, and which has been such an inexhaustible theme for the tawdry rhetoric of Northern eloquence.
Even in the insolence of its triumph, the North feels the necessity of at least a decent pretext for its destruction of the cardinal feature in the American system of government – the sovereignty of the States. With habitual want of candor, Northern writers pretend that the Constitution of the United States does not affirm the sovereignty of the States, and that, therefore, secession was treason against that Constitution to which they had subscribed; in other words, the created does not give authority to the creator —i. e., the Constitution, which the States created, does not accredit sovereignty to the States, and, therefore, the States are not sovereign. It is not pretended that the States were not, each of them, originally independent powers, since they were so recognized by Great Britain, in the plainest terms, at the termination of the first revolution. Nor is it asserted that the union of the States, under the title of United States, was the occasion of any surrender of their individual sovereignty, as it was then declared that “each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence.” A conclusive demonstration of the retention of sovereignty by the States is seen in the entire failure of the Constitution, either by direct assertion or by implication, to claim its surrender to the Union.
If the sovereignty of the States be conceded, the South stands justified as having exercised an unquestionable right. It was never formally denied, even at the North, until Mr. Webster, in his debate with Mr. Calhoun, affirmed the doctrine of the supremacy of the Union, to which conclusion the Northern masses sprung with alacrity, as an available justification for compelling the submission of the South to the outrages which they had already commenced.
Volumes of testimony have been adduced, proving the theory of State sovereignty to have been the overwhelmingly predominant belief among the statesmen most prominent in the establishment of the Union, and in shaping the policy of the Government in its earlier history. Argument proved an unavailing offset to the stern decrees of the sword, and is quite unnecessary so long as the unanswerable logic of Calhoun, Davis, and a score of Southern statesmen remains upon the national records – a perpetual challenge, as yet unaccepted, to the boasted intellect of the North, and a significant warning of the final adjudication of the centuries. We shall intrude no argument of our own in support of State sovereignty, upon which rests the vindication of the South and her leaders. Before us are the apposite and conclusive assumptions of men who have been the revered sources of political inspiration among Americans.
The Federalist, that most powerful vindication of the Constitution, and earnest plea for its adoption by the States, assumes that it was a “compact,” to which “the States, as distinct and independent sovereigns,” were the parties. Yet this doctrine, the basis upon which rests the august handiwork of Madison and Hamilton, the “architects of the Constitution,” when applied by Davis and his compatriots, becomes treason! Such is the extremity to which despotism, in its wretched plea of expediency, is driven; and the candid, enlightened American of to-day realizes, in his country, a land in which “truth is treason, and history is rebellion.”
Chief-Justice Marshall, the great judicial luminary of America, and an authority not usually summoned to the support of doctrines hostile to the assumptions of Federal power, gave most emphatic testimony to the propriety of the States’ Rights view of the relations of State and Federal authority. In the Virginia Convention which ratified the Constitution, he said: “The State governments did not derive their powers from the General Government. But each government derived its powers from the people, and each was to act according to the powers given it. Would any gentleman deny this? He demanded, if powers not given were retained by implication? Could any man say, no? Could any man say that this power was not retained by the States, since it was not given away?” The view so earnestly urged by Marshall, was not only avowed generally, but Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania insisted upon a written declaration, in the Constitution, of the principle that certain attributes of sovereignty, which they did not delegate to the Union, were retained by the States.
Mr. Madison, whose great abilities were taxed to the utmost to secure the ratification of the Constitution by Virginia, vigorously and earnestly defended it against the allegation that it created a consolidated government. With the utmost difficulty, he secured a majority of ten votes, in the Virginia Convention, in favor of the Constitution, which his rival, Patrick Henry, denounced as destructive of State sovereignty.
Defining the expression, “We, the people,” Mr. Madison said: “The parties to it were the people, but not the people as composing one great society, but the people as composing ‘thirteen sovereignties.’” To quote Mr. Madison again: “If it were a consolidated government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient to establish it. But it was to be binding on the people of a State only by their own separate consent.” Under the influence of these arguments, and others of the same import from Mr. Madison, whom she thought, from his close relations to the Constitution, high authority upon all questions pertaining to its character, Virginia finally acceded to the Union. It is especially noteworthy, however, that Virginia, when becoming a party to the Constitution, expressly affirmed, in the most solemn manner, the right to “resume” her grants of power to the Federal Government.
In deference to the accumulated evidence upon this subject, came the unqualified statement, from eminent Northern authority,14 that, “This right [of secession] must be considered an ingredient in the original composition of the General Government, which, though not expressed, was mutually understood.”
But whatever may be thought of the prescriptive and inherent right of sovereignty, exercised by the South in withdrawing from the Union, as deducible from the peculiar nature of the American system, and as expounded by the founders of that system, there can be no question as to its entire accordance with the spirit of American polity. Authority is abundant in support of the assertion that, not even in the North, previous to the inception of the present revolution, was the idea of a constrained connection with the Union entertained. From every source of Northern opinion has come indignant repudiation of a coerced association of communities, originally united by a common pledge of fealty to the right of self-government.
Upon this subject Mr. John Quincy Adams spoke in language of characteristic fervor: “The indissoluble link of union between the people of the several States of this confederated nation is, after all, not in the right, but in the heart. If the day should ever come (may heaven avert it!) when the affections of the people of these States shall be alienated from each other – when the fraternal spirit shall give way to cold indifference, or collision of interest shall fester into hatred, the bands of political association will not long hold together parties no longer attracted by the magnetism of conciliated interests and kindly sympathies; and far better will it be for the people of the disunited States to part in friendship from each other than to be held together by constraint.”
Even Mr. Lincoln, whose statesmanship is not likely to be commemorated for its profundity or scholarship, fully comprehended the exaggerated reverence of the American mind for the “sacred right of self-government.” Now that his homely phrases are dignified by the Northern masses with the sanctity of the utterances of Deity, assuredly there should be no apprehension that his opinions may not be deemed conclusive. In 1848, Mr. Lincoln said: “Any people whatever have the right to abolish the existing government, and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most valuable, a most sacred right.”
A brave affirmation was this of the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence, that “Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed;” and one which would have commanded the united applause of the North, then and now, had the application concerned Hungary, Poland, Greece, or Mexico. But, with reference to the South, there was a most important modification of this admirable principle of equity and humanity. When asked, “Why not let the South go?” Abraham Lincoln, the President, in 1861, said: “Let the South go! Where, then, shall we get our revenue?” And the united North reëchoed: “Let the South go! Where, then, shall we look for the bounties and monopolies which have so enriched us at the expense of those improvident, unsuspecting Southerners? Where shall we find again such patient victims of spoliation?”
Mr. Horace Greeley frequently and emphatically, previous to the war, affirmed the right of changing its political association asserted by the South. Three days after the election of Mr. Lincoln, in November, 1860, his paper, the New York Tribune, said: “If the Cotton States shall become satisfied that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace… We must ever resist the right of any State to remain in the Union, and nullify or defy the laws thereof. To withdraw from the Union is quite another matter; and whenever any considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep it in. We hope never to live in a Republic whereof one section is pinned to another by bayonets.” On the 17th of December, 1860, the Tribune said: “If it [the Declaration of Independence] justifies the secession of three millions of colonists in 1776, we do not see why it would not justify the secession of five millions of Southerners from the Federal Union in 1861.”
Such are a few illustrations, to which might be added innumerable quotations, of the same import, from the most prominent sources of Northern opinion. Never has there been a question so capable of positive solution and easy comprehension, when subjected to the test of candid investigation, and never so successful a purpose to exclude the illumination of facts by persistent and ingenious misrepresentation. The North has reason for its extravagant exultation at the skill and audacity with which the brazen front of hypocrisy, for a time, at least, has successfully sustained, in the name of humanity and liberty, the most monstrous imposition and transparent counterfeit of virtue ever designed upon an intelligent age.
To the triumphant historical vindication of the South, there remains only the essential condition of a clear and truthful statement of the provocations which impelled her to adopt that long-deferred remedy, which is the last refuge of a people whose liberties are imperiled. Secession, however strong in its prescriptive or implied justification as a principle, was not to be undertaken from caprice, or trivial causes of dissatisfaction.
Abuses, numerous, serious, and consecutive, were required before disunion became either desirable or acceptable to the South. The native conservatism of the Southern character renders it peculiarly averse to agitation; to this were added social features, the safety of which would be greatly imperiled by civil war, and thus a train of influences tended to make Southern soil, of all others, the least favorable to the growth of revolutionary principles.
In the development of this volume, we have glanced at the progress of those sectional differences, at various periods precipitated by the insolent aggressions of Abolitionism, which steadily depreciated the value of the Union in Southern estimation. Continued aggressions by her enemies; their Punic faith, illustrated in a series of violated pledges, and habitual disregard of the conditions of the covenant which bound South and North together; petty outrages, taunts and insults, emanating from every possible source of public expression at the North, for many years had banished fraternal feeling and precluded those interchanges of comity between the sections which were the indispensable requisites to national harmony. It is undeniable, that for years previous to secession, the sentimental attachment to the Union, which was the distinctive characteristic of Southern patriotism – unlike the coarse, utilitarian estimate of the Union as a source of pecuniary profit, which constituted its value to the North – had been greatly impaired. Since 1850, and to a considerable extent during the preceding decade, the most sagacious statesmen of the South contemplated disunion as an event almost inevitable, unless averted by a contingency of very improbable occurrence. There must be an awakening by the North to a more just appreciation of its constitutional and patriotic obligations, or an unmanly submission by the South, to a condition of degrading inferiority, in a government to whose construction, prosperity, and distinction, she had contributed more than a proportionate share of influence.
Chief among the considerations which admonished the South of the perils which environed her situation in the Union, was the total destruction of that sectional balance, which had been wisely adjusted by its founders, as the safeguard of the weaker against the stronger influence. Having in mind the wise saying of Aristotle, that “the weak always desire what is equal and just, but the powerful pay no regard to it,” the statesmen of 1787 designedly shaped the chart of government with a view to the preservation of equality. The struggle between the weaker element, naturally contending in behalf of the equilibrium, and the stronger striving for its overthrow, was, at an early period, distinctly foreshadowed. With characteristic prevision, Alexander Hamilton, probably the foremost statesman of his day, foretold the nature of this contest over the principle of equality. Said that sagacious publicist: “The truth is, it is a contest for power, not for liberty.”
This contest, indeed, so long waged, was, many years since, decided overwhelmingly against the South. In 1850, the Northern majority in the House of Representatives, the popular branch of the government, had increased from a majority, in 1790, of five votes, to fifty-four. Years before, the legislation of Congress assumed that sectional bias, which was undeviatingly adhered to for the purpose, and with ample success, of the material depression of the South. Under the baleful influences of hostile legislation, of tariffs aimed directly at her commercial prosperity, of bounties for fostering multifarious Northern interests, her position in the Union was helpless and deplorable in the extreme. Yet, like a rock-bound Prometheus, with the insidious elements of destruction gnawing at her vitals, the South suffered herself to be chained by an influence of sentiment, of association, and reminiscence to the Union, fully conscious of the growing rapacity of her despoiler and of her own hopeless decline. Her infatuation was indeed marvelous, in trusting to the dawning of justice and generosity in a fierce, vindictive, and remorseless sectional majority.
The alarming portents of ultimately complete material prostration, to be consummated by these perversions of the purposes of the Union, were terribly significant, in view of the venom which actuated the enemies of the South. The sectional balance was hopelessly gone; Southern material prosperity destroyed by sectional legislation; not a check, originally provided by the Constitution for the protection of the weaker section, but had been virtually obliterated; Northern perfidy illustrated in the violation of every compact which, in operation, proved favorable to the South, while the latter was held to a rigid fidelity in all agreements favorable to her enemies; the nullification, by the legislatures of half the Northern States, of Federal laws for the protection of Southern property, are a few of those grievances which presented to the South the hard and inexorable alternative of resistance, or abject submission to endless insult and outrage.
A Southern Senator,15 announcing the secession of his State, and his own consequent withdrawal from the Senate, stated the question in a form, which even then had the authority of history.
“Not a decade, nor scarce a lustrum, has elapsed (since Alabama became a State) that has not been strongly marked by proofs of the growth and power of that antislavery spirit of the Northern people, which seeks the overthrow of that domestic institution of the South, which is not only the chief source of her prosperity, but the very basis of her social order and State polity. It is to-day the master-spirit of the Northern States, and had before the secession of Alabama, of Mississippi, of Florida, or of South Carolina, severed most of the bonds of the Union. It denied us Christian communion, because it could not endure what it calls the moral leprosy of slave-holding; it refused us permission to sojourn, or even to pass through the North with our property; it claimed freedom for the slave, if brought by his master into a Northern State; it violated the Constitution, and treaties, and laws of Congress, because designed to protect that property; it refused us any share of lands acquired mainly by our diplomacy, and blood, and treasure; it refused our property any shelter or security beneath the flag of a common government; it robbed us of our property, and refused to restore it; it refused to deliver criminals against our laws, who fled to the North with our property or our blood upon their hands; it threatened us by solemn legislative acts, with ignominious punishment, if we pursued our property into a Northern State; it murdered Southern men when seeking the recovery of their property on Northern soil; it invaded the borders of Southern States, poisoned their wells, burnt their dwellings, and murdered their people; it denounced us by deliberate resolves of popular meetings, of party conventions, and of religious, and even legislative assemblies, as habitual violators of the laws of God and the rights of humanity; it exerted all the moral and physical agencies that human ingenuity can devise, or diabolical malice can employ, to heap odium and infamy upon us, and to make us a by-word of hissing and of scorn throughout the civilized world.”
There was no room for uncertainty as to the significance of the election of Abraham Lincoln to the Presidency, in 1860, by a party exclusively sectional in organization, and upon a platform, which virtually declared the Union, as then constituted, in opposition to justice, humanity, and civilization.
The real danger to the South, involved in this election, was that it was a sectional triumph – a victory of North over South, in a contest where the South risked every thing, the North nothing. From time immemorial sincere patriots of both sections had deprecated the formation of sectional parties, organized upon geographical interests, or upon ideas confined to limited portions of the Union. Washington, in his farewell injunction, admonished his countrymen of the deplorable results which must follow the presentation of such issues.
The Chicago platform was more than a menace to the South; it was a defiance of law, a declaration of war upon the Constitution. The election of Lincoln was both a legal and moral severance of the bonds of Union. While he received the united vote of the North, save New Jersey, he did not receive one electoral vote from the South. His shaping of his administration was consistent with the character of the party which elected him. All his constitutional advisers were Northern men or Southern Abolitionists; social outlaws in their own section, in consequence of their notorious personal depravity, and infidelity to their immediate fellow-citizens. Of like character were the subordinate appointments of the Federal Government in Southern communities.
Nor was there reason to doubt the policy of the Government under its new management. Mr. Lincoln had been sufficiently communicative of his own bitter hostility to Southern institutions. In fact, with much show of justice, his admirers claimed for him the original suggestion of the idea of an “irrepressible conflict,” afterwards so elaborately pronounced by William H. Seward. Public announcements, from prominent speakers of the successful party, amply revealed the feast to which the South was invited. Wendell Phillips, the most able, eloquent, and sagacious of the original Abolitionists, thus pointedly defined the situation: “No man has a right to be surprised at this state of things. It is just what we have attempted to bring about. It is the first sectional party ever organized in this country. It does not know its own face, and calls itself national; but it is not national – it is sectional. The Republican party is a party of the North pledged against the South.”
SPEECH OF HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS, ON WITHDRAWING FROM THE U. S. SENATE. JAN. 21, 1861
Mr. Davis. I rise, Mr. President, for the purpose of announcing to the Senate that I have satisfactory evidence that the State of Mississippi, by a solemn ordinance of her people, in convention assembled, has declared her separation from the United States. Under these circumstances, of course, my functions are terminated here. It has seemed to me proper, however, that I should appear in the Senate to announce that fact to my associates, and I will say but very little more. The occasion does not invite me to go into argument; and my physical condition would not permit me to do so, if otherwise; and yet it seems to become me to say something on the part of a State I here represent, on an occasion so solemn as this.
It is known to Senators who have served with me here, that I have, for many years, advocated, as an essential attribute of State sovereignty, the right of a State to secede from the Union. Therefore, if I had not believed there was justifiable cause; if I had thought that Mississippi was acting without sufficient provocation, or without an existing necessity, I should still, under my theory of the Government, because of my allegiance to the State of which I am a citizen, have been bound by her action. I, however, may be permitted to say that I do think she has justifiable cause, and I approve of her act. I conferred with her people before that act was taken, counseled them then that if the state of things which they apprehended should exist when the convention met, they should take the action which they have now adopted.
I hope none who hear me will confound this expression of mine with the advocacy of the right of a State to remain in the Union, and to disregard its constitutional obligations by the nullification of the law. Such is not my theory. Nullification and secession, so often confounded, are, indeed, antagonistic principles. Nullification is a remedy which it is sought to apply within the Union, and against the agent of the States. It is only to be justified when the agent has violated his constitutional obligations, and a State, assuming to judge for itself, denies the right of the agent thus to act, and appeals to the other States of the Union for a decision; but when the States themselves, and when the people of the States, have so acted as to convince us that they will not regard our constitutional rights, then, and then for the first time, arises the doctrine of secession in its practical application.
A great man, who now reposes with his fathers, and who has often been arraigned for a want of fealty to the Union, advocated the doctrine of nullification because it preserved the Union. It was because of his deep-seated attachment to the Union – his determination to find some remedy for existing ills short of a severance of the ties which bound South Carolina to the other States, that Mr. Calhoun advocated the doctrine of nullification, which he proclaimed to be peaceful – to be within the limits of State power, not to disturb the Union, but only to be a means of bringing the agent before the tribunal of the States for their judgment.
Secession belongs to a different class of remedies. It is to be justified upon the basis that the States are sovereign. There was a time when none denied it. I hope the time may come again, when a better comprehension of the theory of our Government, and the inalienable rights of the people of the States, will prevent any one from denying that each State is a sovereign, and thus may reclaim the grants which it has made to any agent whomsoever.
I, therefore, say I concur in the action of the people of Mississippi, believing it to be necessary and proper, and should have been bound by their action if my belief had been otherwise; and this brings me to the important point which I wish, on this last occasion, to present to the Senate. It is by this confounding of nullification and secession, that the name of a great man, whose ashes now mingle with his mother earth, has been evoked to justify coercion against a seceded State. The phrase, “to execute the laws,” was an expression which General Jackson applied to the case of a State refusing to obey the laws while yet a member of the Union. That is not the case which is now presented. The laws are to be executed over the United States, and upon the people of the United States. They have no relation to any foreign country. It is a perversion of terms – at least it is a great misapprehension of the case – which cites that expression for application to a State which has withdrawn from the Union. You may make war on a foreign State. If it be the purpose of gentlemen, they may make war against a State which has withdrawn from the Union; but there are no laws of the United States to be executed within the limits of a seceded State. A State, finding herself in the condition in which Mississippi has judged she is – in which her safety requires that she should provide for the maintenance of her rights out of the Union – surrenders all the benefits (and they are known to be many), deprives herself of the advantages (and they are known to be great), severs all the ties of affection (and they are close and enduring), which have bound her to the Union; and thus divesting herself of every benefit – taking upon herself every burden – she claims to be exempt from any power to execute the laws of the United States within her limits.
I well remember an occasion when Massachusetts was arraigned before the bar of the Senate, and when the doctrine of coercion was rife, and to be applied against her, because of the rescue of a fugitive slave in Boston. My opinion then was the same that it is now. Not in a spirit of egotism, but to show that I am not influenced, in my opinion, because the case is my own, I refer to that time and that occasion, as containing the opinion which I then entertained, and on which my present conduct is based. I then said that if Massachusetts, following her through a stated line of conduct, choose to take the last step which separates her from the Union, it is her right to go, and I will neither vote one dollar nor one man to coerce her back; but will say to her, God speed, in memory of the kind associations which once existed between her and the other States.
It has been a conviction of pressing necessity – it has been a belief that we are to be deprived, in the Union, of the rights which our fathers bequeathed to us – which has brought Mississippi into her present decision. She has heard proclaimed the theory that all men are created free and equal, and this made the basis of an attack upon her social institutions; and the sacred Declaration of Independence has been invoked to maintain the position of the equality of the races. The Declaration of Independence is to be construed by the circumstances and purposes for which it was made. The communities were declaring their independence; the people of those communities were asserting that no man was born, to use the language of Mr. Jefferson, booted and spurred, to ride over the rest of mankind; that men were created equal – meaning the men of the political community; that there was no divine right to rule; that no man inherited the right to govern; that there were no classes by which power and place descended to families; but that all stations were equally within the grasp of each member of the body politic. These were the great principles they announced; these were the purposes for which they made their declaration; these were the ends to which their enunciation was directed. They have no reference to the slave; else, how happened it, that, among the items of arraignment against George III, was, that he endeavored to do just what the North has been endeavoring of late to do, to stir up insurrection among our slaves. Had the Declaration announced that the negroes were free and equal, how was the prince to be arraigned for raising up insurrection among them? And how was this to be enumerated among the high crimes which caused the colonies to sever their connection with the mother country? When our Constitution was formed, the same idea was rendered more palpable; for there we find provision made for that very class of persons as property; they were not put upon the footing of equality with white men – not even upon that of paupers and convicts; but, so far as representation was concerned, were discriminated against as a lower caste, only to be represented in the numerical proportion of three-fifths.
Then, Senators, we recur to the compact which binds us together; we recur to the principles upon which our Government was founded; and when you deny them, and when you deny to us the right to withdraw from a government, which, thus perverted, threatens to be destructive of our rights, we but tread in the path of our fathers when we proclaim our independence, and take the hazard. This is done, not in hostility to others – not to injure any section of the country – not even for our own pecuniary benefit; but from the high and solemn motive of defending and protecting the rights we inherited, and which it is our duty to transmit unshorn to our children.
I find in myself, perhaps, a type of the general feeling of my constituents toward yours. I am sure I feel no hostility toward you, Senators from the North. I am sure there is not one of you, whatever sharp discussion there may have been between us, to whom I can not now say, in the presence of my God, I wish you well; and such, I am sure, is the feeling of the people whom I represent toward those whom you represent. I, therefore, feel that I but express their desire, when I say I hope, and they hope, for peaceable relations with you, though we must part. They may be mutually beneficial to us in the future, as they have been in the past, if you so will it. The reverse may bring disaster on every portion of the country; and if you will have it thus, we will invoke the God of our fathers, who delivered them from the power of the lion, to protect us from the ravages of the bear; and thus, putting our trust in God, and in our firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right as best we may.
In the course of my service here, associated, at different times, with a great variety of Senators, I see now around me some with whom I have served long; there have been points of collision, but whatever of offense there has been to me, I leave here – I carry with me no hostile remembrance. Whatever offense I have given, which has not been redressed, or for which satisfaction has not been demanded, I have, Senators, in this hour of our parting, to offer you my apology for any pain which, in the heat of discussion, I have inflicted. I go hence unincumbered of the remembrance of any injury received, and having discharged the duty of making the only reparation in my power for any injury offered.
Mr. President and Senators, having made the announcement which the occasion seemed to me to require, it only remains for me to bid you a final adieu.
A frequent accusation alleged against Mr. Davis and other Southern Senators who adopted his course of a formal withdrawal from the Senate, is that they thus gave the Republican party control of the Senate, and voluntarily surrendered its power to the hostile administration soon to be inaugurated. It is a sufficient answer to this statement that the mere admission that the administration was hostile to Southern interests, and menacing to Southern safety and honor, or even that the South had good reason for so believing, is to fix the responsibility of disunion elsewhere than upon the Southern leaders.
To have retained his seat under such circumstances would have been altogether inconsistent with Mr. Davis’ conception of the nature of the position. He was committed, by public announcement, to a very different view of the obligations of the representative of a State in the Federal Congress. Holding it to be a point of honor not to occupy such a relation, with the object of hostility to the Government, years ago he announced, in connection with an allusion to a calumnious insinuation, that he would answer in monosyllables the man who would charge him with being a disunionist.
Entertaining his view of the character of the American political system, of which the foundation was the doctrine of a paramount allegiance of the citizen to his State, when Mississippi withdrew from the Union, he had no other alternative than to vacate the position which he held by her commission, and which was, at once, the sign of the equality and sovereignty of the States, and of the adherence of each to the league by which she was united to the others. To represent a State adhering to the Union, and use the position to make war upon the Government, or to retain a seat in Congress when the State had, by its sovereign fiat, revoked its grants, and withdrawn from the league, were offenses belonging to the last stage of decadence in political morality and personal honor.
Retiring from the Senate, Mr. Davis returned, within a few days thereafter, to his residence in Mississippi. The State was not unmindful of the necessity of preparations for a war which, though not deemed inevitable, was yet extremely probable. Mr. Davis was honored by an appointment to the command of the militia of the State, with the rank of Major-General. His retirement upon his plantation thus promised to be of short duration, but before he could assume the responsibilities which Mississippi, in this reiteration of her confidence, had conferred, the voice of millions invoked his guidance of their destinies in the hazardous experiment of independent national existence.
Secession, in its rapid progress, confirmed the threadbare theory of the progressive tendency of revolutionary movements. Acquiring impetus as it advanced, before the first of February, 1861, six States had declared themselves no longer members of the Union.20 Representatives from these States met, in convention, at Montgomery, Alabama, on 4th February, 1861, for the purpose of forming a provisional government. On the 8th February, this body adopted a constitution, and proclaimed an addition to the family of nations, under the title of The Confederate States of America.
The next day the Congress of the Confederate States announced its choice of the two highest constitutional officers of the new Government:
President, Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi.
Vice-President, Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia.
CHAPTER VIII
THE CONFEDERACY ESTABLISHED AND IN OPERATION – CALMNESS AND MODERATION OF THE SOUTH – THE MONTGOMERY CONSTITUTION – THE IMPROVEMENTS UPON THE FEDERAL INSTRUMENT – POPULAR DELIGHT AT THE SELECTION OF MR. DAVIS AS PRESIDENT – MOTIVES OF HIS ACCEPTANCE – HIS PREFERENCE FOR THE ARMY – DAVIS THE SYMBOL OF SOUTHERN CHARACTER AND HOPES – ON HIS WAY TO MONTGOMERY – A CONTRAST – INAUGURATION AND INAUGURAL ADDRESS – THE CONFEDERATE CABINET – TOOMBS – WALKER – MEMMINGER – BENJAMIN – MALLORY – REAGAN – HISTORICAL POSITION OF PRESIDENT DAVIS – THE TWO POWERS – EXTREME DEMOCRACY OF THE NORTH – NOBLE IDEAL OF REPUBLICANISM CHERISHED BY THE SOUTH – DAVIS’ REPRESENTATIVE QUALITIES AND DISTINGUISHED SERVICES – THE HISTORIC REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CONFEDERATE CAUSE – EARLY HISTORY OF THE GOVERNMENT AT MONTGOMERY – CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT DAVIS UNLIMITED – PRESIDENT DAVIS’ ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY – HIS MILITARY ADMINISTRATION – THE CONFEDERATE ARMY – WEST POINT – NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER OF FORTS SUMTER AND PICKENS – MR. BUCHANAN’S PITIABLE POLICY – THE ISSUE OF PEACE OR WAR – PERFIDIOUS COURSE OF THE LINCOLN ADMINISTRATION – MR. SEWARD’S DALLIANCE WITH THE CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONERS – HIS DECEPTIONS – THE EXPEDITION TO PROVISION THE GARRISON OF SUMTER – REDUCTION OF THE FORT – WAR – GUILT OF THE NORTH – ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR
Thus, without the disorder of anarchy, and without the violence of armed conflict, a new and imposing structure of state was speedily erected from the separated fragments. The event was indeed unparalleled, and, to the mind of the world, unused to the novel spectacle of the dismemberment of an empire, except as the consummation of years of bloodshed, its philosophy was difficult of comprehension.
The sixth of November, 1860, was the ominous day upon which the revolution, so long threatened, and so often deferred by Southern concession and sacrifice, was inaugurated. Upon that day, with the election of Abraham Lincoln, was opened a new volume in American history. Upon that day, the American Union, “formed to establish justice,” resting upon the principle of equality as its foundation-stone, passed under the control of an arrogant majority, pledged to its perversion, to the oppression of nearly one-half its members. From the profession of fraternity, and the outward pretense of comity, it passed under the domination of principles whose origin was discord and whose logical result was dissolution.
The answer of those who were threatened most seriously by this subversion of the Government of their fathers, though well considered, neither debated with passion, nor concluded with rashness, was worthy of men – the descendants of the authors of American Independence, and educated in that political school which teaches the assertion of the rights of the few against the power of the many. A manly resistance, such as only threatened degradation inspires in the bosoms of freemen, which the insolence of faction had long defied and a conscious physical superiority had haughtily derided, was, at length, thoroughly aroused. Within a few months, the revolutionary movement, begun in November, and pressed, by its authors, to its inevitable consequences, had reached the important result of a withdrawal of nearly one-fourth of the States constituting the American Union.
The new government, in the incidents attending its construction and setting in operation, fully vindicated the earnest and conscientious convictions of the people who had called it into existence. The absence of tumult and of all passionate display, at Montgomery, was in marked contrast with the indecent exultation witnessed at Washington from the adherents of the incoming administration. The calmness, moderation, and evident earnestness of purpose which prevailed at the South, and was thus manifested by those who were intrusted with the framing of the new government, impressed the world to an extent that prepared it to entertain a sympathy for the Southern cause not to have been expected from the prevalent, though erroneous, impressions of foreigners respecting the merits of the sectional quarrel in America.
That secession was not a revolutionary movement, but merely the necessary defense of a people threatened with material ruin and political degradation, by a revolution which had already been consummated, was amply demonstrated by its immediate consequences. The Confederate leaders, at Montgomery, exhibited an almost religious veneration for the spirit, forms, and associations of the government which they had abandoned. The strict adherence of the Montgomery Constitution to the features of the Federal instrument, indicates the absurdity of the impression that it was a proclamation of revolution; and the circumstances of its adoption are totally inconsistent with a correct conception of the conduct of an insurgent body.
It was a signal improvement upon the original American Constitution, and the few alterations made were commended by enlightened and conservative intellects every-where, as necessary changes in the perfection of the American polity. The object sought, and successfully consummated, was to embody every valuable principle of the old Constitution with certain remedial provisions for the correction of obvious evils, which experience had fully indicated. Among these changes, which were universally recognized as of the utmost value, were provisions making the Presidential term six years, instead of four, as under the old system, and precluding reëlection; permitting cabinet ministers to participate in the debates of Congress, and the virtual abolition of the pernicious system of removing all officials, of whatever degree, upon each advent of a new administration. The Confederate Constitution positively prohibited the African slave-trade, which the Federal Constitution had failed to do. A striking provision, and one never before avowed in any similar instrument, was the prohibition of duties for the purpose of protection. There was, indeed, nothing whatever in the Montgomery instrument which a candid and enlightened public sentiment, even at the North, might not have fully approved, excepting the ample and avowed protection to property in slaves. This, it was claimed, was not an alteration of the old Constitution, but merely a formal interpretation of its obvious purpose.
In no respect was the action of the new Confederacy deemed more fortunate than in the selection of its leader. That, in the choice of Mr. Davis as President, the Congress only responded to the preconceived choice of the Southern people, was attested by the spontaneous acclamation with which the announcement was received. Even those who had been in doubt as to the proper personage to endow with the powers and responsibilities of a position, at once the most onerous, and, looking to the contingencies of the early future, a long and sanguinary war, with the chances of a disastrous termination, the most precarious of modern times, yielded hearty recognition of the wise selection of the Congress.
The responsibilities and difficulties of the trust, did not suggest to Mr. Davis hesitation as to its acceptance. If this, the highest distinction which public appreciation had yet tendered him should prove a forlorn hope, his sense of duty would no more permit hesitation than in the assumption of more cheaply-earned honors. Entertaining no purpose of inglorious ease, amid the trials and perils, which, with a prevision, rare, indeed, at that period, he already anticipated, his own preference was for a different station of public service. Months subsequently he indicated the post of danger as the post of duty to which he had aspired in that gigantic struggle through which his country must pass to the assurance of independence. “I then imagined,” said he, “that it might be my fortune again to lead Mississippians in the field, and to be with them where danger was to be braved and glory won. I thought to find that place which I believed to be suited to my capacity – that of an officer in the service of the State of Mississippi.”21
Of the public conviction as to his preëminent fitness, there could not be a question. His character, his abilities, his military education and experience, had long been recognized throughout the Union, and his exalted reputation was a source of just pride to the South. No Southern statesman presented so admirable a combination of purity, dignity, firmness, devotion, and skill – qualities for which there is an inexorable demand in revolutionary periods. William Tell, with his cross-bow and apple, to the rustic simplicity of the Swiss, was the very embodiment of the genius of liberty. Far beyond any influence of fiction was the magic potency of the red shirt and felt hat of Garibaldi to imaginative Italy; and Washington, as Lamartine said, with his sword and the law, was the symbol standing erect at the cradle of American liberty. Equally with the greatest of these prototypes was Jefferson Davis, the symbol of the noble aspirations of the proud, impulsive, chivalrous race which confided to him the conduct of its destinies through the wilderness of revolution to the goal of independence and nationality beyond. He did not seek the position; had not been conspicuous in flaming exhortations to popular assemblies; had not employed any of the arts of the demagogue – of flattery or cajolery of the masses into a false and extravagant estimate of his qualities; but before the world were his character, fame, and services, in unadorned simplicity, painted only in the severe colors of truth. It was the tribute to virtue, most to be valued when unsought; the award of honor, only appropriate when merited and becomingly worn.
Mr. Davis’ assumption of his trust was characterized by a dignity, absence of ostentation, and profound appreciation of its delicate nature, in the highest degree imposing. From it was augured such a worthy administration of public affairs as would secure for the Confederacy, if permitted the blessings of peace, an enviable position among the nations of the earth. But his first announcement of its policy indicated his appreciation of the danger of war, in which its utmost exertions would be required to vindicate the independence which the States had declared. To the heroic maintenance of that position he committed himself by the most emphatic avowals; and in whatever contingency, whether of peace or war, his purpose was one of deathless resistence to any denial of the right of self-government, which his fellow-citizens had exercised.
Informed of his election, Mr. Davis immediately left his home for the seat of government. Along the route to Montgomery he was greeted, by the people, with every possible demonstration of patriotic enthusiasm and personal regard. In response to these demonstrations, he at several points addressed the people in terms of characteristic eloquence, dignity and moderation.
Proud, indeed, must ever be, to the Southern people, the contrast of the noble bearing of their chosen ruler with the display of vulgarity attending the journey of Mr. Lincoln from Springfield to Washington. These two men – the one with the calm dignity of the statesman and the polished bearing of the gentleman; the other with coarse jests and buffoonery, upon the eve of the most important event in their individual history, and pregnant with significance to millions – were no bad indices of the civilization of their respective sections.
Arriving in Montgomery, Mr. Davis was inaugurated on the 18th February, with a simplicity of ceremony, an absence of personal inflation, and a degree of popular enthusiasm, which well befitted the formal assertion of true republican liberty, equally protected against the license of mobs and the usurpations of tyrants. The ceremonies of inauguration were little more than the taking of the oath of office and the delivery of the inaugural address. The inaugural of President Davis is unquestionably of the highest order of state papers. As a model of composition, it is rarely equaled; and its statement of the position of the South, the grievances which had led to the assumption of that position, her hopes, aspirations, and purposes, has never been surpassed in power and perspicuity, by any similar document.
INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT DAVIS, DELIVERED AT THE CAPITOL, MONDAY, FEB. 18, 1861
Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of America; Friends and Fellow-Citizens:
Called to the difficult and responsible station of Chief Executive of the Provisional Government which you have instituted, I approach the discharge of the duties assigned to me with an humble distrust of my abilities, but with a sustaining confidence in the wisdom of those who are to guide and aid me in the administration of public affairs, and an abiding faith in the virtue and patriotism of the people.
Looking forward to the speedy establishment of a permanent government to take the place of this, and which, by its greater moral and physical power, will be better able to combat with the many difficulties which arise from the conflicting interests of separate nations, I enter upon the duties of the office, to which I have been chosen, with the hope that the beginning of our career, as a Confederacy, may not be obstructed by hostile opposition to our enjoyment of the separate existence and independence which we have asserted, and, with the blessing of Providence, intend to maintain. Our present condition, achieved in a manner unprecedented in the history of nations, illustrates the American idea that governments rest upon the consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter or abolish governments whenever they become destructive of the ends for which they were established.
The declared purpose of the compact of union from which we have withdrawn, was “to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity;” and when, in the judgment of the sovereign States now composing this Confederacy, it had been perverted from the purposes for which it was ordained, and had ceased to answer the ends for which it was established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot-box, declared, that so far as they were concerned, the government created by that compact should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted a right which the Declaration of Independence of 1776 had defined to be inalienable. Of the time and occasion for its exercise, they, as sovereigns, were the final judges, each for itself. The impartial and enlightened verdict of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct, and He, who knows the hearts of men, will judge of the sincerity with which we labored to preserve the government of our fathers in its spirit. The right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the States, and which has been affirmed and re-affirmed in the bills of rights of States subsequently admitted into the Union of 1789, undeniably recognizes in the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the purposes of government. Thus the sovereign States, here represented, proceeded to form this Confederacy, and it is by abuse of language that their act has been denominated a revolution. They formed a new alliance, but within each State its government has remained, and the rights of person and property have not been disturbed. The agent, through whom they communicated with foreign nations, is changed; but this does not necessarily interrupt their international relations.
Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from the former Union to the present Confederacy, has not proceeded from a disregard on our part of just obligations, or any failure to perform any constitutional duty; moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights of others; anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly justified by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton aggression on the part of others, there can be no cause to doubt that the courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States will be found equal to any measures of defense which honor and security may require.
An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of a commodity required in every manufacturing country, our true policy is peace and the freest trade which our necessities will permit. It is alike our interest, and that of all those to whom we would sell and from whom we would buy, that there should be the fewest practicable restrictions upon the interchange of commodities. There can be but little rivalry between ours and any manufacturing or navigating community, such as the North-eastern States of the American Union. It must follow, therefore, that a mutual interest would invite good will and kind offices. If, however, passion or the lust of dominion should cloud the judgment or inflame the ambition of those States, we must prepare to meet the emergency, and to maintain, by the final arbitrament of the sword, the position which we have assumed among the nations of the earth. We have entered upon the career of independence, and it must be inflexibly pursued. Through many years of controversy with our late associates, the Northern States, we have vainly endeavored to secure tranquillity, and to obtain respect for the rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separation; and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity of the Confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled; but if this be denied to us, and the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, it will but remain for us, with firm resolve, to appeal to arms and invoke the blessings of Providence on a just cause.
As a consequence of our new condition, and with a view to meet anticipated wants, it will be necessary to provide for the speedy and efficient organization of branches of the Executive Department, having special charge of foreign intercourse, finance, military affairs, and the postal service.
For purposes of defense, the Confederate States may, under ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon the militia; but it is deemed advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that there should be a well-instructed and disciplined army, more numerous than would usually be required on a peace establishment. I also suggest that, for the protection of our harbors and commerce on the high seas, a navy adapted to those objects will be required. These necessities have doubtless engaged the attention of Congress.
With a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers, in so far as it is explanatory of their well-known intent, freed from the sectional conflicts which have interfered with the pursuit of the general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that States, from which we have recently parted, may seek to unite their fortunes with ours under the government which we have instituted. For this your Constitution makes adequate provision; but beyond this, if I mistake not the judgment and will of the people, a reunion with the States from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable. To increase the power, develop the resources, and promote the happiness of the Confederacy, it is requisite that there should be so much of homogeneity that the welfare of every portion shall be the aim of the whole. Where this does not exist, antagonisms are engendered which must and should result in separation.
Actuated solely by the desire to preserve our own rights and promote our own welfare, the separation of the Confederate States has been marked by no aggression upon others, and followed by no domestic convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have received no check; the cultivation of our fields has progressed as heretofore; and even should we be involved in war, there would be no considerable diminution in the production of the staples which have constituted our exports, and in which the commercial world has an interest scarcely less than our own. This common interest of the producer and consumer can only be interrupted by an exterior force, which should obstruct its transmission to foreign markets – a course of conduct which would be as unjust toward us as it would be detrimental to manufacturing and commercial interests abroad. Should reason guide the action of the Government from which we have separated, a policy so detrimental to the civilized world, the Northern States included, could not be dictated by even the strongest desire to inflict injury upon us; but if otherwise, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it, and the suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness of our aggressors. In the meantime, there will remain to us, besides the ordinary means before suggested, the well-known resources for retaliation upon the commerce of an enemy.
Experience in public stations, of subordinate grade to this which your kindness has conferred, has taught me that care, and toil, and disappointment, are the price of official elevation. You will see many errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate, but you shall not find in me either a want of zeal or fidelity to the cause that is to me highest in hope and of most enduring affection. Your generosity has bestowed upon me an undeserved distinction – one which I neither sought nor desired. Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your wisdom and patriotism, I rely to direct and support me in the performance of the duty required at my hands.
We have changed the constituent parts but not the system of our Government. The Constitution formed by our fathers is that of these Confederate States, in their exposition of it; and, in the judicial construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its true meaning.
Thus instructed as to the just interpretation of the instrument, and ever remembering that all offices are but trusts held for the people, and that delegated powers are to be strictly construed, I will hope, by due diligence in the performance of my duties, though I may disappoint your expectations, yet to retain, when retiring, something of the good-will and confidence which welcomed my entrance into office.
It is joyous, in the midst of perilous times, to look around upon a people united in heart, where one purpose of high resolve animates and actuates the whole – where the sacrifices to be made are not weighed in the balance against honor, and right, and liberty, and equality. Obstacles may retard – they can not long prevent – the progress of a movement sanctified by its justice, and sustained by a virtuous people. Reverently let us invoke the God of our fathers to guide and protect us in our efforts to perpetuate the principles which, by his blessing, they were able to vindicate, establish, and transmit to their posterity, and with a continuance of His favor, ever gratefully acknowledged, we may hopefully look forward to success, to peace, and to prosperity.
Working in great harmony between its executive and legislative departments, the new government, within a very few weeks, presented an extraordinary spectacle of compact organization, though in all its parts it was yet purely provisional. The Cabinet announced by the President, embraced, for the most part, names well known to the country in connection with important public trusts. It may not be inappropriate to speak briefly here of those who sustained to President Davis the close relations of constitutional advisers.
The expedition was some hours on its way,25 when its purpose to provision the fort was announced to the Governor of South Carolina by an agent of the United States. This announcement was telegraphed to Montgomery by General Beauregard, who also asked for instructions. His government replied, that if the message was authentic, a demand should be made for the surrender of the fort to the Confederate forces; and in the event of refusal, its reduction should be undertaken. On the 11th of April the demand was made and refused.26 In obedience to the orders of his government General Beauregard opened fire upon Fort Sumter early on the morning of the 12th April. On the 13th the fort surrendered.
The calculations of Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet, as to the result to be produced by the attack on Fort Sumter, provoked by their deliberate and dishonest design, were not disappointed. A furious and instantaneous rush to arms by the North followed the intelligence of the surrender of the fort, and revealed the ferocious lust with which it had awaited the signal to begin the crusade against the liberties and property of the South. As no possible trait of guilt had been wanting in the means employed to precipitate hostilities, so no conceivable feature of atrocity was to be wanting in the conduct of a war by the North, produced by its own avarice, perfidy, and lust of dominion.
The brief recapitulation which we have given sufficiently exposes the pretexts upon which the North began the war of coercion. Assuming that the national dignity had been insulted, and the national honor violated, by an attack upon the flag of the Union, under the impious profession of vindicating the law, the North drew its sword against the sovereignty of the States. It had procured the assault upon Sumter – that essential step to the desired frenzy of the masses. By a shallow device, the South had been provoked to initiate resistance – that long-sought pretext which should justify the most barbaric invasion of modern times. Yet, under this flimsy imposition, the North cloaks its crime, and exults in its anticipated immunity from those execrations which have been the reward of similar examples of turpitude. The spirit of inquiry is not to be thus deftly eluded, nor the avenging sentence of history so easily perverted. The question shall not be, who fired the first shot? but, who offered the first aggression? who first indicated the purpose of hostility? We are not required to await the bursting forth of the flames over our heads, when the fell intent of the incendiary is revealed to our sight. The menace of the murderer justifies his intended victim in eluding the blow while the steel is uplifted.
Jefferson Davis signed the order for the reduction of Fort Sumter, but he did not thereby invoke the calamities of war. That act was simply the patriot’s defiance to the menace of tyranny. It was the choice of the freeman between resistance and shame.
CHAPTER IX
EVENTS CONSEQUENT UPON THE BOMBARDMENT OF FORT SUMTER – MR. LINCOLN BEGINS THE WAR BY USURPATION – THE BORDER STATES – CONTINUED DUPLICITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT – VIRGINIA JOINS THE COTTON STATES – AFFAIRS IN MARYLAND, MISSOURI, AND KENTUCKY – UNPROMISING PHASES OF THE SITUATION, AFFECTING THE PROSPECTS OF THE SOUTH – DIVISIONS IN SOUTHERN SENTIMENT – THE NORTHERN DEMOCRACY – PRESIDENT DAVIS’ ANTICIPATIONS REALIZED – HIS RESPONSE TO MR. LINCOLN’S PROCLAMATION OF WAR – PUBLIC ENTHUSIASM IN THE SOUTH – PRESIDENT DAVIS’ MESSAGE – VIRGINIA THE FLANDERS OF THE WAR – REMOVAL OF THE CONFEDERATE CAPITAL TO RICHMOND – POLICY OF THAT STEP CONSIDERED – POPULAR REGARD FOR MR. DAVIS IN VIRGINIA – ACTION OF THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES – NORTH CAROLINA; HER NOBLE CONDUCT, AND EFFICIENT AID TO THE CONFEDERACY – MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN VIRGINIA – GENERAL LEE – HIS SERVICES IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE WAR – MINOR ENGAGEMENTS – PREPARATIONS FOR THE GREAT STRUGGLE IN VIRGINIA – AN IMPORTANT HISTORICAL QUESTION – CHARGES AGAINST MR. DAVIS CONSIDERED – HIS STATESMAN-LIKE PREVISION – DID HE ANTICIPATE AND PROVIDE FOR WAR? – WHEN MR. DAVIS’ RESPONSIBILITY BEGAN – HIS ENERGETIC PREPARATION – THE PREVAILING SENTIMENT AT MONTGOMERY AS TO THE WAR – QUOTATIONS FROM GENERAL EARLY AND GENERAL VON MOLKTE
Events quickly followed the surrender of Fort Sumter, foreshadowing the violence and magnitude of the strife about to be joined between the sundered sections of America. If the North showed itself prompt and enthusiastic to recognize the signal of conquest and spoliation, the South was tenfold more resolute and confident in its triple armor of right. If the adroit appeals of Mr. Lincoln’s adherents, in behalf of an “insulted flag,” and an “outraged national dignity,” broke down the barriers of party, and united the Northern masses in an imagined crusade of patriotism for the rescue of the Union, the occasion brought to the Confederacy accessions of strength, which, if they did not ensure a successful defense, established the fact of protracted resistance.
Mr. Lincoln and his advisers promptly seized upon the favorable opportunity presented by the fanatical excitement prevalent throughout the North. Within forty-eight hours after the intelligence of the bloodless encounter of Sumter was flashed over the land, his proclamation of war against the seceded States was read by thousands of excited people.27 A flimsy and indefensible perversion of an act, passed by Congress, in 1795, which simply provided the raising of armed posses “in aid of the civil authorities,” was the shallow pretext, under which was masked the real design of a war which was to terminate in the destruction of the sovereignty of the States. Beginning with this clear usurpation of the power of Congress, which is alone authorized to declare war, and proclaiming a purpose to “maintain the honor, the integrity, and existence” of the Union, “and the perpetuity of popular government,” the work of conquest was begun.
The role undertaken by the Federal government was embarrassed by many difficulties. It had not yet relinquished the hope of retaining the Border States firm in their adhesion to the Union. As yet the action of those States had indicated no purpose of separation from the North, unless in the event of direct interference by the Federal authorities with their domestic concerns, or in the event of a war of subjugation against the seceded States. Popular feeling in all the Border States was unmistakably resolved against the policy of coercion, and in several instances State Legislatures had declared a purpose to make common cause with the seceded States, whenever the Federal authorities should appeal to force against them. It was difficult indeed for the latter to reconcile their hostile purposes against the Confederate States with the professions of peaceful intentions which they so freely tendered to the Border States. Well pleased, however, with the uniform success of its policy of duplicity, the Federal administration adhered to its “treacherous amusement of double and triple negotiations,” hoping to amuse the Border States, by pacifying assurances, until its schemes of coercion could be thoroughly prepared.28 But the sham was too transparent to deceive. Friendly assurances and protestations of a desire to avoid the effusion of blood were not to be accepted in the face of gigantic martial preparations.
An immediate consequence of Mr. Lincoln’s proclamation of war, and invocation of an army of seventy-five thousand men, for the subjugation of the Cotton States, was to throw the mighty energies and heroic spirit of Virginia, hitherto neutral and hesitating, into hearty sympathy with the Confederacy. The sublime courage and devotion of this noble State, manifested by the circumstances of her accession to the cause of her sister States, have been the theme of repeated, but not extravagant eulogy. With a full conviction of her own peculiar perils in a war which she had zealously striven to prevent; from which, whatever its eventualities, she had little to hope, and with a perfect prevision of the ruin which was to ravage her bosom, Virginia proudly assumed the post of leadership and of peril in the struggle for those immortal principles, of which her soil was the nursery and her illustrious sons the foremost champions. The historic prestige of Virginia was heightened by this act of supreme devotion, and the value of her influence was speedily demonstrated by the enthusiastic accession of other States to the cause which she had espoused. The ordinance of secession, adopted by the Virginia Convention, was followed immediately by a temporary alliance29 with the Confederate States, and in a few weeks afterward the Confederacy embraced, in addition to its original members, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas, each of which, by formal State action, ratified the Confederate constitution.
The arbitrary acts of the Federal government, in Maryland and Missouri, not only vindicated the course of those States which had interpreted its policy as one of subjugation, but greatly strengthened the already preponderant Southern sympathies of those two commonwealths. Increasing by consecutive proclamations his demands for troops, Mr. Lincoln soon had nearly two hundred thousand men under arms. These troops assembled under false pretenses at different points, were used for purposes of glaring despotism; overawing the pronounced Southern feeling of the people by military arrests, by licentious and violent demonstrations of the soldiery. Missouri was soon in open revolt against the Federal authorities, and in Maryland a general uprising was prevented by the thorough precautions which had been adopted, rendering clearly hopeless such an undertaking. The Legislature of Missouri, unquestionably representing a large majority of her citizens, eventually adopted an ordinance of secession and ratified the constitution of the Confederate States. Kentucky, vainly attempting a policy of neutrality, was divided in sentiment and in strength between the contestants. A portion of her citizens, residing within the Confederate lines, several months after the beginning of the war, declared the State out of the Union, and associated Kentucky with the Confederacy.
Such were the immediate consequences resulting from the capture of Fort Sumter. All hopes of peace vanished in the rush of events which daily contributed new elements to the incipient strife, and with constant reinforcements of strength and feeling to each of the contending parties, there was wanting no omen of a struggle bloody and exhaustive beyond all previous example.
There were phases of the situation not to be lightly appreciated by so thoughtful a statesman as President Davis, which did not encourage that sanguine conviction, so extravagantly indulged in by many popular leaders, of an overwhelming and immediate triumph of the Southern cause. The immense disparity of physical resources, as was abundantly shown by the lessons of history, could be neutralized by a wise public administration, by superior valor, and by that high sense of public virtue, in its original Roman sense of fortitude, endurance, and willing sacrifice in the cause of country, which is the last and sure defense of a nation’s liberties. Nor were those important advantages of the South, to the value of which historical precedents have so conclusively testified – a conscious rectitude of purpose – a supreme conviction that theirs was the better cause, and that, besides, it was a war for home and family, to be fought mainly upon their own soil – to be overlooked in an intelligent estimate of the relative strength of the belligerents.
It was not a failure to recognize these great advantages which forbade wise and reflective Southern statesmen to indulge in those grotesque exhibitions of braggadocio, with which demagogues amused excited crowds at railway stations and upon street-corners. There was an element of weakness in the South, which, looking to the contingencies of the future, and remembering the incertitude of war, might prove the source of serious danger. This was the absence of that unity in the South, to which all her statesmen had looked forward, whenever actual battle should be joined between the defenders and assailants of Southern liberties. To see a “United South,” had been for years the dream of Calhoun’s noble intellect. Davis, with equal energy and ability, had striven for such united action by the South as would command peace and security in the Union, or independence beyond its limits. But now the battle was joined, and the dream was not to be realized.
Kentucky was hopelessly divided, and though, from the overwhelming majority of her people in sympathy with the South, were to come thousands of gallant soldiers, the Confederacy was to be denied the powerful aid which the brave heart and mighty resources of united Kentucky should have thrown into the scale. Missouri, in consequence of her geographical position, peculiarly assailable by the North-western States, and by divisions among her population, was similarly situated; while Maryland, a gallant and patriotic State, not less than South Carolina devoted to the independence of the South, was securely shackled at the first demonstration, by her people, of sympathy with their invaded countrymen.
But not only was there a failure to realize united action by those States, which, by geographical contiguity, no less than by identity of political institutions, constituted what was designated as The South. There was by no means a thoroughly harmonious sentiment among the people of those States which had joined the Southern alliance. This was conspicuously the case in Western Virginia and Eastern Tennessee.30 Though apparently insignificant in the midst of the general enthusiasm which prevailed in the early months of the war, these and other instances of local disaffection were to prove, at more than one critical period, fruitful of embarrassment. Intelligence of Confederate disasters was always the signal for exhibitions of that covert disloyalty which Confederate success compelled to concealment. Always ready to assist the invaders of their country, the so-called “Union men” of the South were valuable auxiliaries to the Federal armies as spies, and as secret enemies to the cause of the patriots; but they were not more hurtful and insidious in these capacities than as the nucleus around which crystallized, under the direction of disappointed demagogues, the various elements of discontent which were subsequently developed.
Yet in both sections was the outward seeming at least of an undivided war sentiment. The Union party of the South, as it had previously existed – a powerful political organization, embracing a majority of the people of the Border States – did not more immediately disappear, as the certainty of war was developed, than did the party of peace at the North. The Northern Democracy did not, for a moment, strive to breast the popular current, but its leaders, the life-long allies of the South, committed, by a thousand declarations to the cause of States’ Rights, eagerly vied with the Republican leaders in threats of vengeance against the South. The Dickinsons, Everetts, Cochranes, Logans, and Butlers – hitherto the professed friends and advocates of the South – with that pliant accommodation to circumstances, so befitting the instincts of the demagogue, in their harangues to howling mobs, proclaimed themselves the advocates of a ruthless and indiscriminate warfare upon a people who had been driven, by intolerable wrongs, into patriotic resistance.
We have already described the attitude and condition of the Confederate Government at Montgomery previous to the attack upon Fort Sumter. The honorable exertions of President Davis, cordially approved by Congress and the people, to avoid a collision of arms, were disappointed, and events had now verified his life-long conviction, that the exercise of their sovereignty, by the States, would be attended by a war involving their existence. Sustained by an unlimited popular confidence, with a comparatively perfected organization, and with every possible preparation that the difficulties of its situation would permit, the Government met, with commendable composure, the shock of arms which its chief had foreseen to be inevitable.
The proclamation of President Lincoln, declaring war upon the Confederate States, was promptly responded to by President Davis, in official announcements, appropriately recognizing the condition of public affairs, and inviting energetic preparations for immediate hostilities. He at once called upon the various States for quotas of volunteers for the public defense. By public proclamation, he invited applications for privateering service, in which armed vessels might assist in the public defense on the high seas; under letters of marque and reprisal granted by Congress.31
In every instance, and by all classes of citizens, an enthusiastic response was given to the demands of the Government. Individuals and corporations entered into a generous and patriotic rivalry in the tender of aid to the cause. Wealthy citizens donated large sums of money or supplies, while railroad and transportation companies tendered valuable assistance in the conveyance of troops and stores. An enthusiastic desire to enter the public service was manifested in every community. Men decrepit from age, or infirm from disease, were importunate in demanding any service suitable to their condition. Volunteering progressed so actively that a few weeks only sufficed to show that the Confederacy – for the present at least – would not want soldiers. In all the States the responses to the call for volunteers exceeded the quotas.
Congress assembled in special session, in obedience to a proclamation of the President, on the 29th of April. The message was an eminently characteristic document, and made a profound impression both in Europe and the United States. Its calm and clear statements were in marked contrast with the wild elements of war convulsing the country. Europe was not less amazed and delighted with its dignity and force, than was the North impressed with the earnest terms in which the purpose of resistance was announced. He reviewed and established the doctrine of secession, detailed the facts showing the bad faith of the Northern government about Fort Sumter, and the necessity for its capture; spoke in terms of keen, yet dignified satire of Lincoln’s proclamation, which attempted to treat seven sovereign States united in a confederacy, and holding five millions of people and a half million of square miles of territory, as “combinations,” which he proposed to suppress by a posse comitatus of seventy-five thousand men; congratulated the Congress on the probable accession of other slave States; informed them that the State Department had sent three commissioners to England, France, Russia and Belgium, to seek the recognition of the Confederate States; advised legislation for the employment of privateers for measures of defense, and for perfecting the government organization; and concluded with these impressive words: “We feel that our cause is just and holy; we protest solemnly in the face of mankind that we desire peace at any sacrifice save that of honor and independence; we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any kind from the States with whom we were lately confederated. All we seek is to be let alone; that those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, this we must resist to the direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is abandoned, the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce that can not but be materially beneficial. So long as this pretension is maintained, with firm reliance on that divine power which covers with its protection the just cause, we will continue the struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self-government.”
The geographical position of Virginia clearly indicated that State as the Flanders of the war. Within her boundaries was necessarily to be located the first line of Confederate defense, and also to be found more than one favorable point d’appui for the invading forces. To the aid of important geographical and physical considerations, moral and political necessities were superadded, to urge a prompt and vigorous assistance to Virginia, in the heroic effort which she was preparing for her deliverance. With the eye of the soldier and the appreciation of the statesman, President Davis urged the immediate removal of the seat of government to the neighborhood of the seat of war. On the 20th of May the seat of the Confederate Government was transferred from Montgomery to Richmond, the capital of Virginia, and within a few days afterward Mr. Davis reached the latter city.32
The transfer of the Confederate capital to Richmond was an event affecting the direction, character, and destinies of the war to such an extent as entitles it to be considered one of its salient incidents. As a measure of policy, it has been variously viewed, and has involved some interesting discussion of military and strategic considerations. In the progress of events during the war, its wisdom was generally recognized, and in the calmer judgment of the present there is scarcely a dissenting voice to the prevailing opinion that it was a master-stroke of political sagacity and military forecast.
High military authority has been quoted in support of the opinion opposed to locating the Confederate capital at Richmond. Ingeniously enough it was alleged that such a step involved fighting on the exterior of the circle instead of the centre, and that thus the great advantage to the party conducting operations upon an interior line would be surrendered. It was also tolerably certain that the North would aim, in its invasion, at the Confederate capital as the vital objective point of its campaigns; and to transfer the capital to a point so far north as Richmond, greatly diminished the enemy’s difficulties – first, as to space; and secondly, by shortening his line of transportation and supply.
But these views were the conclusions of a purely strategic judgment, overlooking entirely moral and political considerations involved, nor are they by any means exhaustive of the argument as to the military aspects of the situation. The courageous and unselfish action of Virginia deserved a response of similar spirit from the Confederacy. Virginia had voluntarily become the outpost of the South, and her people needed the presence among them of that authority which was to wield her great resources, organize her energies, and give counsel to her courage. Her people invited the Government to join them and make the battle for the common deliverance of the South around their homesteads. To accept this invitation was a step no less characteristic of President Davis than was his prompt, decisive action in the crisis at Buena Vista. It had the combined advantage of bold defiance and prudent calculation. This bold courting of the issue by the infant power, at the very outset of hostilities, was the foundation of that brilliant prestige which marked its earlier history. To an adversary intoxicated with an overweening sense of numerical superiority, and a brutal reliance upon his superior strength, this defiant planting of the standard in front of his first line was a significant warning of the difficulties of the task which he had undertaken.
President Davis has never seen reason to regret the transfer of the Government to Richmond. It bound Virginia, by indissoluble ties to the fortunes of the Confederacy, and was the beginning of an affection for himself, among her citizens, which it was their pride to exhibit in the face of calamities common to him and to themselves. Not even in his own gallant State of Mississippi are the genius, virtues, and fame of Jefferson Davis cherished with a more tender association than in Virginia.
A brief résumé of events will now assist to a clear understanding of the situation of affairs when President Davis reached Richmond in the latter part of May. Virginia, a week previously, had, by formal vote of her people, ratified the ordinance of secession adopted by her convention. When the convention passed the ordinance of secession on the 17th of April, the State authorities, with commendable discretion, prepared to make important seizures of arms, stores, etc., the property of the Federal Government within the limits of the State. Governor Letcher – well known for his steadfast devotion to the Union, and for his honorable zeal to preserve it – in this trying crisis of the State, was nobly faithful to his Virginian instincts, and mindful of the honorable part which devolved upon Virginia’s Governor.
The capture of two places of special importance was sought by expeditions arranged with secrecy and ingenuity, but resulting, in both instances, in only partial success. These places were Gosport Navy-yard – famous for its dry-dock, shops, ammunition, arms, timber, rope-walks, and other appurtenances of an extensive naval establishment – and Harper’s Ferry, on the Potomac, with its extensive armory and arsenal, large collection of arms, and valuable machinery. At the latter place, the Federal commander, by an unworthy subterfuge, obtained a delay in the attack which the Virginians were about to make, and took advantage of a parley, to attempt the destruction, by fire, of the buildings and machinery. Much valuable property was destroyed, but the State secured machinery, which was afterward turned to most important account, and many excellent arms for her rapidly gathering volunteers. The attempted destruction, by the Federals, at Gosport, was imperfectly executed. Among the prizes captured here was the steam frigate Merrimac, nearly finished, but greatly damaged by fire. Within a very few months this vessel was destined to a performance, conspicuous for all time in the annals of naval warfare.
The authorities of North Carolina – a State which had clung with unsurpassed fidelity to the Federal Union – acted with a vigor which well befitted a community conspicuous, in the first American revolution, for the fidelity of its patriotism. Slow to reach her conclusions, North Carolina was fully up to the demands of the occasion, in her preparation for a struggle, during which her revolutionary fame was to be excelled by a second dedication of her blood and energies to the cause of liberty. On the 21st of May, North Carolina, by unanimous vote of her convention, adopted an ordinance of secession. Her brave Governor (Ellis) whose services were too soon lost to his State and country, had previously caused the seizure of Forts Macon and Caswell, and the arsenal at Fayetteville, with nearly sixty thousand arms, of which half were of the most approved construction.
On the 19th of April occurred a collision between citizens of Baltimore and Massachusetts soldiers, en route to the Federal capital, followed by such a stringent policy as made clearly hopeless the open coöperation of Maryland, unless by successful invasion of the Confederate forces.
Missouri, under the guidance of Jackson, Price, and other able and resolute leaders, was preparing a heroic resistance, but under difficulties greater than were experienced in any other Southern State, against the domination established upon her soil.
When President Davis reached Richmond he found Virginia in an advanced state of preparation. Thirty thousand troops were in camps of instruction, or upon duty at Norfolk, upon the peninsula of James and York Rivers, and at different points upon the northern boundary of the State. In supreme command was General Robert E. Lee, the friend and former classmate of the President at West Point; and, under him, Colonel John B. Magruder, also his associate at West Point, and other officers of promise and ability, seeking service in defense of their native State and the South. As the several States acceded to the Confederacy, their troops, arms, stores, etc., were turned over to the Confederate authorities, and officers were assigned rank in the Confederate service by a rule, regulated by the rank which they had held in the Federal army.
In accordance with this rule, General Lee was third on the list of full generals appointed by President Davis – General Cooper being first, and General Albert Sydney Johnston being second. General Lee had been first commissioned, after the tender of his resignation in the Federal service, a Major-General of Virginia forces. Until he was commissioned full general, by President Davis, in June, 1861, he continued to act as the general commanding the Virginia forces, and was invested also with the direction of the Confederate troops which were arriving daily from the States south. His authority was as follows:
“Montgomery, May 10, 1861.
“To Major-General R. E. Lee: To prevent confusion, you will assume control of the forces of the Confederate States in Virginia, and assign them to such duties as you may indicate, until further orders; for which this will be your authority.
“L. P. Walker, Secretary of War.”
It would be impossible to overestimate the services of General Lee in the preparation of the Virginia troops for the field, and in preparing the general defense of the State by the location and disposition of the Confederate forces as they arrived in Virginia. His distinguished services afterwards are hardly better evidence of his genius as a soldier, than the results of his arduous labor at this trying period, and in a position of comparative obscurity. President Davis fully indicated his confidence in the counsels of Lee by his constant retention of him at his side. The South has probably not yet appreciated the extent to which the genius of Lee, in coöperation with that of Davis, aided in those earlier achievements of the war, which secured the immediate preservation of the Confederacy, and earned so flattering a reputation for others.
With the establishment of the Confederate authority in Virginia, reinforcements from other States were constantly added to her own levies, and by the middle of June, more than fifty thousand men were in arms for her defense. As yet, collisions between the opposing forces had been rare, and totally indecisive. A force of raw volunteers, unorganized and imperfectly armed, was surprised in Western Virginia, by a movement of considerable vigor on the part of the Federal commander, and the patriots, under Colonel Porterfield, compelled to retreat. At Great Bethel, near Fortress Monroe, a few hundred Virginians and North Carolinians, under Colonel Magruder, handsomely repulsed a large column of Federal troops, attempting to advance up the peninsula. In the then uneducated popular idea of military operations, the fight at Bethel was magnified to an extent greatly beyond its real importance. It had, nevertheless, a timely significance, in its evidence of the spirit of the Confederate soldiery. President Davis was pleased to recognize this fact in a congratulatory letter to Governor Ellis, commending the conduct of the North Carolinians who were engaged in the fight.
These minor affairs were preliminary incidents to the thrilling events, upon a more extended scale of operations, and upon a more important theatre, which were to make memorable the approaching midsummer. Pending the preparations, active and extensive on both sides, for the coming grand encounter, there was a marked pause in military operations, attended by an agreeable subsidence of the feverish excitement of which war is so productive. The struggle for the mastery in Virginia, which it was plain would decide the present fate of the Southern movement, was destined also to decide, in a large measure, the extent and duration of the war. Viewed in its historical significance, it becomes chiefly important as a stage of the revolution indicating a new departure, and an altered direction of events. Preparation was now to be displaced by action. Skirmishes were to be followed by heavy engagements, and the high prestige of the South was now to be subjected to its first test, in that long series of cruel encounters, between valor and endurance on one side, and mere weight of numbers on the other.
Preliminary to the narrative of these important events, appropriately arises one phase of that historical question which involves the statesmanship, the forecast, and the general fitness of Jefferson Davis in the position which he now occupied, and under the circumstances by which he was surrounded.
It would be a superfluous and unprofitable task to consider in detail the numerous allegations, trivial and serious, made against President Davis by his assailants, in support of their professed belief in his responsibility for the failure of the Confederate cause. When facts are perverted, history distorted, and prejudice, rather than truth, is the governing influence, such allegations will be sufficiently numerous, even though they be not well sustained. Nor yet is it maintained that President Davis committed no errors in the long and trying term of his administration. It is very certain that no such defense, asserting his infallibility, would be approved by him. But the real historical significance of the question of Mr. Davis’ capacity for his office may be reduced to very simple dimensions. Conceding him to be mortal, we concede that he is fallible. Then the question arises, Were his errors sufficiently numerous and serious, unaided by other and greater causes, to have occasioned the failure of the South in the late war? Again, conceding still more liberally to his assailants, were those errors the chief causes of a failure, which might have been avoided, despite all other adverse influences, disadvantages, and obstacles, if a different administrative policy had prevailed?
The subject now has no value, save in its historical sense, and in that sense its value must be determined from the stand-point just indicated. At least it is in that aspect that we propose to consider it, whenever its discussion shall be appropriate in these pages. The consideration will be modified by many collateral questions which must incidentally arise. It may be necessary to ask if no other Southern leader, entrusted with great responsibilities, and enjoying uninterrupted popular favor, during and since the war, committed mistakes quite as serious and frequent as did the President, in proportion to the multiplicity of his cares? It may be appropriate, too, to consider the influence that these mistakes of others exerted upon those final disasters for which he alone is held responsible. These questions we propose to consider, each in its appropriate place, and with becoming candor. If we shall not meet the arguments and allegations employed against Mr. Davis with a spirit more ingenuous than has seemed to actuate his assailants, our success must be poor, indeed.
Those who profess to consider President Davis wanting in the necessary qualifications for his position, dwell with especial emphasis upon what they are pleased to characterize his failure in the early months of the war, to foresee its character, duration and magnitude, and the consequent imperfect preparation of the Confederate Government. It is asserted that he was utterly blind to all the indications of a long and obstinate struggle, urged upon his attention by a more sagacious statesmanship than his own; that he was persistent and arrogant in his prophecies of a struggle, short, brilliant, and overwhelming in favor of the South, even after the war had commenced; and that before the bombardment of Sumter he was no less positive in his convictions that there would be no war; that he was, in short, stupidly unreasoning and inactive, deaf alike to entreaties, arguments, and facts.
If, indeed, it could be established that during the era of secession (the interval between November, 1860, and April, 1861), Mr. Davis had cherished expectations of peaceable separation, and that during that portion of his presidential term embraced before the assault upon Sumter, relying upon this prospect of peace, he had failed to prepare for war, then, indeed, would his responsibility be great; but it would be shared by every contemporary statesman of the South, almost, if not quite, without an exception. History may palliate the amazing infatuation of the Southern masses at this period, but surely its verdict must be a contemptuous condemnation of that vaunted statesmanship which scouted war as the result of secession, as an impossibility, and its anticipation as the product of timidity. But President Davis is not driven to the extremity of seeking so poor a refuge as the common and universal blindness and weakness of that critical period. Recognizing the justice of that test which demands of the true statesman a prescience beyond the average vision, it is believed that his defense may be made easy and triumphant.
Candid investigation will demonstrate the fact that Davis, among Southern statesmen, was an almost solitary exception in his rejection of the dominant sentiment of the times. The remarkable consistency of his public life is in no respect better sustained than in his oft-repeated apprehensions of eventual war between the sections. His dread of disunion arose from his dread of civil war, and the latter he always urged to be the necessary consequence of the former. Striving to save the Union upon a just and constitutional basis, he yet habitually admonished the South of the inevitable result of disunion, and coupled his admonitions with earnest exhortations of thorough preparation for the most serious emergency in its history. His speeches, addresses, and letters, furnish irrefutable testimony of his apprehension of civil war as an inevitable concomitant of disunion. Not one line, or one sentence, written or uttered by him in the entire period of his public career, can be so construed as to indicate a different conviction. Believing that he foresaw the impending conflict, he strove with indefatigable energy and incomparable ability, in company with Calhoun, in 1850, to place the South in a position which would then have rescued her liberties. If the warning voice of the South, proclaiming the inexorable decree of disunion, unless her constitutional rights were fully and forever secured, had then been disregarded, at least her resistance must have been more effectual than it could become by postponement. In innumerable passages of rare eloquence, he has left an imperishable record of patriotic devotion to a constitutional union, and touching proofs of the emotion with which he contemplated the evils which were to follow its destruction. The words of his farewell address to the Senate, (“putting our trust in God, and in our firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right as best we may”) do not more clearly indicate the calm determination with which he would meet the peril, than his appreciation of its serious nature.
When it is alleged that the inadequate preparation of the South, during the period which we have characterized as the era of secession, enters as a most important feature in the explanation of her failure, a proposition is boldly asserted, which is, at least, debatable; but its discussion does not devolve upon us.33 Mr. Davis is assuredly not to be held justly accountable for what the various States failed to do while he was at his post of duty in the Senate, and in no manner controlling their action. No responsibility can attach to him beyond the action of the Confederate Government, save in the case of his own State, and whatever preparation Mississippi made was at his instance. By what law of justice or logic can Mr. Davis be made accountable for the inadequate preparation of Georgia, (assuming that Georgia was unprepared, or had omitted any preparation that was possible under the circumstances), which then had the full benefit of the counsels of reputed statesmen like Messrs. Toombs, Stephens, and Brown? or of South Carolina, under the counsels of Messrs. Rhett and Orr, and the Charleston Mercury? Of Alabama, led by the brilliant genius of Mr. Yancey? Yet, upon the aggregate resources and means of defense of these and the other States must depend the safety of the Confederacy. While Mr. Davis was yet in Washington, striving against hope to avert the dreaded issue, many of the States, under the guidance of their leading men, were passing ordinances of secession. Assuredly, then, he is not to be censured for any lack of preparation at this period. Yet no very close examination of the record is necessary to establish the fact, that those who have since been most forward in denying the prevision of statesmanship to Davis, were then, by their own showing, precipitating their several States into secession, totally unprepared for a war, the very possibility of which they derided.
The responsibility of Mr. Davis can date only from his inauguration as President of the Confederate States, on February 18, 1861. Between that date and the actual breaking out of war was an interval of less than two months. Within this period the results accomplished were certainly all that could have been anticipated, and all that ever were accomplished by any government yet in its infancy, within the same space of time. The organization of the Government had been perfected, efforts made to secure intercourse with foreign nations, and the civil administration completed in all important features. With the aid of that master genius for organization, General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General of the Confederate army, the basis of a military organization, upon which the most splendid armies of modern history were speedily created, was prepared; troops were called into the field; and the Confederacy, in proportion to its means, was actually placed, in two months, upon a war footing, not inferior to that of the enemy at the outbreak of hostilities.
The unprejudiced Northern or European reader, whose admiration has been freely expressed for the valor and endurance of the South, and for the skillful use of its comparatively limited resources, may well be amazed at the censures of Mr. Davis, from Southern sources.
But what was his error after assumption of the Presidency? More important still, what is the evidence? So far as we have been able to gather the evidence, it consists in the fact that President Davis did not urge the indiscriminate purchase of arms in Europe, or wherever else they might have been obtained. The intelligent foreign reader can only be amazed that, upon this single fact – for it is the only fact alleged – rests the charge that President Davis did not make adequate preparation for war. The answer is very simple, and indisputable. First, the Confederate Government, from the date of its organization, endeavored constantly to purchase serviceable arms wherever they could be obtained. Second, the Confederate Government had given extensive orders to Northern manufactories (because they were nearest) at Chickopee and elsewhere, some of which were filled and the arms received, while, in other cases, they were seized by the Federal authorities after the commencement of hostilities while en route South. Third, there were very few serviceable arms to be purchased in Europe; and in support of this assertion we have only to recall the enormous swindles practised on the Federal Government in its purchase of arms in Europe at this period. Arms were offered, in some instances, to the Government, and rejected, because President Davis, while Secretary of War, had become acquainted with their worthlessness; and thus, while certain speculations were disappointed, the means of the Government were not squandered. An examination of the records will demonstrate the fact that the Confederate Ordnance Bureau, under Colonel Gorgas, was conducted with signal judgment and ability. From the beginning to the end, it was managed with a success which entitles it to be considered probably the most ably conducted bureau of the Government.
But not only do the recorded events of the period vindicate Mr. Davis from the accusations of a tardy and delinquent policy in providing for the threatened emergency of war; they are fully conclusive as to the energetic provision made when hostilities were opened. Nothing can be more emphatic in its enunciation of a bold, vigorous policy than President Davis’ message to the Confederate Congress, assembled by special convocation, on the 29th of April:34 “There are now in the field at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski, nineteen thousand men, and sixteen thousand are now en route for Virginia. It is proposed to organize and hold in readiness for instant action, in view of the present exigencies of the country, an army of one hundred thousand men.” Surely we must look elsewhere than to such an announcement as this, for evidence in support of this pretended absence of foresight, and inappreciation of the extent and character of the approaching struggle. This, be it remembered, was in Davis’ first response to the Federal declaration of war, only two weeks after the fall of Sumter, and when President Lincoln had, as yet, called for but seventy-five thousand men. This was the spirit in which President Davis began the contest, and the results which immediately followed, in months of brilliant and consecutive triumphs, demonstrated the ample provision made for the emergency.35
In marked contrast with this vigorous policy were the silly vaporings of demagogues, prating of Southern invincibility against a world in arms, protesting that the North, under no circumstances, could be induced to fight, and scouting a longer duration of a war with “Yankees,” than six months at the farthest. That such was the dominant conviction at Montgomery, no contemporary authority will deny. An eminent Virginian, a commissioner from his own State to the Confederate Congress, was amazed to hear laughed at as an excellent joke, his congratulations to that body, upon the wise determination to locate the seat of government at Richmond, in close proximity to the seat of war. The grave legislators at Montgomery, at least, had not yet comprehended that there was to be war.
But perhaps we are in fault, in thus offering the evidence of uncontradicted facts and obvious conclusions, where only vague inferences and unsupported allegations are urged to the contrary. There are graver questions yet to be encountered, far better justifying difference of opinion, and affording better ground for discussion of the philosophy of the Southern failure. Censure of those who have had the conduct of a ruined cause is as inevitable as the criticism which ever waits upon history; but it is not, therefore, always just. A great soldier,36 who has but recently contributed a chapter to history, thrilling in interest and inestimable in importance, when congratulated since upon his brilliant triumphs, touchingly replied: “How would it have been if success – this unexampled success – had not crowned our undertaking? Would not this undeserved exaltation have been so much unreasonable criticism and undeserved blame?”
To a certain class of Southern critics, we commend the magnanimous sentiment of an illustrious fellow-countryman,37 now mourning, in exile, the afflictions of his country: “As for myself, I have not undertaken to speculate as to the causes of our failure, as I have seen abundant reason for it in the tremendous odds brought against us. Having had some means of judging, I will, however, say that, in my opinion, both President Davis and General Lee, in their respective spheres, did all for the success of our cause which it was possible for mortal men to do; and it is a great privilege and comfort for me so to believe, and to have been able to bring with me, into exile, a profound love and veneration for those great men.”
CHAPTER X
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WAR IN 1861 – THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MORE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH RESULTS IN THE FIELD THAN AT SUBSEQUENT PERIODS – MR. DAVIS’ CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE CONFEDERACY – THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT ADOPTS, IN THE MAIN, THE DEFENSIVE POLICY OF THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES – FEDERAL PREPARATIONS – GENERAL SCOTT – DEFENSIVE PLANS OF THE CONFEDERATES – DISTRIBUTION OF THEIR FORCES – THE CONFEDERATE CAMPAIGN OF 1861 JUSTIFIED – DISTRIBUTION OF THE FEDERAL FORCES – PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN – GENERALS PATTERSON AND JOHNSTON – JUNCTION OF BEAUREGARD AND JOHNSTON – MANASSAS – PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE BATTLE-FIELD – HIS DISPATCH – HIS RETURN TO RICHMOND – A SPEECH NEVER PUBLISHED BEFORE – REFLECTIONS UPON THE RESULTS OF MANASSAS – MR. DAVIS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABSENCE OF PURSUIT – STONEWALL JACKSON’S VIEWS – DAVIS IN FAVOR OF PURSUIT OF THE FEDERALS – MISREPRESENTATIONS – MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN VARIOUS QUARTERS – THE “TRENT AFFAIR” – RESULTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR
Whatever crudities may appear in the general plans of warfare, adopted by the American belligerents in 1861, when tested by the maxims which have obtained in other wars, waged upon different theatres of action, and for different purposes, at least there was not wanting a palpable and definitive shape. With remarkable rapidity and precision, the military situation was adjusted to the attainment of certain general objects, which continued, during the successive stages of the war, to be pursued, with varying fortune, by the respective contestants.
The incipient campaign of the war was peculiarly regulated and determined by the paramount aims which had impelled the respective parties to arms. Of necessity, the campaign, on the part of the North, must be offensive, while the South, in a defensive attitude, must prepare to parry the blows of her assailant. The pretext of the North was to assert the “national authority” over what it was pleased to term “rebellious” territory. The animus of the South was to repel an invasion which menaced her liberties and firesides. Whatever advantages may have belonged to the position of the South were not overlooked by those who were charged with her defense; and it may safely be claimed, in view of the immediate and overwhelming result in her favor, that whatever compensation, for obvious disadvantages, she had anticipated from the resources of skillful leadership, was fairly rendered.
The two Governments, at Washington and at Richmond, were then more directly chargeable with the actual results in the field than at subsequent periods. The army had then become less independent of the Government. Its organic structure was undeveloped, and it had not yet become identified with those commanders whose history was hereafter to be so interwoven with its own. In a general sense, it may be remarked, that the connection of President Davis with all the campaigns of the Confederate army, was that which the country designed it should be, when, in consequence of his military aptitude and experience, it placed him in charge of the public administration. Moreover, it was consistent with that inevitable responsibility which attached to the office of chief executive. Ignorant and intemperate partisans have labored to prove his responsibility for those casualties of war, which are utterly beyond human calculations, and to trace to his influence disasters of the battle-field, with which he could by no possibility have been connected. As is usual in such cases, these criticisms are made with a total forgetfulness of the unintentional tribute, which is accorded to Mr. Davis, in ascribing to him the chief responsibility for a military administration, which the world declares to have had few parallels in its history.
When President Davis reached Richmond, from Montgomery, the military situation had already assumed a well-defined shape. The plans of defense, adopted by the Virginian authorities, mainly under the direction of General Lee, and carried into partial execution before the alliance with the Confederacy had been formally consummated, were adhered to by the Confederate Government. President Davis, as we have seen, fully impressed with the demands of the exigency, immediately upon his arrival, addressed himself, with characteristic vigor and promptitude, to such measures as would secure a successful campaign. In the meantime, the preparations of the Federal Government were equally vigorous, and by no means indefinite in their aims.
Whatever may be the comparative merits, when placed in antithetical juxtaposition, of the plans of campaign adopted by the two Governments in 1861, or whatever may be alleged of the blunders and mishaps of the Federal scheme of warfare, there could be no question of the full comprehension of the necessities of the situation by the veteran commander of the Federal armies. We are not called upon here to give an opinion of General Scott in his personal or political relations, but that combination of sagacious military minds, upon which devolved the defense of Southern liberties, was not likely to commit the error of a disparaging estimate of his abilities.
General Scott, far in advance of the prevailing opinion at the North, dreamed of no holiday enterprise. He well knew that Southern valor, directed by leaders whose names were identified with the proudest prestige of America, and enlisted in the defense of principles which were the dearest convictions and traditions of the Southern heart, was not to be crushed in a “three-months’” wrestle of arms. Accordingly, his preparations were for war in its broadest and most terrible sense; a war between powerful nationalities; a war in which, though sustained by inexhaustible resources and popular enthusiasm, he had yet to contend with a race essentially military in its instincts, earnest in conviction, led by men whose capacities he had amply tested, and aided by defensive position, vast extent of territory, and by those numerous obstacles in the way of conquest, which must have been apparent to the eye of an experienced soldier.
The attitude of the Confederate Government was necessarily defensive. History would be searched in vain for examples justifying an invasion by a people entirely agricultural in habits and resources, weak in numbers, and with a government not yet organized three months, of a powerful manufacturing and commercial nation, of dense population, and great wealth and resources. Without supplies, equipment and transportation, and without the time or opportunity to obtain them, successful invasion of the North, however attractive to the popular imagination, was clearly impossible. Viewed from the more educated stand-point, furnished by the later developments of the war, the crude ideas, from which arose the popular aspiration of at once “carrying the war into Africa,” are ludicrous in the extreme. Indeed, there can be little doubt that the defensive, subjected to such modifications as the casualties of war render proper and necessary in all plans, whether offensive or defensive, was at all times the true policy of the South. Certain it is, that, upon two occasions, essaying the offensive under the most favorable circumstances, and under their greatest commander, the Confederates were overtaken by disaster. There can be no just criterion, furnished by European wars, by which to test the Confederate military policy in the main. Parallels between the American civil war and those waged by Frederick the Great and Napoleon are inadmissable. Not only were circumstances entirely dissimilar, but able military critics have indicated physical peculiarities, forbidding the unexceptional application to American warfare, of maxims which, elsewhere, are undisputed.
Nevertheless, war as a science must be worse than useless, unless its underlying principles have universal application. Nor is it maintained that there were no circumstances which would have justified a departure from the usually defensive policy of the Confederates. Upon two occasions the main army of the South, having successfully encountered upon its own soil the most prodigious efforts of the enemy’s strength, sought to follow him in the moment of his recoil. The Confederate invasion of 1862, culminating at Antietam, and that of 1863, culminating at Gettysburg, were undertaken with the purpose of destroying, upon his own soil, an enemy already defeated. Each of these endeavors was based upon sound principles; and there is no little palliation for the disaster, in either case, in reflecting how great would have been the results of success. Much of the philosophy of the war in Virginia is to be explained by the fact of the thoroughly aggressive character, as soldiers, of President Davis and General Lee. These two directing minds, by whose combined genius and will, the fortunes of the Confederacy were so long upheld, in full and cordial coöperation during the entire war, were in nothing more harmonious, than in the desire for an aggressive campaign, whenever it could be undertaken with a reasonable promise of success. Hence, the history of the army of Northern Virginia develops, throughout, that military policy which is known as the “defensive with offensive returns.”
After the conclusion of the alliance between Virginia and the Confederate States, which placed all “military operations, offensive and defensive, in Virginia,” under the control of the Confederate President, troops from the other Southern States had been thrown northward with astonishing rapidity. As rapidly as they arrived, regiments were sent to the various localities where it had been thought expedient to establish a defensive force. These posts were distributed with a view to their strategic bearing upon particular sections of territory, which it was deemed necessary to defend, and also with reference to their strategic connection with each other, and with the chain of combinations making the general plan of defense.
In the early summer, the distribution of the Southern forces in Virginia was as follows: At Manassas Junction, thirty-five miles south-west from Washington, and the point of intersection of the lines of railroad running southward to Richmond, and to the Shenandoah Valley, was a force, to the command of which General Beauregard was transferred from the charge of the defenses of Charleston. Manassas Junction was obviously a strategic point of the first importance, as the centre of the railroad system of Northern Virginia, and as a base of operations threatening Washington, and immediately across the path of any overland expedition against Richmond. The favorable estimate of General Beauregard’s abilities entertained by the President, added to the popularity which followed his services at Charleston, occasioned his assignment to what was obviously to be the most important theatre of operations.
Auxiliary to the command of Beauregard, but operating independently of that officer, was a force at Harper’s Ferry, on the Potomac, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, an officer of reputed skill, who had earned honorable distinction in Mexico, and enjoyed high rank and reputation in the Federal service. This force had a mission second in value only to that of the army at Manassas. It was charged with the defense of the rich and populous Shenandoah Valley, teeming with supplies, and inhabited by a hardy and patriotic population. Its position was intermediate between the forces operating in Western Virginia, and those in front of Washington, and threatening to the enemy’s line of communication westward via the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.
In Western Virginia were the commands of Generals Wise and Garnett, respectively, in the Kanawha Valley, and upon the main line of communication between the sections east and west of the Alleghany mountains. The forces of Wise and Garnett were designed for the double purpose of defending the sections of territory in which they were respectively located, and for the aid and encouragement of the patriotic portion of the population, then under the joint domination of the Union men and Federal soldiers.
In the meantime, upon the distant theatre of Missouri, the war had assumed a most interesting phase. Many months before the legally-elected legislature of that State adopted an ordinance of secession, Missouri was contributing valuable aid to the struggling Confederacy. Driven by the oppressive course of the Federal Government into resistance, in spite of their efforts to save their State from the destructive presence of war, the Southern men of Missouri organized under the leadership of General Sterling Price and Governor Jackson. Accessions of men from all portions of the State were constantly made to the patriot forces, and, within a few weeks, a large force was upon the southern border, animated by an enthusiastic desire to undertake the redemption of their homes.
But the Missourians, though sufficiently numerous to constitute an effective army, were confronted by difficulties which would have appalled men of less heroic purpose, or enlisted in an inferior cause. Hostilities had been precipitated upon them while they were entirely unprepared – wanting arms, ammunition, and other indispensable material of war. The remoteness of Missouri from the seat of government, and the inadequate transportation, prevented that prompt and efficient aid by the Confederate authorities which it was equally their interest and inclination to afford. Nevertheless, with almost miraculous rapidity, the army of General Price was organized, and supplied with such material as he could obtain.
The Federal commander, in his march southward from St. Louis, pursued, with considerable vigor, the various detachments of the patriots who were hastening to the standards of Price. After several minor engagements, in which the Missourians displayed the most devoted heroism, a considerable battle was fought, early in August, near Springfield, in the south-western corner of the State, in which the Federal army was disastrously defeated, and its commander killed. In this battle, the Missouri forces were aided by a Confederate force, under General McCulloch, which had advanced northward from Arkansas. Later in the year, General Price advanced through the central portion of the State, receiving large additions to his army, and captured the largest garrison of Federal troops in Northern Missouri. Having accomplished these valuable aims, he, with great skill and daring, effected a safe retreat to the south-western frontier. President Davis, in a message to Congress, echoed the hearty appreciation of the Southern people, in a special tribute to the valor and devotion of the southern population of Missouri.
Kentucky also had become the theatre of hostilities. The Federal Government, recognizing the neutrality of Kentucky so long as was necessary to mature their plans for her subjugation, finally insisted upon making her a party to the war, and invaded her territory with a view to operations against the Confederacy. President Davis thus stated the motives of the policy adopted by the Confederate Government respecting Kentucky:
“Finding that the Confederate States were about to be invaded through Kentucky, and that her people, after being deceived into a mistaken security, were unarmed, and in danger of being subjugated by the Federal forces, our armies were marched into that State to repel the enemy, and prevent their occupation of certain strategic points, which would have given them great advantages in the contest – a step which was justified, not only by the necessities of self-defense on the part of the Confederate States, but also by a desire to aid the people of Kentucky. It was never intended by the Confederate Government to conquer or coerce the people of that State; but, on the contrary, it was declared by our Generals that they would withdraw their troops if the Federal Government would do likewise. Proclamation was also made of the desire to respect the neutrality of Kentucky, and the intention, by the wishes of her people, as soon as they were free to express their opinions.
“These declarations were approved by me; and I should regard it as one of the best effects of the march of our troops into Kentucky, if it should end in giving to her people liberty of choice, and a free opportunity to decide their own destiny, according to their own will.”
Not long after the occupation of various points in Kentucky, by the respective armies, an engagement occurred at Belmont, on the Missouri shore, near Columbus, resulting in the defeat of the Federal force engaged. The Confederate forces engaged were a portion of the command of General Polk, and the defeated Federal commander was General U. S. Grant.
Before the first year of the war terminated, the Confederates experienced reverses resulting from the naval superiority of the enemy. Expeditions were undertaken against the Carolina coast, and were successful to the extent of securing a permanent lodgment of the Federal forces.
In the month of November the forcible seizure, by a Federal naval officer, of the persons of Messrs. John Slidell and James M. Mason, commissioners, respectively, from the Confederate States to France and England, and, at the time, passengers on an English steamer, excited strong hope of those complications between the United States and European powers which were reasonably anticipated by the South. This act was a palpable outrage and violation alike of international law and comity. It was, nevertheless, indorsed by public sentiment at the North, in manifold forms of expression.
In England, the intelligence of an outrage upon the national flag was received with outbursts of popular indignation, which compelled the Government to make a resentful demand upon the United States. The course of the English Government was characteristic of the nation which it represented. There was neither discussion nor parley, but a simple imperative demand for the surrender of the commissioners and their attachès.
Never was so deep a humiliation imposed upon a people as that imposed by the course of the Federal authorities upon the North. The prisoners, over whose capture the whole North had but recently exulted, as at the realization of the fruits of a brilliant victory, were surrendered immediately. Mr. Seward even declared that they were surrendered “cheerfully,” and in accordance with the “most cherished principles of American statesmanship,” and advanced an argument in favor of complying with the demands of the British Government, far more to have been expected from a British diplomatist, than from the leading statesman of a people who had promptly indorsed the outrage.
This concession of the Federal Government was the first of numerous disappointments in store for the Southern people, in the hope, so universally indulged, of foreign intervention. Expectation of immediate complications between England and the United States, received great encouragement from the earlier phase of the “Trent affair,” as was called the seizure of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. Consequent upon the correspondence between the Governments of England and the United States, growing out of the “Trent affair,” were announcements in Parliament, which should have discouraged the anticipation of interference by England, at least with the cabinet then in power. Lord John Russell declared that the blockade of the Southern ports was effective, in spite of abundant evidence, and in spite, even, of the declarations of the British consul at Charleston to the contrary. This concession was intended, doubtless, as a salvo to the North for its deep humiliation, and was, indeed, rightly construed as an evidence of the real sympathies of the British cabinet in the American struggle. In this aspect, it was an assurance of no little significance.
At the election, in November, Mr. Davis, without opposition, was chosen the first President of the Confederacy, under the permanent government, which was soon to succeed the provisional organization. Mr. Stephens was reëlected Vice-President.
In his message to the provisional Congress, at the beginning of its last session, the President thus sketched the situation at the close of the first year of the war:
“To the Congress of the Confederate States:
“The few weeks which have elapsed since your adjournment have brought us so near the close of the year, that we are now able to sum up its general results. The retrospect is such as should fill the hearts of our people with gratitude to Providence for his kind interposition in their behalf. Abundant yields have rewarded the labor of the agriculturist, whilst the manufacturing interest of the Confederate States was never so prosperous as now. The necessities of the times have called into existence new branches of manufactures, and given a fresh impulse to the activity of those heretofore in operation. The means of the Confederate States for manufacturing the necessaries and comforts of life, within themselves, increase as the conflict continues, and we are rapidly becoming independent of the rest of the world, for the supply of such military stores and munitions as are indispensable for war.
“The operations of the army, soon to be partially interrupted by the approaching winter, have afforded a protection to the country, and shed a lustre upon its arms, through the trying vicissitudes of more than one arduous campaign, which entitle our brave volunteers to our praise and our gratitude.
“From its commencement up to the present period, the war has been enlarging its proportions and extending its boundaries, so as to include new fields. The conflict now extends from the shores of the Chesapeake to the confines of Missouri and Arizona; yet sudden calls from the remotest points for military aid have been met with promptness enough, not only to avert disaster in the face of superior numbers, but also to roll back the tide of invasion from the border.
“When the war commenced, the enemy were possessed of certain strategic points and strong places within the Confederate States. They greatly exceeded us in numbers, in available resources, and in the supplies necessary for war. Military establishments had been long organized, and were complete; the navy, and, for the most part, the army, once common to both, were in their possession. To meet all this, we had to create, not only an army in the face of war itself, but also military establishments necessary to equip and place it in the field. It ought, indeed, to be a subject of gratulation that the spirit of the volunteers and the patriotism of the people have enabled us, under Providence, to grapple successfully with these difficulties.
“A succession of glorious victories at Bethel, Bull Run, Manassas, Springfield, Lexington, Leesburg, and Belmont, has checked the wicked invasion which greed of gain, and the unhallowed lust of power, brought upon our soil, and has proved that numbers cease to avail, when directed against a people fighting for the sacred right of self-government and the privileges of freemen. After seven months of war, the enemy have not only failed to extend their occupancy of our soil, but new States and Territories have been added to our Confederacy; while, instead of their threatened march of unchecked conquest, they have been driven, at more than one point, to assume the defensive; and, upon a fair comparison between the two belligerents, as to men, military means, and financial condition, the Confederate States are relatively much stronger now than when the struggle commenced.”
CHAPTER XI
PROSPECTS AT THE BEGINNING OF 1862 – EXTREME CONFIDENCE OF THE SOUTH – EXTRAVAGANT EXPECTATIONS – THE RICHMOND EXAMINER ON CONFEDERATE PROSPECTS – WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES PREDICTED – THE BLOCKADE TO BE RAISED – THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY DECREED BY HEAVEN – RESULT OF THE BOASTFUL TONE OF THE SOUTHERN PRESS – THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISASTERS OF 1862 – PRESIDENT DAVIS URGES PREPARATION FOR A LONG WAR – HIS WISE OPPOSITION TO SHORT ENLISTMENTS OF TROOPS – PREMONITIONS OF MISFORTUNES IN THE WEST – THE CONFEDERATE FORCES IN KENTUCKY – GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON – HIS CAREER BEFORE THE WAR – CHARACTER – APPEARANCE – THE FRIEND OF JEFFERSON DAVIS – MUTUAL ESTEEM – SIDNEY JOHNSTON IN KENTUCKY – HIS PLANS – HIS DIFFICULTIES – THE FORCES OF GRANT AND BUELL – CRUEL DILEMMA OF GENERAL SIDNEY JOHNSTON – A REVERSE – GRANT CAPTURES FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON – LOSS OF KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE – FEDERAL DESIGNS IN THE EAST – BURNSIDE CAPTURES ROANOKE ISLAND – SERIOUS NATURE OF THESE REVERSES – POPULAR DISAPPOINTMENT – ORGANIZED OPPOSITION TO THE CONFEDERATE ADMINISTRATION – CHARACTER AND MOTIVES OF THIS OPPOSITION – AN EFFORT TO REVOLUTIONIZE PRESIDENT DAVIS’ CABINET – ASSAULTS UPON SECRETARIES BENJAMIN AND MALLORY – CORRECT EXPLANATION OF THE CONFEDERATE REVERSES – CONGRESSIONAL CENSURE OF MR. BENJAMIN – SECRETARY MALLORY – CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOUTHERN MIND – THE PERMANENT GOVERNMENT – SECOND INAUGURATION OF MR. DAVIS – SEVERITY OF THE SEASON – THE CEREMONIES – APPEARANCE OF PRESIDENT DAVIS – HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS – ITS EFFECT – POPULAR RE-ASSURANCE – MESSAGE TO CONGRESS – COMMENTS OF RICHMOND PRESS
When President Davis held his first New-Year’s reception, as the chief magistrate of the infant Confederacy, there were not wanting signs of the approaching shadows, which were to throw in temporary eclipse the brilliant foreground of the first year of the war. Richmond was then in its exultant spirit, its gayety, festivity, and show, the type of that fatal confidence in Southern invincibility, which, in a few weeks of disaster, was brought to grief and humiliation.
In that numerous and brilliant assemblage, representing the various branches of the new government, civil, naval, and military, members of Congress and of State Legislatures, and admiring citizens, eager to make formal tender of their esteem to the first President of the South, there were few who discerned the omens of the coming storm, which was to shake its foundation, the power of which that occasion was an imposing symbol. Perhaps there were as few who could penetrate his assuring exterior of grace, gentleness, and dignity, and share the anxiety with which, even in the midst of popular adulation, he contemplated the approach of that stern trial for which the country was so deficient in preparation.
With singular accord of opinion, writers, who had an inside view of the Southern conduct of the war, have commented upon the disasters consequent upon the period of fancied security and relaxed exertions which followed the battle of Manassas. We can not share, however, the shallow and unphilosophical conclusion which pronounces the glorious triumph of Manassas a calamity to the South. The temporary salvation of the Confederacy, guaranteed by that victory, was not its only fruit. Manassas gave a stamp of prestige to Southern valor and soldiership, which not even a deluge of subsequent disasters could efface. It gave an imperishable record and an undying incentive to resolution.
Yet it is not to be questioned that the public apathy, engendered by an exaggerated estimate of the value of the numerous and consecutive triumphs of the preceding summer and autumn, was measurably productive of evil consequences. Encouraged by the press, in many instances, the Southern people saw, in the comparatively easy triumphs of their superior valor over undisciplined Northern mobs – for which Manassas, Belmont, Leesburg, and similar engagements constituted the mere apprenticeship of war – the auguries significant of a speedy attainment of their independence. Inflated orators and boastful editorials proclaimed the absolute certainty of early interference of foreign powers, in behalf of the South, as the source of the indispensable staples of cotton and tobacco. In the face of the enormous preparations of the enemy, his monster armies, numbering, in December, 1861, more than six hundred thousand men; his numerous fleets for sea-board operations, and iron-clad floating batteries for the interior streams, comparatively insignificant successes were pointed to as sufficient proofs of the inability of the enemy to make any serious impression upon Southern territory.
The Richmond Examiner, which had early evinced a disposition hostile to President Davis and his administration, the ablest and most influential journal of the South, destined to furnish both the brains and inspiration in support of future opposition, was conspicuous in its contempt for the fighting qualities of the North, and vehement in its prophesies of good fortune for the Confederacy. Late in December, the Examiner, commenting upon recent intelligence from the North, said: “All other topics become trifles beside the tidings of England which occupies this journal, and all commentary that diverts public attention from that single point is impertinence. The effect of the outrage of the Trent on the public sentiment of Great Britain more than fulfills the prophesy that we made when the arrest of the Confederate ministers was a fresh event. All legal quibbling and selfish calculation has been consumed like straw in the burning sense of incredible insult. The Palmerston cabinet has been forced to immediate and decisive measures; and a peremptory order to Lord Lyons comes with the steamer that brings the news to the American shore. He is directed to demand the unconditional surrender of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, to place them in the position they were found beneath the British flag, and a complete disavowal of their seizure as an authorized act. Now, the Northern Government has placed itself in such a position that it can do none of these things. The Abolitionist element of the Northern States would go straight to revolution at the least movement toward a surrender of the captives; the arrest was made by the deliberately written orders of the Government, already avowed and published beyond the hope of apology or possibility of retraction.
“The United States can do absolutely nothing but refuse the demands of Great Britain, and abide the consequences of that refusal. What they will be can be clearly foretold: first, there will be the diplomatic rupture; Lord Lyons will demand his passports, and Mr. Adams will be sent away from London; then will follow an immediate recognition of the Southern Confederacy, with encouragement and aid in fitting out its vessels, and supplying their wants in the British ports and islands. Lastly, a war will be evolved from these two events.”
Continuing its comments upon what it terms the “raving madness” of the North, the Examiner says: “Then came the proclamation of Lincoln. Nothing but insanity could have dictated it; and without it the secession of Virginia was impossible. Then their crazy attempt to subdue a country not less difficult to conquer than Russia itself, with an armed mob of loafers.”
In the contemplation of the pleasing sketch which its imagination had executed, the Examiner asks: “Spectators of these events, who can doubt that the Almighty fiat has gone forth against the American Union, or that the Southern Confederacy is decreed by the Divine Wisdom?” It declares that the “dullest worldling, the coolest Atheist, the most hardened cynic, might be struck with awe by the startling and continued interposition of a power beyond the control or cognizance of men in these affairs;” and triumphantly asks: “Who thought, when the Trent was announced to sail, that on its deck, and in the trough of the weltering Atlantic, the key of the blockade would be lost?”
The natural and inevitable result of the assurances tendered to the people, was to lull the patriotic ardor which marked the first great uprising for defense, when two hundred thousand men sprung to arms. There can be no justice in holding the Confederate Government responsible for the popular apathy, which it had no agency in producing, or for the weakness of the armies, which, next to the naval weakness of the South, was the immediate cause of the disasters of the early months of 1862.
Since the commencement of hostilities, the Government had been indefatigable in its efforts to promote enlistments of volunteers for the war, instead of the twelve-months’ system, which could be adequate for the demands of a temporary exigency only, and not for such a terrific struggle as must result from the temper and resources of the two contestants. Volunteering was as yet the only method of raising troops sanctioned by law, or likely to meet popular approval. The country was not yet prepared for an enforced levy of troops; and it is only necessary to remember the opposition, in certain quarters, to the execution of the subsequent conscription law, adopted under the pressure of disasters which made its necessity plain and inevitable, to conjecture the temper in which such a measure would have been met, in the over-confident and foolishly exultant tone of the press and public in the winter of 1861.
Mr. Davis especially sought to disabuse the public mind of its fallacious hope of a short contest, by his efforts to place the military resources of the South upon a footing capable of indefinite resistance to an attempt at conquest, which was to end only with the success or exhaustion of the North. Conscious of the perpetual disorganization and decimation of the armies which must result from the system of short enlistments, he had, early in the war, attracted unfriendly criticism by his refusal of any more six or twelve-months’ volunteers than were necessary to meet the shock of the enemy’s first advance. It was clear to his mind that, under the wretched system of short enlistments, which he characterized as a “frightful cause of disaster,” the country must, at some period of the war, be virtually without an army. Such was the case in January and February, 1862, when the enemy eagerly pressed his immense advantage while the process of furloughs and reënlistments was in progress, and the army almost completely disorganized.
Such a crisis was inevitable, and had it not occurred then, it would merely have been deferred, to be encountered at a period when the capacity of the Confederacy was even less adequate for its perils. The lesson was not without its value, since it drove the country and the press to a recognition of the fact that independence was not to be won by shifts and dalliance, by temporary expedients, and by spasmodic popular uprisings for temporary exigencies.
The efforts of the Government were unceasing to prepare for the tremendous onset of the enemy in almost every quarter of the Confederacy, which it must have been blind, indeed, not to anticipate. The responses to the calls of the Government were neither in numbers nor enthusiasm encouraging. The people were blind in their confidence, and deaf to appeals admonishing them of perils which, in their fancied security, they believed impossible of realization. But this soothing sense of security was soon to have a terrible awakening. The Confederate Government had recognized the peculiar perils menacing the western section of its territory. There for weeks rested the anxious gaze of President Davis, and thence were to come the first notes of alarm – the immediate premonitions of disaster.
Immediately, upon the occupation of Kentucky by the Confederate forces, had begun the development of a plan of defense by the Southern generals. The command of General Polk, constituting the Confederate left, was at Columbus. On the upper waters of the Cumberland River, in South-eastern Kentucky, was a small force constituting the Confederate right, commanded first by General Zollicoffer, and afterward by General Crittenden. At Bowling Green, with Green River in front, and communicating by railway with Nashville and the South, was the main Confederate force in Kentucky, commanded by General Buckner until the arrival of General Albert Sidney Johnston, whom President Davis had commissioned a full general in the Confederate service, and assigned to the command of the Western Department.
Apart from the historical interest which belongs to the name of Albert Sidney Johnston, and from the dramatic incident of his death at the very climax of a splendid victory, which immediately paled into disaster upon his fall, as the long and valued friend of Jefferson Davis, he is entitled to special mention in the biography of the latter.
Albert Sidney Johnston was born in Mason County, Kentucky, in 1803. He graduated at West Point in 1826; was commissioned as Lieutenant of infantry; served in the Black Hawk war with distinction; resigned and settled in Texas in 1836. He volunteered as a private in her armies soon after the battle of San Jacinto. His merit soon raised him from the ranks, and he was appointed senior Brigadier-General, and succeeded General Houston in the command of the Texan army. In 1838 he was appointed Texan Secretary of War, and in 1839 organized an expedition against the hostile Cherokees, in which he routed them completely in a battle on the river Neches. He warmly advocated the annexation of Texas to the United States, and after this union was effected, he took part in the Mexican war. His services at the siege of Monterey drew upon him the public favor and the thanks of General Butler. He continued in the army, and in 1857, was sent by President Buchanan as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army to subdue the Mormons. His successful advance in the Great Salt Lake City, and the skill and address with which he conducted a difficult enterprise, largely increased his fame. When the war commenced between the North and South, he was in California, but when he learned the progress of the revolution, he resigned his commission and set out from San Francisco, to penetrate by land to Richmond, a distance of two thousand three hundred miles.
The safe arrival of General Albert Sidney Johnston, within the lines of the Confederacy, was greeted with a degree of public acclamation hardly less enthusiastic than would have signalized the intelligence of a great victory. It was known that the Federal authorities, anxious to prevent so distinguished and valuable an accession to the generalship of the South, were intent upon his capture. For weeks popular expectation had been strained, in eager gaze, for tidings of the distinguished commander, who, beset by innumerable perils and obstacles, was making his way across the continent, not less eager to join his countrymen, than were they to feel the weight of his noble blade in the unequal combat.
Few of the eminent soldiers, who had sought service under the banners of the Confederacy, had a more brilliant record of actual service; and to the advantages of reputation, General Johnston added those graces and distinctions of person with which the imagination invests the ideal commander. He was considerably past middle age; his height exceeded six feet, his frame was large and sinewy; his every movement and posture indicated vigorous and athletic manhood. The general expression of his striking face was grave and composed, but inviting rather than austere.
The arrival of General Johnston in Richmond, early in September, was a source of peculiar congratulation to President Davis. Between these illustrious men had existed, for many years, an endearment, born of close association, common trials and triumphs, and mutual confidence, which rendered most auspicious their coöperation in the cause of Southern independence.
“Albert Sidney Johnston,” says Professor Bledsoe, in a recent publication, “who, take him all in all, was the simplest, bravest, grandest man we have ever known, once said to the present writer: ‘There is no measuring such a man as Davis;’ and this high tribute had a fitting counterpart in that which Davis paid Johnston, when discussing, in the Federal Senate, the Utah expedition. Said he … ‘I hold that the country is indebted to the administration for having selected the man who is at the head of the expedition; who, as a soldier, has not a superior in the army or out of it; and whose judgment, whose art, whose knowledge is equal to this or any other emergency; a man of such decision, such resolution that his country’s honor can never be tarnished in his hands; a man of such calmness, such kindness, that a deluded people can never suffer by harshness from him.’”
President Davis immediately tendered to General Johnston the command of one of the two grand military divisions of the Confederacy, and he as promptly repaired to the scene of his duties.
The general features of General Johnston’s policy contemplated a line of defense running from the Mississippi through the region immediately covering Nashville to Cumberland Gap – the key to the defense of East Tennessee and South-western Virginia, and thus to the most vital line of communication in the South. It is easy to conceive the large force requisite for so important and difficult a task, against the immense armies of Grant and Buell, numbering, in the aggregate, more than one hundred thousand men. Despite the earnest appeals of General Johnston, and notwithstanding that upon the successful maintenance of his position depended the successful defense of the entire southern and south-western sections of the Confederacy, his force, at the last of January, 1862, did not exceed twenty-six thousand men. Informed of his perilous situation, the Confederate Government could do no more than second the appeals and remonstrances of General Johnston. Slight accessions were made to his force from the States which were menaced, but, as results speedily demonstrated, he was unable to meet the enemy with an adequate force at any one of the vital points of his defensive line.
In the immediate front of General Johnston’s position was the army of Buell, estimated at forty thousand men, which, during the entire winter, was in training for its meditated advance along the line of the railroad in the direction of Nashville. Under Grant, at Cairo, was an army of more than fifty thousand men, which, in coöperation with a formidable naval force, was designed to operate against Nashville, and, by securing possession of the line of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, to hold Kentucky and West Tennessee. General Johnston’s position was indeed a cruel dilemma, and was sufficiently explained in a letter to President Davis, representing the inadequacy of his force, for either front of attack, upon a line whose every point demanded ample defense. Only a self-denying patriotism could have induced General Johnston to occupy his false position before the public, which accredited to him an army ample even for aggressive warfare. With an almost certain prospect of disaster, he nevertheless resolved to make the supreme effort which alone could avert it.
“General Miles observed, interrogatively, that it was reported that John C. Calhoun had made much money by speculations, or favoring the speculations of his friends, connected with this work (the Rip-Raps, near Fortress Monroe).
“In a moment Mr. Davis started to his feet, betraying much indignation by his excited manner and flushed cheek. It was a transfiguration of friendly emotion. The feeble and wasted invalid and prisoner, suddenly forgetting his bonds – forgetting his debility, and ablaze with eloquent anger against this injustice to the memory of one he loved and reverenced. Mr. Calhoun, he said, lived a whole atmosphere above any sordid or dishonest thought – was of a nature to which even a mean act was impossible. It was said in every Northern paper that he (Mr. Davis) had carried with him five millions in gold when quitting Richmond – money pilfered from the treasury of the Confederate States; and that there was just as much truth in that as in these imputations against Calhoun… Calhoun was a statesman, a philosopher, in the true sense of that grossly-abused term – an enthusiast of perfect liberty in representative and governmental action.” —Prison Life of Jefferson Davis. Library edition, pages 206, 207.
South Carolina, December 20, 1860.
Florida, January 7, 1861.
Mississippi, January 9, 1861.
Alabama, January 11, 1861.
Georgia, January 20, 1861.
Louisiana, January 26, 1861.
Texas, February 1, 1861.
“He was received with an outburst of enthusiasm. A suite of handsome apartments had been provided for him at the Spotswood Hotel, until arrangements could be made for supplying him with more elegant and suitable accommodations. Over the hotel, and from the various windows of the guests, waved numerous Confederate flags, and the rooms destined for his use were gorgeously draped in the Confederate colors. In honor of his arrival, almost every house in the city was decorated with the ‘Stars and Bars.’
“An elegant residence for the use of Mr. Davis was soon procured. It was situated in the western part of the city, on a hill, overlooking a landscape of romantic beauty. This establishment was luxuriantly furnished, and there Mr. and Mrs. Davis dispensed the elegant hospitalities for which they were ever distinguished. Mrs. Davis is a tall, commanding figure, with dark hair, eyes and complexion, and strongly-marked expression, which lies chiefly in the mouth. With firmly-set yet flexible lips, there is indicated much energy of purpose and will, but beautifully softened by the usually sad expression of her dark, earnest eyes. Her manners are kind, graceful, easy, and affable, and her receptions were characterized by the dignity and suavity which should very properly distinguish the drawing room entertainments of the Chief Magistrate of a Republic.”